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About Google Book Search Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at |http : //books . google . com/| THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW: DEFENSE OP ITS PRINCIPLES, WITH CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE FROM THE WORKS OP MANY EMINENT .AMERICAN STATESMEN. BY WILLIAM HARRISON CLARKE. SECOND EDITION — REVISED. OflSces are public trusts, not private »j>o\\s.—DanU>l Webster. No people have a higher public interest, except the preservation of their liberties, than intecjity in the administration of their government in all its branches.— ZT*. 3. Supreme Court. \ ' NEW YORK : ^ CHARLES T. DILLINGHAM, 718 & 720 Broadway. 1891. , ^f3S_ Copyright, 1891, hy William 1L Clarke. The Lovejoy Co., Electrottpbrs, 444 & 446 Pearl St., New York. From the Press of P. F. MoBeeen, 61 Beekman St, New York. PREFACE. The improvements in the revised edition of this work consist in an Appendix, a new Index, the addition of fresh matter to about thirty pages of the Introduction and various chapters, and the correction of a few errors. The Appendix possesses much historical value, for it contains pertinent quotations from the works of many contemporary and recent statesmen not quoted in the body of the book. The warning of Storey and Washington (pages 225, 226) concern- ing the dangers of party spirit, should be read and heeded by every American, Parties, when they strive solely for principle, are the hfe of a nation ; but when they strive solely for pelf, patronage, and power, they are its death. Even corrupt party leaders may destroy a republic ; sometimes even ambitious leaders may do so. Did a nation ever make a narrower escape than did our own during the slaveholders' rebeUion ? Who but ambitious party leaders caused that rebellion ? Some truthful words concerning the crime of buying and selling votes have been added to page 52. This evil cannot be too soon remedied. Voters slK)uld be educated up to a higher standard. The American who acknowledges any man as his political "boss," at the polls or elsewhere, disgraces the name American. Independent voting and an educational test for voters are what is wanted. The man who can- not botli read and write the English language, should not be allowed to vote. This would supersede the necessity for the so-called Force Bill, for the rule would apply to blacks as well as whites. A few words concerning the crime of business men neglecting to vote would be an important supplement to page 52. The subject of civil service reform is still one of the greatest issues of the day. The Christian Register (Boston) truly says : " We are yet on the threshold of this the most important reformation in America/n political history.'''' Other newspapers have testified to the same effect, extracts from a few of which appear on page 240. There is much work yet to be done. But the outlook is hopefuL If civil service reformers are as vigilant in the future as they have been in the past, ultimate victory is assured. A people who have the intelligence to discover their mistakes and the courage to correct them, Me capable of self-government ; otherwise they are not Some allowance should be made for the harsh words concerning Mr. Van Buren (pages 76-79), as they were uttered in the heat of debate. Nbw Yoek, May, 1891. PREFACE TO FIRST The chief object of this work is to defend the principles of the Civil Service Law. It is not a criticism of the law, nor docs it treat to anj great extent of civil service economy as such, except in so far as the subject is expounded incidentally* but with ability and in the aggrep^ate with great success, by many American statesmen, extracts from whose works embellish and enrich its pages. These extracts in fact constitute a great part of the civil service history and literature of the country, particularly its early history and literature, and therefore constitute much of the value of this volume. This is well, and is besides oppor- tune, for the subject of civil service reform is one of the greatest issues of the day, and too much light cannot be shed upon it A work that even aids in elucidating such an important subject ought to be accepui- ble ; indeed it appears to be one of the needs of the times. The fact that one chapter of the work is mostly devoted to corruption at elections and remedial election laws, only adds to its value, for the subject is not only collateral but of great importance, of as great importance perhaps as civil service reform itself. Whatever may be said of the original parts of the volume, the compiled parts are certainly both useful and instructive reading, and ought to aid in elevating and purifying American politics. The importance of a sound civil service policy was never bettor illus- trated perhaps than by the New York Times, when criticising, in 1864, Senator Sumner's civil service bill It said the subject was second in importance only to the cnishing of the then rebellion. The Times was then under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry J. Raymond, a states- man and one of the best known editors of his day. I am indebted to Mr. George William Curtis, the President of the National Civil Service Reform League, for valuable suggestions and encouragement to persevere in my researches, and also to the Astor Library for the use of many books. Other obh'gations are acknowl- edged here and there throughout the vohime. This work, it should be understood, refers to the naiioncU civil ser- vice law. The civil service laws of New York and Massachusetts are patterned after the national law, but of course contain provisions pe- culiar to themselves. W. H. C. New York, July, 1888. CONTENTS. PAGE INTRODUCTION— History of Civil Service Legislation, Summary of the salient points of the Civil Service Law, experiences of Chief Examiners, number of persons examined yearly, &c. - 7 CHAPTER I. FRTJITS AND FACTS. The law promotes Education, Efficiency, Economy. — Its chief Ob- ject — ^Its Constitutionality. — In harmony with the Teachings of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay. — Aids instead of Hampers the President, who makes his own Rules for its Execution - - 17 CHAPTER II. COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS. Their Utility proved by trial by Probation, examinations for Pro- motion, contrasts with non-Competitive Examinations, &c. — Appointees independent of Politicians. — Educational require- ments. — Opinions and Experiences of practical men, &c. - 26 CHAPTER III. SOME OF THE LAW'S PROMISES. Reforms of Priceless value Probable. — The danger of Bribery at Elections. — Opinions thereon of Messrs. Buchanan, Harrison, Benton, Jefferson, Barton, Bell, and Graves. — The chief English Election laws from 1275 to 1883 38 CHAPTER IV. THE PATRONAGE AND MERIT SYSTEMS COMPARED. The superiority of the Merit System shown by various Contrasts. — Picture of an extraordinary Officeseeking Drama (page 58). — How the President and Congressmen are harassed by Office- seekers. — Congressman Kleiner's Experience - - - 53 VI CONTENTS. CHAPTER V. DANGER OF AN OFFICEHOLDERS' ARISTOCRACY, p^^j. The importance of the Subject. — The Cause of and Remedy for Aristocracies. — No danger in Life Tenures when based on Merit. — George William Curtis's Opinion of them. — Insolence of Office. — G-reat Depravity of the Roman Aristocracy (note) - 61 CHAPTER VI. THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM. Its practicability only Apparent — Jackson versus Jackson. — Prob- able causes of his Radical Change. — Marcy's femous Speech and humorous Letter to Buchanan. — Lincoln versus Lincx)ln. — His overweening Ambition. — The Spoils Doctrine undemocratic and ruinous. — Appalling Corruption at Washington after the Civil War. — ^The Civil Service Law a Rock to build upon - 71 CHAPTER VII. LEADING STATESMEN'S PRINCIPLES. The Merit System both Preached and Practiced by the six first Presidents. — Powerful blows at the Patronage System. — A pro- found Disquisition on its Evils by WiUiam Paley of England. — Justice Wilson on Patronage and Official Appointments - - 91 CHAPTER VIII. THE POWER OF REMOVAL. A remedy for its Mistakes and Abuses. — The Power discussed in the first Congress (1789). — The Decision then made criticised by Benton, Webster, and others. — The 4- Years' Term Law - 112 CHAPTER IX. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY. Its Utility. — The Civil Service Systems of England, Canada, British India, Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, and China - - 177 APPENDIX — Letters to the Albany Evening Journal; words of warning from Storey and Washington ; extracts from Bishop Potter's Centennial Address ; Civil Service Statute - - 195 INDEX 233 PUBLIC OPINION 240 INTRODUCTION. Thb Civil Sebvice Law was passed January 16, 1883. The bill was drawn by Dorman B. Eaton of New York, as Chairman of the Committee on Legislation of the New York Civil Service Reform Association.* The law was preceded by two other laws, namely. Sec- tions 164 and 1753 of the United States Revised Stat- utes (printed on page 23). Sec. 164 was passed March 3, 1853 ; Sec. 1753 March 3, 1871. The latter was originated by Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois. The civil service law bill was preceded by three other bills, all of which failed to pass Congress. The first was introduced, in 1864, by Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, whose only recorded words are (Cong. Globe, 1864, p. 1985) : " The object of the bill is to provide a competitive system of examination in the civil service of the United States. ^^ The bill, a good founda- tion only on which to build, may be found in Sumner^s Works, vol. viii, p. 452. The bill, owing perhaps to the pressure of other business, never came up for dis- cussion by the Senate. The second bill, which was . wider in its scope than Mr. Sumner's, was introduced, in 1865, by Representative Thomas Allen Jenckes of Rhode Island, and again, with improvements, in 1866. Mr. Jenckes advocated his bill ably, argumentatively, ♦ For an account of Senator Pendleton's connection with the biU, see pages 216, 217. VIU VARIOUS CIVIL SERVICE BILLS. and earnestly during several sessions of Congress.* The third bill was introduced, in 1869, by Senator Schurz of Missouri. \[t gave the President the option of select- ing from among the men who passed the Board, or of ordering men of his own selection before it, and re- quired five and eight year terms of office. The object of the five-year term was to prevent such appointments from being made during the year of the inauguration of the President. The idea was, as explained by Mr. Schurz^ that appointments, as a rule, should not be made until the administration was well settled down to business. Senator Schurz^s bill required a year of pro- bationary service, Representative Jenckes^s six months. Both required competitive examinations. Other civil service bills have been introduced at different times by Senators Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, George F. Edmunds of Vermont, and B. Gratz Brown of Missouri, and Representatives John A. Kasson of Iowa, Albert S. Willis of Kentucky, and Thomas M. Bayne of Pennsyl- vania. It is noteworthy in this connection that Representa- tive Samuel Brenton of Indiana, on August 11, 1852, offered an amendment to a resolution proposing to in- crease the pay of civil service clerks in Washington, the concluding part of which is as follows (Congressional Globe, vol. xxiv, pt. 3, p. 2189): "No removals shall be made except for incompetency, or cause shown to the satisfaction of the President of the United States. And in the selection of said clerks, they shall, as far as * The New York Independent, in criticising the first edition of this work, says : " The only correction we have to suggest to the historical part of the book is that Thomas A. Jenckes deserves more credit for the fiist steps to which he forced a reluctant Congress than is accorded to him." The criticism ia well taken. Mr. Jenckes's works are liis best monument, however. Words are empty things in comparison. THE LAWS CHIEF PROVISIONS. IX practicable^ be taken from the several States and Terri- tories in proportion to the number of Senators, Repre- sentatives, and Delegates from each in the Thirty-third Congress/' This is practically the same, so far as it goes, as the civil service law. Mr. Brenton said his object was to secure permanency, to prevent sectionalism in the se- lection of clerks, and to "break down party spirit as much as possible.'' The provisions of the civil service law concerning ex- aminations are : It provides that in any State or Terri- tory " where there are persons to be examined,'' at least two examinations shall be held each year, and in such places " as to make it reasonably convenient and inex- pensive for applicants to attend before them." It pro- vides that the examiners, " not less than three," shall be chosen from among United States officials* "resid- ing in said State or Territory." It requires the Com- missioners to make regulations for examinations and annual reports of their proceedings, with such sugges- tions as in their judgment will result in improving the service ; and it authorizes them to make investigations concerning all matters "in respect to the execution of this act." It requires that selections for office shall be from among the three competitors graded highest in the examinations. It forbids favoritism in examina- tions, and exempts officeholders from either political assessments or services, and makes a violation of either ♦ This is required not only in the interest of economy but to secure examiners who wre &miliar with the real needs of the offices for which applicants are examined. The examiners receive no extra compeusation. (Third An, Rept, p. 43.) Yet many persons favor the employmeut of paid examinera — experts in their respective lines. Common-sense ex- aminers are what are needed, whether paid or not paid — men who will not injure the cause by asking irrelevant questions. A few do so. X THE EFFICACY OF THE NEW RULES. provision a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or impris- onment or both, and the new rules (adopted February 2, 1888) require that a violation of the latter provision shall be followed by dismission from the service. It exempts from examination — {a) One private secretary, or one confidential clerk, of the head of each classified department, and of each assistant secretary thereof; and also of each head of bureau appointed by the Presi- dent by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (b) Direct custodians of money, for whose fidelity an- other oflScer is under oflScial bond ; but this exception shall not include any oflScer below the grade of assistant cashier or assistant teller, (c) Disbursing officers who give bonds, (d) Persons employed exclusively in the secret service of the government, (e) Chief clerks. (/) Chiefs of divisions." Other exceptions are : Deputy collectors who do not also act as inspectors, examiners, or clerks ; otherwise not ; cashier, assistant cashier, and auditor of the collector ; chief acting disbursing officer ; deputy naval officers ; deputy surveyors ; assistant post- masters, and superintendents, custodians of money, stamps, stamped envelopes, or postal-cards, who are designated as such by the Postoffice Department. It provides for non-competitive examinations when com- petent persons do not compete, and for several other cogent and justifiable reasons. As said on page 27, competitors must answer 70 per cent, of the questions asked, except ex-soldiers and sailors, who are required to answer but 65, the old standard. Competitive exam- inations for promotion are compulsory, except for ex- soldiers and sailors, and the widows and orphans of deceased soldiers and sailors. These also receive pref- erence in case of a reduction of force in any branch of the classified service. All who attain an average of 75 per cent, are eligible to promotion. The education EDUCATION, AGE LIMITS, ETC. XI required in examinations for ordinary oflSces embraces common-school studies only, and in many cases only a few of these. As to the age at which a person may be examined, in the Customs Department clerks and mes- sengers must be 20 years old ; all others 21. In the Postal Department clerks must be 18 years old ; mes- sengers, stampers, and junior clerks must not be under 16 or over 45 ; carriers not under 21 or over 40 ; all others not under 18 or over 45. Soldiers and sailors may be examined on the written consent of the Secre- tary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. * Other important provisions of the law are : It de- clares that its oflScials shall not "coerce the political action of any person or body, or interfere with any election,'' and dismission is the penalty of a violation of the provision. It forbids any questions as to an ap- plicant's political or religious opinions, and when such opinions are known, any discrimination on account of them. Further, it requires its officials to .discounte- nance the disclosure of such opinions. And again dis- mission is the penalty. It forbids the appointment to office of persons who habitually use intoxicating liquors to excess. It limits the number of members of the same family who may hold office in the grades covered by it. It forbids its three Commissioners, "not more than two of; whom shall be adherents of the same par- ty," from holding any other office under the United States. It authorizes the President to remove any Com- missioner. An appointing officer may, if he deems it for the good of the service, object in writing to making an appointment, and refer the matter to the Commis- sion for investigation. No eligible person can be cer- ♦For further information about competitive examinations, and also- some facts about trial by probation, as well as a few other fiicts perti- nent to the above summary, see Chapter II (page 26). Ill BUSINESS MEN FOR POSTMASTERS. tified for appointment more than three times. When necessary, transfers may be made from one department to another. There are four branches of the classified tjivil service, namely, the departmental, the customs, the postal, and the railway mail service. (For the civil service statute itself, see page 228.) Such is a summary of the chief features of the law and its rules and regulations. The whole is certainly a good foundation on which to build a sound civil ser- vice system. This is proved by experience, for the sys- tem is working as satisfactorily as could be expected under the circumstances. The law should be increased in scope till all postmasters, employes of the internal revenue service, mints, &c., come within its provisions, with the necessary exceptions of course. Postmasters tshould be removed only for good cause known to the Postmaster-General or President, or at the request of a majority of the business men of their place of office.* Further, where it is practicable to hold promotion ex- aminations, vacant postmasterships as well as subordi- ^^ ■ I ■ ■ ■ .- ^ M - ■ ^ ■ ■ I - - „ * Complaints on account of partisan postmasters are not new. As early as 1848 Postmaster- General Cave Johnson said (Appendix to Cong. Grlobe, Dec. 2, 1848, p. 30): "There has been for some years past a strong feeling pervading the country that tlie system (the Postoffice Department) had been conducted * * * with the view of promoting party purposes and party organization, rather than the business and so- cial interests it was created to advance — ^that the offices were bestowed as tJie reward of partisan services, rather than from the merit and qual- ifications of those selected. * * * The postoffice system was designed for business purposes, * * * and should be in nowise connected with the party politics of the day." As a remedy, Mr. Johnson proposed that "the Postmaster-Greneral be nominated by the President to the Senate for a specific term of years ; be separated from the Cabinet, and only removable by impeachment ; and the appointment of the principal subordinate officers, for a like term of years, be given to him ; and to provide that no removal should be made except for good and sufficient cause, to be reported to each session of the Senate." MR. WEBSTER'S 22 YEARS' EXPERIENCE. XIU nate positions should be filled by the person standing the best test. The selection of postmasters under the civil service law system would of course require special rules and regulations, just as the other departments do. The politics of a postmaster is about as important to a citizen as the politics of the fireman who extinguishes a fire in his house. There are now about 3,000 postmas- ters drawing $1,000 or over a year, who have for this reason to be confirmed by the Senate. In twenty years more the number will probably be 5,000. It is impos- sible for the Senate to confirm this great number prop- erly and attend to other business at the same time. This is one of many good reasons why postmasterships should be brought under civil service law rules. The law seems to be working satisfactorily. Chief Examiner Wm. H. Webster of the national service, who has held office in Washington for 22 years, and, like the late Mr. Windom, is ^^able to judge by comparison of the two systems ^^ (see page 213) writing (Dec. 1, 1890) in answer to questions propounded by myself, says : " With few exceptions, the applicants are of good character, and I believe tlie morale of the employ^ lias already been much improved by the merit system. In a vast majority of cases the intelligence of the appointees under this system is of a higher order than that of those appointed under the old system. However, it may be well to state in tliis connection that the intelligence of the applicants varies considerably according to the different sections of the Union from which they come. The small percentage of appointees " dropped at the end of the probationary period " proves that the appointees pos- sess practical ability. Great injustice is sometimes done civil service appointees and the merit system itself by comparing tlie service ren- dered by these newly-made clerks with that of men appointed under the old system — men who have had the benefit of an extended ex- perience in the public service, and many of whom have gradually become efficient clerks by lapse of time and at the expense of the government The proportion of the qualified applicants who were- appointed for the year ended June 30, 1890, was: Departmental XIV MR. SHEBWIN'S EXPERIENCE AND OPINIONS. sen'ice, about 26 per cent; customs service, nearly 20 per cent; postal and railway mail services, about 45. These percentages are general averages of all the kinds of examination given in each branch of the service. The proportion of appointments varies of course for the different examinations in any branch of the service. In the de- partmental service, for instance, a much larger proportion of those who pass technical examinations — stenc^raphy, type-writing, specials for the Patent and Pension oflBces, &c. — ^are appointed than of those who pass derk or copyist examinations. In this connection it may be proper to stieite that the number of applicants has not been in- creased by the application of the civil service rules, cliarges by certain spoilsmen to the contrary notwithstanding. Applicants for positions not included under the rules, especially for consulships, are much more numerous than for those under the rules. I have no personal knowledge that the examinations have aided any one in securing private work ; but it seems reasonable tlmt they should do so. But I do know that complaints are made that the government is competing too strongly with private industries. The Commission has been in- formed by certain business men that one government department has been taking the most valuable employes in their establishments, and that they found it impossible to retain an efficient force in conse- quence. I do not think that failure to obtain public employment is more discouraging or demoralizing than &ilure to obtain private em- ployment Non-competitive examinations amount to nothing so £Eir as the great object of the civil service law is concerned." Chief Examiner Henry Sherwin of the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission says (Nov. 18, 1890) : "The general intelligence of our applicants is as good as that of persons seeking private employment in similar positions. This is especially true of our police and fire departments. The latter also excel in physique, proportion, strength, and agility. Of course there is a diference in applicants, as tliere is in school children. About a third of those examined fail to get the required 65 per cent A great majority of those who pass examinations show practical ability, in- terest in their work, sobriety, and good deportment in every way. The dismissals for cause are fewer in proportion than under the old rules. A few persons have received private employment in conse- quence of having passed examinations. I thirk there would be more if it were generally known that the Commission is willing to oblige the public in this way. Some eligibles have had their names stricken MR. PHILLIPS'S EXPERIENCE AND OPINIONS. XV from the list because their employers, rather than lose their services, have increased their pay. I do not see how failure to obtain public employment can possibly be so discouraging or demoralizing as fiulure to obtain private employment It may be a little disheartening to a person who is certified, and not chosen; but it certainly cannot b^ 80 demoralizing as seeking private employment now, when the per- son who does so finds nearly every place for which he thinks he is fitted occupied, and does not always receive a courteous answer from the person to whom he appUes. A majority of those who qualify in examinations know that their chances of appointment are small, as others have higher ratings. £ut they have the proud satisfaction of knowing that they have passed absolute tests, and that tliis fact is a recommendation to them. I think competitive examinations are far superior to non-competitive, and my instructions from the Commission are to hold them whenever it can be done, the wishes of some appoint- ing officers to the contrary notwithstanding. But the latter are often held because the offices are so poorly paid that men will not com- pete for them. Two suggestions occur to me. 1. N'o person who deserves dishonorable dismissal should be allowed to resign, whether charges have been preferred against him or not "When dismissed, he should be placed in such a position that he cannot appear again as an applicant and thus plague a civil service commission. 2. Every discharge from the classified service should be accompanied by a writ- ten statement, signed by the person making it, stating explicitly the cause of tlie same, a copy of which should be filed with the Civil Service Commission." Mr. Lee Phillips, Secretary and Executive Officer of the New York City Civil Service Board, says (Dec. 1, 1890) : " The character and general intelligence of the applicants is very fiur indeed. So far as I know, the appointees, with rare exceptions, show practical ability. I attribute this to the fact that our examin- ations are very practical. . About 40 per cent of the qualified appli- cants receive appointment I know of several instances where per- sons have obtained private employment through having their names upon our eligible lists. It is not uncommon fop private individuals to write to me requesting the names of such persons. Failure to obtain public employment is not, in my opinion, any more discouraging or demoralizing than failure to obtain private employment Experi- ence leads me to prefer competitive to non-competitive examinations." XVI CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROGRESS. Mr. "Wm. Potts, ex-Chief Examiner of New York, reports, among other things, that a civil engineer of a leading railroad company re- quested a copy of a list of 16 civil engineers who had passed an examination, with a view of filling a position on the staff of that road. In the national service the number of persons examined in 1883 was 3,542; in 1884, 6,347; 1885, 7,602; from January 16, 1886, to June 30, 1887, 15,852; July 1, 1887, to June 30, 1888, 11,281; July 1, 1888, to June 30, 1889, 19,060; July 1, 1889, to Juue 30, 1890, 22,994— total, 86,678. Of the 13,947 who passed in 1889-1890, the education was: common school, 11,594; college, 1.479; business col- lege, 874. 38,608 women have passed examinations since January 16, 1886. 20,060 appointments were made prior to June 30, 1890. Nm 7. State. ^884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 Total. Examined - - - *683 4,822 4,007 5,517 4,832 4,719 4,896 29.476 Passed 612 3,629 3,158 3,974 3,032 3,761 3,455 2L621 Appointed - - - 435 2,725 2,036 2,693 2,674 2,162 2,322 14,992 New Y. City. Examined - - - 200 2,409 1,927 2,490 2,397 3,139 2,110 tl4,672 Passed 158 2,143 1,653 1,949 1,791 2,545 1,661 11,910 Appointed--- 98 1,148 1,216 1,411 1,524 1,278 912 7,587 MassachiLsetta. Examined - - - — 1,292 1,035 1,433 1,505 1,483 1,572 8,320 Passed — 958 791 • 938 1,014 1,016 1,044 5,761 Appointed - - - — 188 355 403 523 471 451 2,391 In New York 156* appointees were war veterans; average age about 31 ;* education about 90 per cent common school. In Massa- chusetts 226 appointees were veterans (appointed without examina- tion), and about 4 per cent were women ; education about 98 per cent cc-zimon school; average age about 34. The 8,320 examinations are exclusive of the Boston and Cambridge labor services, about 1,500 men, who are registered and, after inquiry as to character, &c., certi- fied for employment One of the best features of this ' labor service ' is that the men, when wanted, are notified by mail No time is lost The system, which now includes mechanics as well as laborers, should be applied to all large cities. It seems to be about perfect Mayor Hugh O'Brien of Boston says (speech in 1885): "I can cer- tainly testify that it has been a great relief to the city of Boston that the Civil Service Commission has taken care of the laboring population. No men have been more abused than the laborers. They have been made the tools of political tricksters ; and with civil service reform enforced they are no longer in the hands of political tricksters." * Exclusive of cities, f Only 1,848 of which were non-competitive. THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW. CHAPTEE I. FRUITS AND FACTS. The law promotes Education, Efficiency, Economy. — Its chief Object — Its Constitutionality. — In harmony with the Teachings of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay. — Aids instead of Hampers the President. The Civil Service Law, judged by its fruits, is a useful and successful reformatory measure. Its fruits or reforms are necessarily limited in number, for it ap- plies to only about a fifth of the subordinate and non- political public oflSces. But notwithstanding this fact, it has made a good beginning in reforming the patron- age system of distributing offices, and it promises well for the future. One of its best reforms is the relief of officeholders from compulsory political assessments. Another is the making of subordinate official tenures coequal with efficiency and fidelity, instead of their depending on the politics of chief officials. It has also greatly relieved the President, the Cabinet,* Congress- men, and customs, postoffice, and other officials of the annoying and sometimes embarrassing burdens of office- seeking. The National Civil Service Commission, and also the State Commissions of New York and Massa- chusetts, have received encouraging reports of the util- ity of the system from nearly every city wherein it has been fairly tritd. The New York Commissioners say ♦See Secretary Windom's testimony, pages 213, 214. 18 INSPIRED BY GENIUS OF OUR INSTITUTIONS. (Second Report, p. 34) : " Higher grade employes, better service, reduction in the number employed, and large economy in expenditure are among the prominent results already partially realized." The law is certainly in harmony with the spirit of the times, for it both promotes and encourages educa- tion.* Mr. Everett P. Wheeler truly says : " So far from its being opposed to the genius of our institutions, it is inspired by that genius." Another good feature of the law is that it is, like all laws should be, non- partisan in its character, having been originated by the best known men of both the Democratic and Republi- can parties. It makes no distinction on account of sex. The provision which requires that examinations for and appointments to office shall be controlled by separate sets of officials, these by a third set (the Civil Service Commissioners), and the Commissioners by the Presi- dent, is certainly a wise one, for, like the government's legislative, executive, and judicial officials, one set checks as well as aids the other. For example, appoint- ing officers are required to keep records of removals, * Mr. Henry Sherwin, chief examiner of the Massachusetts Civil Ser- vice Commission, says (Third Annual Report, p. 11) : "It may be said truthfully that, in their way, civil service examinations form a part of a general educational system. The demands made upon applicants vary in accordance with the pk>sitions for which they are examined. A first examination has shown many of them their various deficiencies, and they have been stimulated to bring their education up to the required standard. In many cases this has been done with the help of friends, but more frequently by attendance at the evening schools which are maintained in many of the cities of the Commonwealth." Many other Americans have made similar testimonials to the above, and Sir Charles Trevelyan and many other Englishmen have testified that the English civil service law has the same effect in England, Can- ada, Australia, British India, &c. To print even a synopsis of so many similar testimonials is certainly superfluous. PUBUC BUSINESS THE SAME AS PBIYATE. 19 rejections, resignations, transfers, and the name and residence of persons selected for trial by probation. This enables the Commissioners to check either unjust removals or rejections after trial by probation. The chief object of the law is the application of the common-sense principles of private business to public business. Public and private business may differ more or less in detail, and even in mode of performance, yet their fundamental principles are the same.* For exam- ple, the violation of certain rules will be followed by more or less injury, while the violation of certain others will be followed sooner or later by insolvency. One of these principles or rules is the retention in employment of efficient and honest men. Another is the removal of either inefficient or dishonest men. The foregoing being universally admitted facts, it is therefore self-evident that, the services rendered being satisfactory, and the exigencies of business permitting, the tenure of service of subordinate public employes, like that of private em- ployes, should be during efficient and faithful service, which service should be rewarded, when practicable, by promotion and a reasonable increase of pay. In private business the removal of efficient and faithful employes to make room for untned men, who might prove to be * The oft-repeated maxim that the public serrice should be conducted on business principles, means that accuracy, promptitude, honesty, econ- omy, and efficiency are as essential in public as in private affairs ; but the methods of securing these qualities cannot be exactly the same. The merchant has a direct personal and pecuniary interest in his private affairs which leads him to make a careful selection of his employes ; but in the public service there must be substituted some more compli- cated agency in the form of laws, regulations, reports, and inspections. — OoL. Silas W. Burt. Tho very men who advocate the ppoils system for public business, iwould call a man a fool if he proposed the same system for private business. — Thomas H. Benton. 20 BEASONABLB WAGES PBOMOTE HONESTY. both inefficient and unfaithful, is deemed the hight of folly. Is it any less so in public business ? Do railroad or telegraph companies injure their business by chang- ing their employes every time they change their presi- dents? Further, reasonable wages and employment during satisfactory service tend to promote honesty. Will not an accountant or weigher, public or private, who learns that he is to be superseded, be tempted to do wrong ? The law itself is new, but its principles are as old as the government, if not in fact as old as civilization. The fact that its principles are in exact conformity with both the principles and practices of the founders of the government, is a good if not perhaps the best argument that can be made in favor of its constitutionality, for it is not reasonable that the founders of the government would both preach and practice doctrine that is in vio- lation of the Constitution.* The law is certainly not unconstitutional. It in effect simply authorizes the President to appoint commissioners to aid him in dis- charging his constitutional functions. The President's powers are therefore really increased, not, as charged by the opponents of the law, diminished. Thus, instead of hampering the President, the law materially increases his facilities for transacting business ; and the increase of facilities is not greater than the increase of business. ♦Daniel Webster says (iv, 196, 198): "I think the legislature pos- sesses the power of regulating the condition, duration, qualification, and tenure of office in all cases where the Constitution has made no express provision on the subject. » * * If Congress were to declare by law that the Attorney-General or the Secretaiy of State should hold his office during good behavior, I am not aware of any ground on which such a law could be held unconstitutional. A provision of that kind might be unwise, but I do not perceive that it would transcend the power of Congress." PEEBIDENT MADISON'S VIEWS. 21 Further, SO far as the President is concerned, the en- forcement of the law is optional instead of compulsory. In fact he can nullify it by merely refusing to enforce it. Thus everything is practically left to the President. This is precisely what the Constitution says Congress may do. Art. II., Sec. 4, says " the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the' heads of departments." This is the modest, not to say timid, way in which the Congress of 1883 sought "to regulate and improve" a small part of the national civil service. But here is the way in which President Madison, one of the framers* of the Constitution itself, says he would proceed (iv, 385) : " The right of suffrage, the rule of apportioning representation, and the mode of appointiiig to and re- moving from office, are fundamentals in a free govern- ment, and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. An unforeseen multiplication of offices may add a weight to the executive scale, disturbing the equilibrium of the government. I should therefore see with pleasure a guard against the evil, * * * eveyi by an amendment of the Constitution,'*^ Alexander Hamilton, another f ramer of the Constitu- tion, not only advocated principles but even proposed a * The opinions of the framers of the Constitution ought to have great "weight. William E. Gladstone says : " As the British Constitution is the most subtile organism which has proceeded from progressive his- tory, so the American Constitution is the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose pf man." If this does not increase the weight of the framers' opinions, what can ? But the Constitution needs revising. Jefferson says (iii, 106): " Every con- stitution and every law naturally expires at the end of every 34 years." Speaking of other omissions, he said he thought the Constitution ought to contain a provision for " the restriction of monopolies. '* (ii, 229.) 22 HAMILTON'S PLAN AND JAY'S PRACTICE. plan very similar to both the plan and fundamental prin- ciples of the civil service law. Indeed it may be said that the law is only an enlargement and improvement of his plan. His " select assembly " would have been, what the Civil Service Commissioners are to-day, a material aid to the President, if not in fact a sort of second Cabinet. He says (" The Federalist," p. 355) : " It will be agreed on all hands that the power of ap- pointment, in ordinary cases, can be properly modified only in one of three ways. It ought to be vested in a single man ; or in a select assembly of moderate num- ber ; or in a single man, with the concurrence of such an assembly." He deprecated "party bargains" (p. 356) as a mode of distributing offices, because " party victories " would " be more considered than the intrinsic merit of the candidate " or " the advancement of the service." The Federalist papers were intended by their authors — Hamilton, Madison, and Jay — to be explanations of the Constitution. So it is hardly necessary to say that Hamilton's plan is what he believed to be the Constitu- tion's plan. John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, did not, so far as I know, formulate any plan for or expatiate at length concerning the dis- tribution of offices. But his actions, when Governor of New York, in 1795, spoke louder than plans, or even the emphatic words he then used, for he refused to make removals on account of politics, notwithstanding Gov. Clinton's officeholders had bitterly opposed him, and his (Jay's) political friends "anticipated the spoils of victory."* (Life of Jay, i, 392.) When one of the * These words were written by William Jay, John Jay's son and biog- rapher, before the delivery of Senator Marcy's spoils doctrine speech. TWO OTHER CIVIL SERVICE LAWS. 23 council of four men that then confirmed nominations, advised the Governor to appoint a Federalist to office, on account of "his zeal and usefulness, ^^ he replied: " That, sir, is not the question. Is he fit for the office ?'' In his inaugural address he said (i, 389) : " To regard my fellow-citizens with an equal eye, to cherish and advance merit wherever found, * * * are obligations of which I perceive and acknowledge the full force. '^ The civil service law, so far as non-competitive ex- aminations are concerned, is not without precedent. Two other acts, namely, sections 164 and 1753 of the United States Bevised Statutes, provide as follows : § 164 No derk shall be appointed in any department, in [any] of the four classes above designated, until he has been examined and found qualified by a board of three examiners. § 1753. The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations for the admission of persons into the civil service of the United States as may best promote the efficiency thereof and ascertain the fitness of each candidate in respect to age, health, character, knowledge, and ability for the branch of service into which he seeks to enter ; and for this purpose he may employ suitable persons to conduct such inquiries, and may prescribe their duties and establish regulations for the conduct of persons who may receive appointments in tiie civil service. The civil service law is a careful elaboration and im- provement of sections 164 and 1753. Therefore one is about as unconstitutional as the other. But even if all were unconstitutional, the abuses they are designed to correct would have to be dealt with by some other law. The law not only seems to be constitutional, but it or a law similar to it seems to be expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.* It causes, it must be admit- * Art i, § 8, says : " The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shaU be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the fore- going powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the gov- ernment of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. " The United States Supreme Court says (106 U. S. Repts., 371): "With- 24 EMINENT LEGAL OPINIONS. ted, a radical change. Therefore it is not strange that it should meet with opposition, for doubt and distrust are the natural consequences of all radical governmen- tal changes. The Constitution itself was not an excep- tion to this rule, for it was voted down by two of the States,* and even some of its framers doubted its per- manent utility. Is it strange then that some men doubt the utility of the civil service law ? The Constitution requires that the President ** shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. ^^ In har- mony with and apparently in view of this fact, the civil in the legitimate scope of this grant Congress is permitted to determine for itself what is necessary and what is proper." In the practical application of government, the public functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers with which the people by the Constitution and laws have intrusted them. They must have a wide discretion as to the choice of means ; and the only limitation upon tlmt discretion would seem to be that the means are appropriate to the end. (Storey on Const., § 432.) The subjedt ts the execution of those great powers on which the wel- fare of the nation depends. * * * This could not be done by confin- ing the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any wliich might be appropriate and which were conducive to the end. (4 Wheaton, 415.) The question whether a statute is a valid exercise of legislative power is to be determined solely by reference to constitutional restraints and prohibitions. It may not be declared void because deemed to be op- posed to natural justice and equity. (74 New Tork Reports, 509.) The construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it, ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons. The officers concerned are usually able men and masters of the sulyect Not unfrequently they are the draughtsmen of the laws they are after- ward called upon to interpret. (113 United States Reports, 571.) * Rhode Island and North Carolina. George Bancroft says (His. of Const, ii, 350): "Neither of the two States which lingered behind re- monstrated against the establishment of a new government before their consent; nor did they ask the United States to wait for them. The worst that can be said of them is that they were late in arriving." HOW TO ADAPT LAWS TO THE PEOPLE. 25 service law authorizes the President to make his own rules for its execution, and requires the Commissioners to aid him, ^^as he may request/' in preparing them. As the rules are subject to such modifications as the President and his aids may find necessary, they ought in the course of time to become not only satisfactory as rules, but also important adjuncts to the law itself. This is well, for the law, which has not yet, except in certain places, had a fair trial, may have faults of both omission and commission, the exact nature of and rem- edy for which time only will determine.* Therefore, in the meantime, good rules will give it strength as well as facilitate its execution. The execution of the law, like the law itself, is simple, but it is laborious, for ex- aminations are held in nearly every State and Territory twice a year. ♦Sir Greorge Cornwall Lewis says ("Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics," i, 173): "A government is, by the nature of its action, constantly trying experiments upon the community. All new measures, all laws enacted for the first time, are in the nature of ex- periments. They are not indeed scientific experiments ; but they are experiments made for a practical purpose, and they are regarded merely tis provisional and tentative until experience has proved their fitness and they are confirmed by the proof of practical success. Being tried, not in corpore vili, but upon the lives and fortunes of the people, the con- duct of tlie experiment must be regulated by tiie nature of the subject upon which it is made. Hence the progress of such experiments is care- fully watched by tlie legislature, while the executive authorities proceed cautiously and gently with a new law, feehng their way as they advance, and exercising their discretion as to its more rapid or tardy advance- ment, either generally or in particular districts. It is by trying a new law on a people, as the maker of new apparel tits it on the body, and by enlarging here and diminishing there, where it does not suit tlie shape, that the legislature gradually adapts its work to tlie wants and feelings of the community. This is an experimental process, for tlie purpose, not of ascerfciining a general tnith, but of improving the institution, and of giving it tlie form best suited to the circumstances of the nation." 2 CHAPTEE II. COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS. Their Utility proved by trial by Probation, examinations for Promotion, contrasts with non-Competitive Examinations, &c — Appointees in- dependent of Politicians. — The education required. — Opinions and Experiences of practical men, &c. The competitive examinations, which may be called the backbone of the civil service law system, about which there is more or less complaint, are a simple mode of ascertaining the relative theoretical qualifica- tions of applicants for office, and of naming those who are entitled to trial by probation as to their practical qualifications before final appointment. The proceed- ings of the examiners are as impartial as are those of a court of justice, and " are open to such spectators as can be accommodated without interfering with the quiet due to those being examined." The examiners know the applicants and their respective papers by numbers, not by names.* There is therefore practically no reason for favoritism! on the part of the examiners, * Regulation 21. The examination papers of each applicant shall be marked only with a number, and his name with his number shall be placed in a sealed envelope, which shall not be opened until after his papers are marked. Regulation 86. Complaints which show injustice or unfairness on the part of any Examining Board, or any one acting under the Commission, or any error in marking, will be considered by the Commission, and if necessary it will revise the marking and grading on the papers, or order a new examination, or otherwise do justice in the premises. f It (the Commission) does not regard itself or the examiners as hav- HOW TO WJSED OUT IMPBACTIOABLB THEORISTS. 27 and consequently no reason for complaint on the part of the applicants. Applicants who answer seventy per cent, of the questions asked, except \eteran soldiers and sailors, who are required to answer but sixty -five, are eligible, when wanted, to trial by probation, without further examination. Those who do not, are eligible to try again in some future examination. The utility of competitive examinations is proved in many ways, but best perhaps by trial by probation. Trial by probation is for six months. It is the gover- nor, as it were, of the civil service law system. Its province is to correct an inherent fault of all theoretical examinations, namely, the indorsement now and then by the examiners of impracticable theorists. Experi- ence shows that, when tried by probation, less than two per cent, of the applicants who have passed competitive examinations fail of final appointment. What system could do better? The utility of the system is also proved by examinations for promotion among office- tog any more right to take into account requests, recommendations, or the wishes or sympathies of persons, however high in official and social standing, than a judge or jury has to depart from the law or the evi- dence by reason of such interposition. (Com'rs* Third An. Rept., p. 73.) The Postmaster-General has found the recommendations of persona for inspectors in the Postal service, who are not yet within the civil ser- vice examinations, to be so unreliable that he has been compelled ta resort to examinations to protect himself against fraud and incompe- tency. For the same reasons the Secretary of the Navy has enforced examinations for securing skilled workmen at the navy-yards. (Ibid., p. 60.) Applicants are required to file formal application papers. These are of themselves " a sort of preliminary examination," for they contain a record of the birth, age, education, physical condition, capacity for business, residence, &c., of each applicant. Besides this three reputable- persons must vouch for the applicant's character. In New York and Massachusetts the sponsors must certify their willingness that their cer- tificates may be published. This makes them careful "28 CIVIL AND MILITARY SERVICES COMPARED. holders themselves. The records in such cases are de- cidedly in favor of those who have passed competitive examinations as against those who have not. Examina- tions for promotion should receive careful attention, for sooner or later many chief officials may be chosen from among the subordinates who pass best in them. * The best feature perhaps of the competitive system is the entire independence of its appointees of politicians. How can public business be efficiently conducted if politicians practically appoint, control, and tax the men who conduct it? Under the competitive system ap- pointees win their positions by merit, and by merit only can they retain them or be promoted. The civil service law system of competitive examina- tions is similar to the system of choosing cadets to the military school at West Point,f that is when the latter is not made a matter of patronage, and it compares favorably with it in its results. The failures, in after life, among the cadets who graduate, like those who are tried by probation in the civil service, are less than two per cent. The cases are not strictly analogous, but * In 1860 a Parliamentary Committee of Investigation said that among the ends to be accomplished was the following : " To encourage industry and foster merit, by teaching all public servants to look for- ward to promotion according to their deserts, and to expect the highest prizes in the service if they can qualify themselves for them." (Eaton's " Civil Service in Great Britain," p. 220.) f The respective civil departments of the government being in effect schools of practical instruction, as in fact are all offices, vocations, and avocations, would it not be policy, when practicable, to make them, like West Point and Annapolis, schools of special theoretical instruction also ? In practical instruction, under the civil service law system, they are equal if not superior to either West Point or Annapolis. Such schools would produce diplomatists, financiers, soldiers, &c. All able- bodied public employes should be soldiers, for they not only belong to but are a part of the government itself. POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS OFFICIALS CHECKED. 29- educational tests are required in both, and trial by pro- bation also, it may be said, for the cadets are practically on trial for four years, during which time incompetent persons are weeded out by numerous examinations. Again, the examinations are a check on politically ambitious officeholders. For example, under the pat- ronage system the Collector of the Port of New York^ wishing to be Governor of the State of New York, can remove subordinate officials, with or witliout cause, to make room for his personal political supporters. Under the competitive or merit system he is checked in two ways. 1. While he has an unrestricted power of re- moval, it is dangerous to abuse it, for, as before said,, he has to furnish the Civil Service Commissioners with records of removals, rejections, &c. 2. He cannot make appointments to office, except in conjunction with other officials, with whom he has no connection, and then only such as have passed an examination. The examinations relieve the President of burdens of which Washington complained, even before his inau- guration as President. (** Writings," ix, 479.) As the public offices have increased about a hundredfold since Washington's day, it is self-evident that a proper exam- ination into the qualifications of all subordinate office- holders would occupy the time of at least fifty men,^ that is if the officeholders were changed every four years. Hence the enactment of sections 164 and 1753 of the United States Revised Statutes, and finally of the civil service law. The President and Cabinet now- adays are sometimes overworked in the performance of regular official duties. Those of the Secretary of the Treasury are sufficient for two men. The failure now and then of worthy and practical men to get appointments is no valid argument against the competitive system, for where there are so many 30 A BUSINESS SCHOOL-HOUSE (NOTE). applicants, the same thing will occur sometimes under any system. No system of course is perfect. But can any system do more than require applicants to prove both theoretical and practical ability before appoint- ment ? The question of satisfactory future service is always a problem, let the business be public or private, and must be taken for granted. Further, the failure of men who have passed creditable competitive exam- inations to get public employment is the means some- times of securing them private employment.* For ordinary purposes competitive examinations are superior to non-competitive in perhaps every respect ; further, it is far more creditable to an applicant to pass the former than the latter. The non-competitive ex- aminations held under Sec. 164 soon degenerated into a farce, the questions asked, according to J. D. Cox, consisting of such as the following: "How far is it to your boarding-house ?" Competitive examinations will probably never degenerate into a farce. The num- ber, vigilance, and jealousy (jealous of their rights) of competitors alone will prevent this, and will also tend to prevent favoritism on the part of appointing officers. President Grant denounced the non-competitive system in 1870, and John Stuart Mill says it "never, in the long run, does more than exclude absolute dunces.'' The competitive examinations, while not a guarantee of good character, are sometimes, but very rarely, the means of exposing bad character. Dorman B. Eaton, * See pages 14, 15, 16 of this work ; alsp U. S. Civil Serv. Com. Rpts. Note. — The McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. of Chicago say : "In reply to your queries, wo beg leave to say that we do not hold competitive examinations with our employes, either in the shops or in the field. "We have the school-house always ninning to educate them to our manner of doing business. "We promote the most worthy." The latter rule is the same as the civil servibo law rula THE ADVANTAGE OF BUSINESS EXPERIBNCX. 31 who speaks from experience, having been a Civil Ser- vice Commissioner, and having also studied the subject (civil service) in Europe, says (" The Spoils System and Civil Service Reform," p. (50) : " Every competitor has his chance of an appointment increased by every one he can strike from the list above him. If he can expose bad character in any person graded higher, that person will be no longer in his way. This interest leads to inquiry and exposure." But, Mr. Eaton might have added, this privilege is liable to abuse. * The claim that a collegiate education is necessary to pass a competitive examination is not sustained by the facts. As a rule about 86 per cent, of the appointees, as is shown in the Introduction, are from common schools and 16 from colleges. But it is true that some offices require proficiency in a greater number of studies than others, and that others again require special educa- tion. The fact that more or less knowledge of mathe- matics, grammar, geography, and a few other elemen- tary studies, is necessary to the proper discharge of general commercial and financial business is certainly indisputable, and it is no hardship for young men fresh from school to be examined in them. But with elderly men the case is different. It is not reasonable to expect them to describe the minute details of these studies after fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years of more or less disnse.f There is need of intelligent and practical ♦The Commissioners say (Third Annual Report) that out of more than 17,000 individual examinations, not more than six or sevei> un- worthy persons have been discovered on the records. " The * Records * are the books in which the names of applicants for examination are entered. The * Registers ' are the books in which the names of those found eligible for appointment after examination are entered." f The Commissioners* Report for 1886 says business experience is alxnost the exact equivalent of a fresh recollection of studies. 32 WASHINGTON, GALLATIN, JEFFERSON, EVERETT. discrimination here. In private business uneducated men do not apply for work which requires educated men. It would be useless. But in public business the case is different. This fact alone justifies competitive examinations. The requirement of educational qualifications on the part of officeholders is not new in this government, nor perhaps in any other. Washington says (" Writings,'* ix, 461) : " The nominator ought to be governed pri- marily by the abilities which are the most peculiarly adapted to the nature and duties of the office which is to be filled." In his last message to Congress Washing- ton recommended the establishment of both a Military School and a National University, the specific object of the latter to be, he said, " the education of our youth in the science of government. In a republic," he con- tinues, " what species of knowledge can be equally im- portant?" (Benton's Abridged Debates, ii, 16.) His admonition, in his Farewell Address, to promote " the general diffusion of knowledge" is familiar to every school-boy. Albert Gallatin, writing to Jefferson, in 1801, said : " So far as respects subordinate offices, talent and integ- rity are to be the only qualifications." Jefferson, in re- ply, said : " Talent and worth alone are to be inquired into." (Adams's Gallatin, p. 279.) Edward Everett, in an address on " The importance of Education in a Republic," says (" Orations," &c., ii, 319, 320): "But I have not yet named all the civil duties for which education is needed as the preparatory discipline. The various official trusts in society are to be filled, from a Commission of the Peace to the place of Chief Justice ; from a Constable up to the President of the United States. The sphere of duty of some of these functionaries is narrow ; of others, large and in- EDUCATION CONGBNIAL WITH REPUBLICANISM. 33 express! bly responsible ; of none, insignificant. Taken together, they make up the administration of free gov- ernment — the greatest merely temporal interest of civil- ized man. There are three courses, between which we must choose. We must have officers unqualified for their duties ; or we must educate a privileged class to monopolize the honors and emoluments of place ; or we must establish such a system of general education as will furnish a supply of well-informed, intelligent, and respectable citizens, in every part of the country and in every walk of life, capable of discharging the trusts which the people may devolve upon them. The topic is of great compass, but I cannot dwell upon it. It is superfluous to say which of the three courses is most congenial with the spirit of republicanism." Similar citations might be made from many other statesmen, but they are certainly superfluous. Some statesmen's deeds speak louder than words ; as, for ex- ample, Governor Samuel J. Tilden's late posthumous gift for educational purposes. The New York Civil Service Commission says (Second Report, 1885, p. 20) : " The competitive method is sup- ported by reasons so obvious and cogent that argument in its favor seems almost supei-fluous. Competition is the law of nature, and is universal in its application. It prevails in every department of human activity, and is the test by which men are measured in every profession, calling, and sphere. It is the only absolutely democratic rule, and therefore consonant with the spirit of our in- stitutions, founded on the political equality of men. By eliminating the elements of favoritism, nepotism, and partisan recompense, it stimulates manly aspirations, develops independence in thought and character, pro- tects the equal rights of every citizen, and secures fair play against selfishness and presumptuous mediocrity." 34 COMPETITIVE EXAMIXATIONS IN IRELAND. Again the Commission says (Same Report, p. 24) : "It is rapidly becoming clear that the system of com- petitive examinations is easily applicable to almost every subordinate post, however high, in every branch of the public service, State or municipal. In Ireland the four national examiners of the public schools are selected by competitive examination, and a note of the subjects for examination gives an idea of the varied scientific and scholarly attainments in which the applicants must be versed." And again the Commission says (Fourth Report, 1887, p. 26) : " One advantage of the competitive system, on which stress has been laid by a Professor of Trinity College, Dublin, is in its avoidance of animosities aris- ing from religious differences, which, he remarked some thirty years ago, * are greatly embittered by the patron- age system.' " Mayor Seth Low of Brooklyn, New York, in 1885, said of the competitive system : " There is a fairness and openness about it peculiarly American, and smacking of all that is best in the American love of fair play and the American demand for equal treatment of all citizens." Governor David B. Hill says (An. Message, 1886) : " Open competition rests on the solid basis of equal rights and fair play, and is a principle so thoroughly democratic in its character, so completely in harmony with the theory of our institutions and the spirit of our people, that the method would seem to commend itself to universal approval. When merit alone, ascertained by fair competition, is recognized as the ground of ap- pointment and promotion, the equity and propriety of the mode are self-evident and require no defense. * * * It is besides a constant stimulus to the better education and training of the people, and a recognition of the utility of our common schools, sustained at the public GOOD EFFECT OP THE PROBATIONABY TERM. 35 expense, and an incentive for the best men to seek the public service." Collector William H. Robertson, writing Dec. 8, 1883, says (First Rept. New York C. S. Com., p. 266) : " For several years the civil service system has been in force in the Custom House at this Port, and the results are highly gratifying to its friends. The appointments are made upon competitive examination wherever it is prac- ticable to do so. No wiser or safer rule could be de- vised for filling these offices." Postmaster Henry G. Pearson of New York, who also believes in the wisdom of competitive tests, says (Same Report, p. 271) ; "I do not desire, however, to be understood as maintaining that the syston of ap- pointment through competitive examination is a never- failing means of securing the services of none but the most efficient and deserving for the performance of the public business. In spite of all precautions, it is and has been possible for idle, intemperate, dishonest, and careless persons to obtain employment under that sys- tem. But the cases have been rare in which those defects have not been discovered before the expiration of the six months' term of probation, and the unfaithful or incompetent servant dismissed." Silas W. Burt, who speaks from experience as Naval Officer of the Port of New York and also Chief Exam- iner of the New York Civil Service Commission, says (Second Rept. N. Y. C. S. Com., p. 47) : " Open compe- tition gives the broadest scope of choice, determines with substantial accuracy the relative fitness of all who apply, and puts on record all the transactions, with their details." As early as 1881, two years before the passage of the civil service law, the New York Chamber of Commerce, whose members' business connection with Custom House 36 N. Y. CHAMBER COMMERCE, WEBSTER, GODKIN. officials makes them eminently qualified to judge of their merits, passed the following among other resolutions : Mesolvedy That in the judgment of this Chamber the system of examinations for appointment to place in the Custom House, which has ruled during the last few years, has been of substantial value to the mercantile community, and is, in their eyes, of great importance. Mesolved, That this Chamber hereby instructs its Committee on Foreign Commerce and the Revenue Laws to wait upon the new Collector, when he shall be installed, with a copy of these resolutions, and to press upon his attention the importance of their subject- matter. The following maxim of Webster is similar in princi- ple to competitive examinations (iii, 4) : " Nothing is more unfounded than the notion that any man has a right to an office. This must depend on the choice of others, and consequently on the opinions of others, in relation to his fitness and qualification for office." Edwin L. Godkin says (" Danger of an Officeholding Aristocracy," p. 14) : " It may be laid down as one of the maxims of the administrative art, that no public officer can ever take the right view of his office, or of his relation to the people whom he serves, who feels that he has owed his appointment to any qualification but his fitness, or holds it by any tenure but that of faithful performance. No code of rules can take the place of this feeling. No shortening of the term can take its place." So far as my researches go, Commissioner of Patents S. S. Fisher has the honor of being the first person to practice the system of competitive examinations in this country. He began them in 1869, and his example was followed by most if not all of his successors in the FISHER AND THOMAS AS PIONEERS. 37 Patent Office. Colonel Fisher, who was a well-known patent lawyer, accepted office more to accommodate President Grant than anything else. But as his profes- sion was more remunerative than his office, he resigned at the end of eighteen months. John L. Thomas, Collector of the Port of Baltimore, instituted, in 1869, strict non-competitive examinations in the Baltimore Custom House. The system was so satisfactory that his two successors in office continued it. When Mr. Thomas was again appointed Collector, in 1877, he found that all the clerks, with three or four exceptions, whom he had appointed between 1869 and 1873 had been retained ; and when he left the office, in 1882, they were still there. (Senate Report No. 576, for' 1882, pp. 179, 182.) Silas W. Burt instituted competitive examinations for promotion among the employes in the New York Naval Office in 1871. This was on his own responsibil- ity. In 1 872 he began competitive examinations under the Grant rules for general admission to the service. In the same year Postmaster Patrick H. Jones began competitive examinations in the New York Postoffice. These were continued by his successor in office, Thomas L. James, in 1873. In 1879 Mr. James improved the system, and issued " Rules governing appointment and promotion in the New York Postoffice." Collector Chester A. Arthur, who was appointed in 1871, introduced radical changes in the New York Cus- tom House. Mr. Eaton says (" Term and Tenure of Office," p. 82) that in five years Mr. Arthur made only 144 removals as against 1,678 during the preceding live years. Mr. Arthur advocated as well as practiced re- form in the civil service, as is shown in Chapter VII of this work. CHAPTEE III. SOME OF THE LAW'S PROMISES. Reforms of priceless value Probable. — The danger of Bribery at Elec- tions. — Opinions thereon of Messrs. Buchanan, Harrison, Benton, Jefferson, Barton, Bell, and Graves. — The chief English Election Laws from 1276 to 1883. An honest and intelligent enforcement of the civil service law promises to have numerous beneficial effects, some of which are more or less indirect. This is nat- ural. A good law not only aids in and leads to other reforms, but is sometimes the parent of other good laws. Further, it creates a general spirit of reform. It promises, by securing the services of men of busi- ness as well as intellectual ability, to materially in- crease, if not double, the efficiency of the civil service. In fact this has been partly accomplished already. In- crease of efficiency will naturally lead to perfection of system, and perfection of system will naturally lead to economy. Are efficiency and system probable, or, in a great degree, even possible, when officeholders are ap- pointed chiefly on account of their politics, and without much if any regard to their ability to discharge the peculiar duties of their offices, and who, for obvious rea- sons, take more interest in politics than in their official business ? It promises to aid in purifying and elevating politics, and to thereby induce and encourage men of character and ability to take part in the affairs of state. It was by such men that the government was founded, and it HOW TO STBENGTHBN BEPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS. 39 is only by sach that it can be preserved. Henc^ the necessity of using any and every means to thwart the bold and violent men whom Franklin warned us would thrust themselves into our government and be our rulers. It has materially interfered with and promises to ruin what, for lack of a better name, may be called the office brokerage business, the stock in trade of which has heretofore consisted rather in the promise than the be- stowal of office. When there are fewer offices to either promise or bestow, the evil will be abated ; and when there are none at all, it will ceawe altogether. It promises to stimulate and lead men to vote for principle — principle, the pedestal on which the monu- ment of republican institutions rests! — principle, the life-blood of the body-politic! When men vote for principle, they vote to refresh, preserve, strengthen, deepen, broaden, and spread republican institutions. This is as unquestionable as is the opposite proposition that when they vote from purely selfish motives, they vote to undermine and weaken republican institutions, and to sooner or later put pirates in command of the ship of. state. From Alderman to President men should vote for principle. And voting for a man of principle is voting for principle. Officeholders themselves can now so vote, for, as before said, they are independent of politicians. This is well, because it is not only proper to so vote, but a respectful independence, even of office- holding itself, is both desirable and commendable. It promises to at least ameliorate an evil that threat- ens the most direful ultimate results, namely, bribery at elections. Even the amelioration of this body-politic cancer is a matter of importance, for in the course of time, with the aid of and in conjunction with other re- forms, it /nay be practically eradicated. The nation can 40 THE LAW AIDS ANOTHEB NEEDED REFORM. Stand the sporadic and local corruptions that are the bane of private as well as public business, but it cannot stand, as a republiCy the general, far-reaching, and mul- tiform evils that continual bribery at elections will cause. * If the cause of corruption at elections be removed, there will be no corruption. As official patronage, either direct or indirect, is a great if not perhaps the chief cause of corrupt elections, it logically follows that the less patronage there is, the less corruption there will be. Therefore if all, or nearly all, of the non-elective public offices were distributed strictly as rewards of merit, and without regard to politics, there would be far less cor- ruption at elections. This plan ought besides to mate- rially increase public interest in elections, in which of course too much care and interest cannot be taken. The civil service law will aid in accomplishing this reform ; and in this way it will tend to renew and strengthen public confidence not only in the fidelity and sacredness of the ballot, but in the stability of the gov- ernment itself. President Buchanan, writing to the Pittsburg Cen- tenary Celebration, in 1858, said (Reports Coms. H. of Rep., 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1859-60, v, -25) : " We have * Webster says (iv, 1 79, 1 SO) : " The principle of republican govern- ments, we are taught, is public virtue ; and whatever tends either to corrupt this principle, to debase it, or to weaken its force, tends, in the same degree, to the final overthrow of such governments. * » * Whenever personal, individual, or selfish motives influence the conduct of individuals on public questions, they affect the safety of the whole system. When these motives run deep and wide, and come in serious conflict with higher, purer, and more patriotic purposes, they greatly endanger that system ; and all will admit that, if they become general and overwhelming, so that all public principle is lost sight of, and every election becomes a mere scramble for office, the system inevitably must fall." VENALITY YEBSUS LIBEBTY. 41 never heard until within a recent period of the employ* ment of money to carry elections. Should this practice increase until the voters and their representatives in the State and National legislatures shall become infected, the fountain of the government will be poisoned at its source, and we must end, as history proves, in a military despotism. ♦ * * When the people become venal, there is a canker at the root of the tree of liberty which must cause it to wither and die." President Harrison, in 1841, in a circular prepared by his Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, said (Civil Ser- vice Refoim League Proceedings, 1885, p. 16) : "I will remove no incumbent ♦ * * who has faithfully and honestly acquitted himself of the duties of his office, except where such officer has been guilty of an active partisanship, ♦ ♦ * thereby bringing the patronage of the government in conflict with the freedom of elec- tions." (These words appear in Tyler^s inaugural also.) Senator Thomas H. Benton, in reporting, in 1826, on the " expediency of reducing the patronage of the Exec- utive," said (Appendix to Gales & Seaton's Debates in Congress, 1826, p. 137): "The power of patronage, unless checked, must go on increasing until Federal in- fluence will predominate in elections as completely as British influence predominates in the elections of Scot- land and Ireland. * * ♦ « Xhe President wants my vote, and I want his patronage. I will vote as he wishes, and he will give me the office I wish for.' What will this be but the government of one man ? and what is the government of one man but a monarchy ?" Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Governor Thomas McKean of Pennsylvania, in 1801, says (" Writings," iv, 350) : " The event of the election is still in dubio, A strong portion in the House of Representatives will prevent an election if they can. I rather believe they 42 PUBE ELECTIONS THE PILLLABS OF LIBEBTT. will not be able to do it, as there are six individuals of moderate character, any one of whom, coming over to the Republican vote, will make a ninth State. Till this is known, it is too soon for me to say what should be done in such atrocious cases as those you mention, of Federal officers obstructing the operation of the State governments. One thing I will say, that, as to the future, interference with elections, whether of the State or general government, by officers of the latter, should be deemed cause of removal, because the constitutional remedy by the elective principle becomes nothing, if it may be smothered by the enormous patronage of the general government. How far it may be practicable, prudent, or proper to look back, is too great a question to be decided but by the united wisdom of the whole administration when formed." Mr. Jefferson issued a circular to the officers of the government after his election, wherein he said he had **seen with dissatisfaction officers of the general gov- ernment taking, on various occasions, active parts in the election of public functionaries, whether of the general or State governments." He further said that an officer should "not attempt to influence the votes of others, nor to take any part in the business of electioneering, that being deemed inconsistent with the Constitution and his duties to it." Senator David Barton of Missouri says (Gales & Sea- ton's Debates, 1830, vol. vi, pt. i, p. 462) : " The free- dom and purity of elections are as essential to our liber- ties as the pillars to the dome they support." Representative John Bell of Tennessee (afterward United States Senator, and, in 1860, a prominent candi- date for the presidency), introduced, in 1837, " A bill to secure the freedom of elections." In the course of a most remarkable speech he said (G. & S.'s Debates, vol. SPOILS SYSTEM TOO DANGEBOUS EVEN FOB WAB. 43 xiii, pt. ii, pp. 1455, 1462, 1475, 1.478) : " I presume, sir, it will scarcely be denied that a large proportion of the officers of the Federal goverament, from the President down to the lowest grade of persons employed in its service, have interfered of late in all Federal elections, directly, openly, and industriously. * * * Offices and employments have been given as the wages of political profligacy — the rewards of hireling service in support of favorite candidates. * * * The abuse of patronage is the Pandora's box of our system. It is the original sin of our political condition, to which every other sin of the times may be fairly ascribed. * * * It is labor thrown away to pursue with research, however relent- less and penetrating, the authors of corruption in the public offices, while the prolific parent of all is permit- ted to survive. * * * It is * * * not so much the aggregate amount of patronage within the control of the government as it is the want of proper legal limita- tions and restrictions upon the use of it, in the hands of the Executive, which is to be dreaded and guarded against. All other dangers in the operation of the gov- ernment will wear out by time, and are of small moment in comparison with this of patronage. * * * If, in war between civilized nations, the spoils principle is regarded as too dangerous for the general safety of property and society, how much more dangerous and insufferable must such a principle be when applied to the contests for power between political parties in a free government ? " * * Mr. Bell quotes copiously from Euglish history. He says (p. 1472) that, in 1779, ** A Lord Lieutenant of a county, an officer appointed by the Grown, was detected in writing to his friends in the county of Southampton, urging them to give their support to his friend, who was also the government candidate for Parliament. When his conduct was brought before the House of Commons, and some of the letters which 44 A MEMORABLE PABUAMENTARY RESOLUTION. Representative Wm. J. Graves of Kentucky, speak* ing of Mr. Bell's freedom of elections bill, said (Same Debates, pp. 1517, 1518, 1525) : "In 1829 the attention of this nation was called to this subject, in the most sol- emn manner, by General Jackson, in his first inaugural address, in which he employs the following language : * The recent demonstrations of public sentiment inscribe on the list of executive duties, in characters too legible to be overlooked, the task of reform, which will require particularly the correction of abuses that have brought the patronage of the Federal government into conflict with the freedom of elections.' * * ♦ This was^ the precept of President Jackson when first elected. But, incredible to tell, in the first term of his administration he hurled from office between nine hundred and one thousand officers. * * * Just as well might General Jackson march the regular army to the doors of this capitol, and demand the head of every member or Sen- ator who has dared to speak the truth of him, as to he had written exhibited, Lord North ventured to say that he thought the case presented no great cause of alarm. Instantly, and it would appear from all sides of the House, there arose such indignant clamors that it was some time before order could be restored, and Lord North was obliged to explain and qualify his meaning. But the most decisive proof of the spirit which prevailed upon the subject, even in corrupt times, and the odium in which all intermeddling of officeholders in elec- tions has ever been held in Great Britain, is to be found in the follow- ing resolution, which the House of Commons adopted on that occasion (1779), without a division, and without a dissenting voice: " * Resolved, That it is highly criminal for any minister or ministers, or any other servant of the Crown in Great Britain, directly or indi* rectly to make use of the power of his office in order to influence thd election of members of Parliament; and that an attempt to exercise that influence is an attack upon the dignity, the honor, and the inde- pendence of Parliament, an infringement of the rights and liberties of the people, and an attempt to sap the basis of our free and happy Con- stitution.' " MB. CUBTIS FOBMULATES CIVIL SEBVICE BULES. 45 wreak his vengeance, or that of some unprincipled sub- altern, upon the helpless officer, by hurling him from his station, for daring to discharge his constitutional right at the polls. Yes, a thousand limes better would it be for the country, for in the one case the people would see and understand the object of the movement, and would fly to the rescue, and deal out vengeance on such a blood-thirsty despot ; whilst in the other case the same object is attained by the concentration of all power in the hands of one man, but in a secret, sly, and insin- uating mode, which it seems the acuteness of the public vision has not yet so clearly discerned." George William Curtis lays down the following fun- damental principles for the general guidance of office- holders ("Harper's Weekly," Nov. 19, 1887): "When a man accepts public office he necessarily surrenders the exercise of certain private rights as a citizen. He is morally bound to promote public respect for the office that he holds and personal confidence in himself. He is bound in every proper way to prevent all suspicion that be misuses his position either for a personal or a partisan object. He is indeed a member of a party, and by a party he is nominated and elected. But he administers his office not for the benefit of a party, but of the peo- ple ; and while upon fitting occasions and in a becoming manner he may justly profess his confidence in the po- litical principles that he holds, he cannot without gross impropriety descend to the mere details of party conten- tion, and endeavor by the weight of his official position to promote the interest of individual party candidates." As before said, too much care and interest cannot be taken in elections. The recognition of this fact no doubt accounts, to a great extent, for the wonderful stability of the English government, a stability that has carried it through war after war, civil as well as foreign. 46 ANCIENT ELECTION LAWS. and even revolutions. The following extracts from the chief election laws passed by that government show the jealous care with which it has guarded, defended, and perfected its elective franchise system. Every act was passed for the purpose of remedying dangerous evils. In 1276 (3 Edward I) it was provided : " And be- cause elections ought to be free, the King commandeth upon great forfeiture, that no man by force of arms, nor by malice or menacing, shall disturb any to make free elections." (The Statutes : Revised Edition, i, 16.) In 1429 (8 Henry VI, 7) Parliament passed the fol- lowing law : " Item, whereas the elections of knights of shires to come to the Parliaments of our Lord the King, in many counties of the realm of England, have now of late been made by very great, outrageous, and excessive number of people dwelling within the same counties of the realm of England, of the which most part was of people of small substance, and of no value, whereof every of them pretended a voice equivalent, as to such elections to be made, with the most worthy knights and esquires, dwelling within the same counties, whereby manslaughters, riots, batteries, and divisions among the gentlemen, and other people of the same counties, shall very likely rise and be, unless convenient and due rem- edy be provided in this behalf ; our Lord the King^ considering the premises, hath provided, ordained, and established, by authority of this present Parliament, That the knights of the shires to be chosen within the same realm of England to come to the Parliaments of our Lord the King hereafter to be holden, shall be chosen in every county of the realm of England by peo- ple dwelling and resident in the same counties, whereof every one of them shall have free land or tenement to the value of 40 shillings by the year at the least above all charges ; and that they which shall be so chose shall PENALTY FOR FALSE ELECTION RETURNS. 47 be dwelling and resident within the same counties ; and such as have the greatest number of them that may expend 40 shillings by year and above, as afore is said, shall be returned by the sheriffs of every county, knights for the Parliament, by indentures sealed be- tween the said sheriffs and the said choosers so to be made/' * * * (Ruffhead's Stat, at Large, i, 481.) In 1444 (23 Henry VI), owing to sheriffs returning " knights, citizens, and burgesses * * ♦ which were never duly chosen," and other fraudulent practices, a stringent law was passed, which, among other things, imposed a fine of £100 to the King and £100 to the aggrieved person for false election returns. In 1690 (2 William and Mary, 7) Parliament passed " An act to declare the right and freedom of election of members to serve in Parliament for the Cinque Ports" as follows : " Whereas the election of members to serve in Parliament ought to be free ; and whereas the late Lord Wardens of the Cinque Ports have pretended unto, and claimed as of right, a power of nominating and recommending to each of the said Cinque Ports, the two ancient towns, and their respective members, one person whom they ought to elect to serve as a baron or member of Parliament for such respective port, an- cient town, or member, contrary to the ancient usage, right, and freedom of elections, ♦ * * be it therefore declared * ♦ * that all such nominations or recom- mendations were and are contrary to the laws and con- stitutions of this realm, and for the future shall be so deemed and construed." (Ruffhead, Ac, iii, 422.) . In 1696* (7 and 8 William III, 4) Parliament passed * T. B. Macaulay, writing of this period, S'lys (" History of England,'* IV, 549) : " It was something new and monstrous to see a trader from Lombard street, who had no tie to the soil of our island, and whose 48 MONEY IN ELECTIONS IN SIXTEEN NINETY-SIX. " An act for preventing charge and expense in elec- tions of members to serve in Parliament " as follows : " Whereas grievous complaints are made * ♦ * of undue elections of members to Parliament, by excessive and exorbitant expenses, contrary to the laws, and * * * dishonorable, and may be destructive to the constitu* tion of Parliaments, * * * be it enacted * ♦ * that no person or persons hereafter to be elected to serve in Parliament, * * * shall * * * directly or indirectly give, present, or allow to any person or persons, having voice or vote in such election, any money, meat, drink, entertainment, or provision * * * to or for such person or persons * * * in order to be elected, or for being elected, to serve in Parliament. * * * And * * * that every person and persons so giving * * * are hereby declared and enacted disabled and incapacitated, upon such election, to serve in Parlia- ment." (Ruffhead, iii, 570.) During the same year Parliament passed " An act for the further regulating elections of members to serve in Parliament, and for the preventing irregular proceed- ings of sheriffs and other officers in the electing and returning such members." The preamble charges that " freeholders and others, in their right of election, as also the persons by them elected to be their representa- wealth was entirely personal and movable, post down to Devonshire or Sussex with a portmanteau full of guineas, offer himself as a candidate for a borough in opposition to a neighboring gentleman, whose ances- tors had been regularly returned ever since the Wars of the Roses, and come in at the head of the poll. Yet even this was not the worst. More than one seat in Parliament, it was said, had been bought and sold over a dish of coffee at Garraway's. The purchaser had not been required even to go through the form of showing himself to the elec- tors. Without leaving his counting house in Cheapside, he had been chosen to represent a place which he had never seen. Such things were intolerable." HEAVY PENALTY FOR CORRUPT VOTING. 49 lives, have heretofore been greatly injared and abused." (iii, 589.) In 1729 (2 George II, 24) Parliament passed " An act for the more effectual preventing bribery and corrup- tion in the elections of members to serve in Parliament." The elector's oath is as follows : " I, A. B., do swear * * * I have not received, * * * directly or indirectly, any sum or sums of money, office, place, or employment, gift or reward * * * in order to give my vote at this election, and that I have not been before polled at this election." The presiding officer had to administer the oath or forfeit £50, and a bribed voter forfeited £500, and was forever disfranchised and treated as if he " was naturally dead." (v, 510.) In 1*734 (7 George II, 16) a stringent act was passed " for the better regulating the election of members to serve in the House of Commons for that part of Great Britain called Scotland ; and for incapacitating the judges of the Court of Session, Court of Justiciary, and barons of the Court of Exchequer, in Scotland, to be elected or to sit or vote as members of the House of Commons." (v, 651.) " An act for regulating the quartering of soldiers during the time of the elections of members to serve in Parliament," passed in 1735, required that, inasmuch as " all elections ought to be free," all soldiers should be removed two miles from the place of election, (v, 681.) By " An act for the better regulating of elections," Ac, passed in 1746 (19 George II, 28), voters are re- quired to swear that they Iiave '* a freehold estate * * * of the clear yearly value of forty shillings, * * * and that such freehold estate has not been granted or made to you fraudulently, on purpose to qualify you to give your vote." (vi, 312.) In 1782 (22 George III, 41) Parliament passed "An 3 50 FOBTT THOUSAND VOTEBS DISFRANCHISED. act for the better securing the freedom of elections," Legislature appointed a President of one of the banks from the ranks of one of the friends of this adminis* tration, and several other officers.*' 82 MRS. MABCY VERSUS MR. MARCT. him what he thought of Mr. Madison's statement. In a letter dated May 4, 1886, he said : '* Mr. Marcy, as I understood, did not renounce the doctrine of the spoils, but merely regretted the blunt, impolitic words in which he expressed the same. He was simply too honest a man to alter or recall his words. My impression is that he lived and died a spoilsman." The word spoils, if not military, is frequently used by military men. Therefore its use by the soldier- statesman Marcy was perhaps only the result of habit. Here is an example of his use of military figures of speech (Curtis's ** Life of James Buchanan," ii, 36) : ** This little battery has kept up a brisk fire for you. * * * For want of experience you do not know the potency of such an adversary. An enemy in' the camp is more dangerous than one outside of it." Here are three military figures of speech in almost as many lines. "This little battery," which was "an enemy in the camp," was Mrs, Marcy y and the gentleman in whose behalf she "kept up a brisk fire," and to whom Mr. Marcy was writing, was James Buchanan, a bachelor y and Mr. Marcy* 8 rival for the then coming Democratic presidential nomination of 1852. The letter is as hu- morons as it is kind and noble. In the political lottery of 1862-53 Governor Marcy drew the prize of Secretary of State, and it is note- worthy that he told Mr. Buchanan some months after accepting the ofiice that, on account of officeseekers and Cabinet Councils, " he had not been able to devote one single hour together to hb proper ofiicial duties." (ii, 81.) So his change of mind, if it came at all, must have come late in life. Senator Marcy was not the first person to distinguish himself during the Jackson administration by making pointed and figurative spoils doctrine speeches. Gover- ANOTHER SPOILS DOCTRINE SPEECH. 83 nor John Eeynolds of Illinois relates the following by William Kinney of Illinois (^^ My Own Times/' p. 185) : " Gk>v. Kinney had been to the city of Washington at the inauguration of Qeu. Jackson, and had considerable agency at the Federal city in the proscription visited on the Whigs of Illinois. It was said he remarked that the Whigs should be whipped out of office like dogs out of a meat-house." * On page 199 Gov. Eeynolds says (inaugural address) : " My official care and patronage shall not be exclusively bestowed upon a few men, and on a particular section of the State, and proscribe the balance. Proscription for opinion's sake is, in my opinion, the worst enemy to a republic It is the birtliright of every freeman to express his political sentiments frankly and freely at the polls of an election, or elsewhere, without the hope of reward or the fear of punishment" President Lincoln, like President Jackson, preached one thing and practiced another. His administration, so far as political parties are concerned, is therefore par- allel with and an offset to President Jackson^s. Writing to Congressman John T. Stuart of Illinois, on Dec. 17, 1840, he said (Century Magazine, Jan., 1887, p. 377) : " This affair of appointments to office is very annoying — more so to you than to me doubtless. I am, as you know, opposed to removals to make places for our friends." Lincoln, however, unlike Jackson, removed practic- ally all of the officeholders. Of course he was justified in removing all who were disloyal. With these excep- tions, he seems to have regretted his course and to have had his early convictions confirmed by experience. In 1865, pointing toward a group of officeseekers, he said : '^ Behold this spectacle ! We have conquered the re- bellion ; but here is a greater danger to the country * As Gov. Reynolds merely says " G-ov. Kinney," I wrote to the Chi- cago Historical Society and asked when Mr. Kinney was Governor of Illinois. In reply Secretary Albert D. Hager said : " ' Governor Kinney of Illinois ' is a myth. On Dec. 6, 1826, at the time Ninian Edwards. was inaugurated Governor of Illinois, Wm. Kinney of St. Clair county was histalled Lieutenant Governor, and held the position till Dec. 9, 1830." 84 LAMON'S DARK PICTURE OF LINCOLN. than was the rebellion/' Senator Sumner vouched for these words to Senator Schurz. Again, shortly before the fall of Kichmond, Lincoln left Washington for City Point, Va., partly, he said, to be near the important military operations then in progress and partly to get away from the officeseekers. To the then Gen. Schurz, speaking of officeseeking, he said: ^'I am afraid that thing is going to ruin republican government." And again. Ward H. Lamon says Lincoln said that if ever the government was overthrown, it would be caused by " the voracious desire of office — this wriggle to live with- out toil, from which I am not free myself. ''* * With Lincoln officeseeking was a disease. Lamon says (" Life of Lincoln," pp. 237, 481, 483): "There is no instance where an important office seemed to be within his reach and he did not try to get it * * * Notwithstanding his overweening ambition, he had not a particle of sym- pathy with the great mass of his fellow-citizens who were engaged in similar scrambles for place. VSThen a candidate himself, he thought the whole canvass ought to be conducted with reference to his success. He would say to a man, ' Your continuance in the field injures me,' and be quite sure he had given a perfect reason for his withdrawal He did nothing out of mere gratitude, and forgot the devotion of his warmest partisans as soon as the occasion for their services was past "What they did for him was quietly appropriated as the reward of superior mer- it, calling for no return in kind. * * * It was seldom that he praised anybody ; and when he did, it was not a rival or an equal in the strug- gle for popularity and power. No one knew better how to ' damn with feint praise,' or to divide the glory of another by being the first and frankest to acknowledge it His encomiums were sometimes mere strat- agems to catch the applause he pretended to bestow. * * * Fully alive to tlie feet that no qualities of a public man are so charming to the people as simplicity and candor, he made simplicity and candor the mask of deep feelings carefully concealed and subtle plans studiously vailed from all eyes but one." Leonard Swett says ("Hemdon's Lincoln," iii, 533, 534, 537): "In dealing with men he was a trimmer, and such a trimmer the world lias never seen. Halifax, who was great in his day as a trimmer, would blush by tlie side of Lincoln ; yet Lincoln never trimmed in principles ; SWETT AND TRUMBULL CORROBORATE LAMON. 85 A few more words as to the patronage system. The doctrine that to the victors belong the spoils, which, as before said, was first practiced nationally in this country by President Jackson, has probably had its day. If it has, it is well. Like the doctrine itself, spoils is a bad word. It is synonymous with robbery, pillage, destruction ! It is suggestive of the days of it was only in his conduct with men. He used the patronage of his of- fice to feed the hunger of various factions. * * * He used every force to the best possible advantage. He never wasted anything, and would always give more to his enemies than he would to his friends : and the reason was because he never had anjrthing to spare, and in the close calculation of attaching the factions to him, he counted upon the ab- stract affection of his friends as an element to be offset against some gift with which he must appease his enemies. Hence there was always some truth in the charge of his friends that he failed to reciprocate their devotion with his favors. * * * Adhesion was what lie wanted ; if he got it gratuitously, he never wasted his substance paying for it " One great pxiblic mistake of his character, as generally received and acquiesced in, is that he is considered by the people of this country as a frank, guileless, and unsophisticated man. There never was a greater mistake. Beneath a smooth surface of caiidor and apparent declaration of all his thoughts and feelings, he exercised the most exalted tact and the wisest discrimination. He handled and moved men remotely as we do pieces upon a chess-board. He retained through life all the friends he ever had, and he made the wrath of his enemies to praise liim. This was not by cunning and intrigue, in the low acceptation of the term, but by far-seeing reason and discernment. He always told enough only of his plans and purposes to induce the belief that he had communicated all ; yet he reserved enough to have communicated nothing. He told all that was unimportant with a gush'ng frankness ; yet no man ever kept his real purposes closer, or penetrated the future further with his deep designs." Lyman Trumbull, in a letter of Oct. 1, 1890, says: "I entirely agree in their (Lamon and Swett's) statements as to the ambition, shrewdness, cunning, and reticence of Mr. Lincoln ; but I am not prepared to say that he was the trimmer Mr. Swett describes him to have been." * * * David Davis says that Lincoln was the most reticent, secretive man he ever knew. Herndon describes his ambition aa overflowing, restless. He says Swett's letter makes the Lincoln historical picture more life-like. All of the five men were Lincoln's personal as well as political fdeiada. 86 A SPOILS PANDEMONIUM Nero. It is akin to barbarism, not to civilization. It is adapted to war and a description of war times, not to peace. If Americans, when talking about public offices^ would stop to think of the exact meaning of this word, it would no longer mar our political vocabulary. In private life what chance of success would a man have who, when he applied for employment, talked about the spoils of private business ? Of course he would have none. Then why should such a man have a chance .in public life ? Is not the spoils system as unreasonable, reprehensible, and ruinous in public as in private busi- ness ? If it is, then is it not undemocratic ? And being undemocratic, does it not logically follow that it is un- American ? If a system is wrong, is not the true rem- edy the application of a precisely opposite system ? Is not the civil service law system the precise opposite of the patronage system ? If it is, then is it not both demo- cratic and American ? But some people say it is neither. Can this be possible ? If Washington, the Adamses, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Franklin, Jay, Hamilton, Gallatin, Quincy, and the many other statesmen and pa- triots whose words of wisdom are quoted in this volume, are not specimen democrats and Americans, who are ? We now come to a period in the history of the gov- ernment when the patronage system reached its natural and legitimate conclusion — a spoils pandemonium. It began under Lincoln and reached its hight apparently under Johnson. Johnson, though hampered by the Senate,* made, directly and indirectly, many removals. * Lyman Trumbull says : " Johnson did not have it in his power to make removals. When he attempted it, his nominations were almost invariably rejected by the Senate, unless the nominee was the favorite and had secured in advance the assurance of support of Senators who had sought to convict the President of high crimes and misdemeanors. Hence most of Johnson's appointments were really dictated by his po- Utica} adversaries." Compare with Cox's remarks, pages 116, 116. DESCRIBED BT JACOB D. COX. 87 Bat some of his appointments were caused by resigna- tions instead of removals. The resignations were caused by dissatisfaction with President Johnson's change of policy ; for after his war passions cooled down, he chose to stand, as it were, almost between rather than on the side of either the Republican or Democratic party. And thus was this iron-willed and tried Union man enabled, despite the intense turmoil and strife of the times, and despite his naturally combative nature, to pursue a comparatively conservative course till the passions of the people had also cooled down. Person- ally Andrew Johnson was incorruptible ; but the cor- ruption among officeseekers during his administration, and for some years afterward, caused as much perhaps by the demoralization of the unparalleled civil war that had just closed as by the then run -mad patronage sys- tem, and aggravated by the complications of reconstruc- tion and the President's quarrel with and impeachment by Congress, was simply appalling. Much documen- tary evidence might be cited, but the testimony of one person will suffice. Jacob D. Cox, a distinguished Union soldier, who was a State Senator in Ohio before the war, Governor of Ohio after the war (1866), and Secretary of the Interior in 1869, says (" North Ameri- can Review," 1871, pp. 87, 88) : " During Mr. Johnson's administration * * * a con- dition of things existed which rivals the most corrupt era that can be found in the history of any nation. Men were known to offer $5,000 for the influence which might secure an appointment to a ganger's situation in the revenue service, where $1,500 was the limit of the pay that could be honestly earned, and when it was morally certain that the advent of a new administration would terminate the employment within a year. This is 88 FBANKUN'S WARNING VOICE. simply a type of similar transactions extending through many grades of the public service." Speaking of the duplicity used to obtain ** an appoint- ment from one end of the Avenue and a confirmation from the other," Mr. Cox says (p. 87) : ** In many instances two wholly separate sets of recom- mendations were procured, one proving that the appli- cant was a faithful supporter of the President, the other proving him an utter despiser of the presidential policy. More than this, it may be easily proven that one or the other party was often cognizant of the fraud perpetra- ted, and the partisans of either side congratulated each other that an appointment or a confirmation had been procured by which the other party was completely cheated. * * * It was a game of * diamond cut diamond,' in which the two parties were using all the resources and refinements of intrigue to get the start of the other in the control of the offices."* The spoils doctrine has done more perhaps to corrupt * Benjanjin Franklin, addressing the Constitutional Convention of 1787 on the subject of salaries, seems to have had a prevision of the scenes above described. He said (** Franklin's Works,'* v, 146): "Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence in the affairs of men. These are * ambition ' and * avarice ' — the love of power and the love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting men to action ; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before such men a post of * honor,' that shall at the same time be a place of * profit,* and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. * * ♦ And of what kind are the men who will strive for this profitable pre- eminence ? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your govern- ment and be your rulers." THE EVILS OF SPOILS SCHEMES INSIDIOUS. S9 American politics than all other causes combined. Its «vils, which are reflected in the darkest pages of the world's history, are insidious. This fact has just been well illustrated, for what did the general public know, at the time, of the corruption described by Mr. Cox? Again, who but the principals and their accomplices would know of the corruption of New York's fugitive (1884) Aldermen, if the facts had not been published? Further, spoils and insidious spoils schemes are not con- "fined to public business. Many are private, or semi- private ; such, for example, as the numerous " rings " and monopolies throughout the country, the corruption of many of which has been exposed by newspapers dur- ing the past twenty-five years. But, as before said, this bad doctrine, which for full :fifty years hung over the nation like the black clouds that precede as well as attend the coming storm, but no blacker than the picture of partisan patronage just por- trayed, has probably had its day. And again, as before said, if it has, it is well, for fifty years more of such corruption would imperil the safety of the nation.* Fortunately a welcome, timely, and. salutary change has come. The beclouded skies are slowly but surely clearing, and the outlook is hopeful. A great political storm is subsiding and is being succeeded by a political sunshine that not only makes the dangers through which we have passed plainer, but is teaching us how to avoid them in the future. Our course is plain. The civil service law, in order to make it a complete success, must be enforced and perfected and its scope gradually increased. Its en- forcement will naturally lead to its perfection, and its * Doubts may well be entertained whether our government could sur- vive the strain of a continuance of this system. — Groter Cleveland. 00 SOMETHING BBTTEB THAN 0FFICBH0LDIK6. perfection to its increase of scope. As before said, the law has made a good beginning. It must also make a good ending. The increase of its usefulness must not cease till it has utterly destroyed the political dragon that has done so much to degrade American politics. Safety itself demands that, no matter what the circum- stances may be, a repetition of the scenes described by Mr. Cox shall be rendered impossible. This, notwith- standing it requires the practical abolition of the pat- ronage system, is not as difficult as it seems. When business men and business men only, without regard to politics, fill all non-political public offices, the patronage system will be practically dead, and the complete reform of the civil service will be a question of only a few years. The civil service law promises to gradually acoom* plish this result. It will then have been carried to its legitimate conclusion. And it is well. There is some- thing higher, better, and more important for Americans than ordinary officeholding.* The time and talent here- tofore spent in striving for office can hereafter be more usefully devoted to studying the exact nature of public grievances and to originating corrective measures for them. This is noble, patriotic, and useful work, for it subserves the interests of the people as a body. Ameri- cans who are not already qualified, should qualify them- selves for this work In short, they should imitate the statesmen whose wise words and examples are given in the succeeding as well as other chapters of this volume. * The Rupport which has been given to the present administration in its efforts to preserve and advance this reform » » » should con- firm our belief that there is a sentiment among the people better than a desire to hold office, and a patriotic impulse upon which may safely rest the integrity of our institutions and the strength and perpetuity of our government. — Grover Cleveland. CHAPTER VII. LEADING STATESMEN'S PRINCIPLES. The Merit System both Preached and Practiced by the six first Presi- dents (forty years). — ^Powerful blows at the Patronage System. — A profoand disquisition on its Evils by William Paley of England (1785). — James Wilson on Patronage and Official Appointments. Pbesidsnt Washington's three cardinal rules were (" Writings," ix, 479) : 1. He would not be under en- gagements to any person. 2. He would not be influ- enced by " ties of family blood." 3. Three things were to be considered : (a) Fitness, (b) The " comparative merits and sufferings in service." (c) The equal distri- bution of appointments among the States. It is noteworthy that the civil service law is practic- ally the same as the three last requirements. It is there- fore Washingtonian. President John Adams went into office with the " de- termination to make as few removals as possible — not one from personal motives, not one from party consid- erations " (ix, 47). But he would not countenance " mis- conduct in office," and he removed "several officers at Portsmouth " because their " daily language," reported to him, implied " aversion if not hostility to the govern- ment." President Jefferson's principles are expressed in thirty- three words, thus (iv, 391) : " Good men, in whom there is no objection but a difference of political principle, practiced only as far as the right of a private citizen 92 JEFFERSON, MADISON, MONBOE, J. Q. ADAMS. will justify, are not proper subjects of removal." Re- ferring to removals from office, Jefferson ^says (iv, 409) : ** I had foreseen, years ago, that the first Republican President * * * would have a dreadful operation to perform." The Marshals removed by him were charged with packing juries. When urged by a representative of the Tammany Society of Baltimore to remove Feder- alists from office, the philosopher said (Parton's " Life of Jefferson," p. 611) : " What is the difference between denying the right of suffrage and punishing a man for exercising it by turning him out of office ?" President Madison, writing to Edward Coles, August 29, 1834, said (iv, 356) : " You call my attention, with much emphasis, to the principle * * * that offices were the spoils of victory. * * ♦ I fully agree in all the odium you attach to such a rule. ♦ * ♦ The prin- ciple could not fail to degrade any administration." President Monroe says (Gilman's " Monroe," p. 202) : ** No person at the head of the government has, in my opinion, any claim to the active partisan exertions of those in office under him." President John Quincy Adams, not only refused to remove political opponents, but he even refused to re- move a naval officer who had been concerned in an unexecuted project to insult one of his (Adams's) polit- ical friends. He says (Morse's "Adams," p. 180): "I have been urged to sweep away my opponents and pro- vide for my friends. I can justify the refusal to adopt this policy only by the steadiness and consistency of my adherence to my own. If I depart from this in one in- stance, I shall be called upon to do the same in many. An invidious and inquisitorial scrutiny into the personal dispositions of public officers will creep through the whole Union, and the most selfish and sordid passions will be kindled into activity to distort the conduct and TYLKR, BUCHANAN, JOHNSON. 9^ misrepresent the feelings of men whose places may be- come the prize of slander upon them."* President Tyler was opposed to making removals on account of political opinions. In his first annual mes- sage he said he had used the power only in cases of unfaithfulness, incompetency, and partisanship that led to undue intiuence over elections. He further said I (Benton's Debates, xiv, 375) : " I shall cordially concur in any constitutional measures for regulating and re- straining the power of removal." James Buchanan, in discussing in the Senate, in 1839^ a bill to prevent the interference of Federal officers with elections, said (Curtis'a " Buchanan," i, 395) : " Now, sir, if any freak of destiny should ever place me in one of these executive departments * * * I shall tell you the course I would pursue. I should not become an inquisitor of the political opinions of the subordinate officeholders. * * * For the higher and more respon- sible offices, however, I would select able, faithful, and well tried political friends. * * * With General Washington, I believe that any other course * would be a sort of political suicide.' " f President Johnson says (Appendix to Cong. Globe, 1867, p. 4) : " The unrestricted power of removal from office is a very great one to be trusted even to a Magis- trate chosen by the general suffrage of the whole peo- ple, and accountable directly to them for his acts. It is undoubtedly liable to abuse, and at some period of our history perhaps has been abused." * Wiishingtoii, says Mr. James Parton, made 9 removals, J. Adams 9, Jefferson 89, Madison 5, Monroe 9, and J. Q. Adams 2. Total, 78. J. G. Calhoun (ii, 488) says J. Adams made 10 removals and Jefferson 42. President Jackson's removals, in eight years, aggregated nearly 1,000. f Washington's Writings, xi, 75. On page IS of the same volume he speaks of " governmental suicide." 04 GRANT, HATSS, TILDSX. President Grant was not long in perceiving the need of reform in the civil service. In his 2nd annual mes- sage he says (Cong. Globe, I8Y0, p. 9) : "I would re- spectfully call your attention to * * * a reform in the civil service of the country. I would have it go beyond the mere fixing of the tenure of office of clerks and employes, * * * I would have it govern * * ♦ the manner of making all appointments. There is no duty which so much embarrasses the Executive and heads of Departments as that of appointments. * * ♦ The present system does not secure the best men, and often not even fit men for public place." President Hayes denounced the patronage system and advocated " a return to the principles and practices of the founders of the government " in both his letter of acceptance and his inaugural address. He also de- nounced the farming out of appointments among Con- * The following ** plank " from the national Democratic " platform " of 1876 favors the requirement of " proved competency " in filling pub- lic offices, which is precisely what the competitive examination system has accomplished. It is statesman-like and is in harmony with the present civil service law : " Reform is necessary in the civil service. Experience proves that officientf economical conduct of the governmental business is not possi- ble if its civil service be subject to change at every election ; be a prize fought for at the ballot-box ; be a brief reward of party zeal, instead of posts of honor, assigned for proved competency, and held for fidelity in the public employ : that the dispensing of patronage should neither be a tax upon the time of all our public men nor the instrument of their ambition." Mr. Tilden, in his letter of acceptance, favors the " organization of a better civil service* system, under the tests, wherever practicable, of proved competency and fidelity." It is noteworthy that he repeats the words " proved competency." It is clear therefore what his course would have probably been had the Electoral Commission declared him elected President instead of Haves. GARFIELD AND AETHUR. 95 gressmen, saying : " The offices in these cases have become not merely rewards for party services, but re- wards for services to party leaders." President Garfield says (Cong. Record, 1881, p. 3) : " The civil service can never be placed on a satisfactory basis until it is regulated by law. For the good of the service itself, for the protection of those who are in- trusted with the appointing power against the i^aste of time and obstruction to the public business, caused by the inordinate pressure* for place, and for the protec- tion of incumbents against intrigue and wrong ^ \ I shall, at the proper time, ask Congress to fix the tenure of the minor offices of the several Executive Departments, and to prescribe the grounds upon which removals shall be made during the terms for which incumbents have been appointed." President Arthur favored civil service reform in his letter of acceptance of the nomination for Vice-Presi- dent as well as in two annual messages. He found the * We press such appointments upon the Departments ; we crowd the doors ; we fill^ the corridors ; Senators and Representatives throng the offices and bureaus until the public business is obstructed ; the patience of officers is worn out, and sometimes, for fear of losing their places by our influence, they at last give way, and appoint men, not because they are fit for the position, but because we ask it. — Garfield^s Speech iif €k>NORESS, 1870. Let it once be fully understood that continuance in office depends solely upon the faithful and efficient discharge of duties, and that no man will be removed to make place for another, and the reform will be half accomplished. — Garfield at Athens, Ohio, 1879. To reform this service is one of the highest and most imperative duties of statesmanship. — Garfield in "Atlantic Monthly," July, 1877, p. 61. f The italics are mine. The civil servi^ce law does not make suffi- cient provision ** for the protection of incumbents against intrigue and wrong ; " neither does it " prescribe the grounds upon which removals shall be made." (See introduction to GQapter YIII.) 96 PRESIDENT CLEVELAND'S DECIDED VIEWS. " inordinato pressure for place " too great to bear, and further that it diverts the President's " time and at- tention from the proper discharge of other duties no less delicate and responsible, and which, in the very- nature of things, cannot be delegated to other hands." Among other things, he said : '^ Original appointments should be based upon ascertained fitness. The tenure of office should be stable. Positions of responsibility should, as far as practicable, be filled by the promotion of worthy and efficient officers." President Cleveland has proved himself a civil service reformer in deed as well as in word, not only as Presi- dent, but as Governor of New York. In his inaugural address he says (Cong. Record, 1885, p. 3) : "The peo- ple demand reform in the administration of the govern- ment and the application of business principles to public affairs. As a means to this end civil service reform should be in good faith enforced. Our citizens have the right to protection from the incompetency of public employes who hold their places solely as the reward of partisan service, and from the corrupting influence of those who promise and the vicious methods of those who expect such rewards. And those who worthily seek public employment, have the right to insist that merit and competency shall be recognized instead of party subserviency, or the surrender of honest political belief." Again, in his second annual message, President Cleve- land says (Cong. Record, Dec. 7, 1886, p. 11): "The continued operation of the law relating to our civil ser- vice has added the most convincing proofs of its neces- sity and usefulness. It is a fact worthy of note that every public officer who has a just idea of his duty to the people, testifies to the value of this reform. Its stanchest friends are found among those who under- MORTGAGING EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE. 97 Stand it best, and its warmest supporters are those who are restrained and protected by its requirements. " The meaning of such restraint and protection is not appreciated by those who want places under the gov- ernment, regardless of merit and efficiency, nor by those who insist that the selection for such places should rest upon a proper credential showing active partisan work. They mean to public officers, if not their lives, the only opportunity afforded them to attend to public business, and they mean to the good people of the country the better performance of the work of their government. " It is exceedingly strange that the scope and nature of this reform are so little understood, and that so many things not included within its plan are called by its name. When cavil yields more fully to examination, the system will have large additions to the number of its friends. "Our civil service reform. may be imperfect in some of its details ; it may be misunderstood and opposed ; it may not always be faithfully applied ; its designs may sometimes miscarry through mistake or willful in- tent ; it may sometimes tremble under the assaults of its enemies or languish under the misguided zeal of im- practicable friends ; but if the people of this country ever submit to the banishment of its underlying princi- ple from the operation of their government, they will abandon the surest guarantee of the safety and success of American institutions." Representative James A. Bayard of Delaware (after- ward United States Senator), the grandfather of Secre- tary of State Thomas F. Bayard, to whose patriotic and disinterested exertions is largely due Thomas Jefferson's elecfion to the presidency in 1801, was decidedly op- posed to " mortgaging the patronage of the Executive," to use his own words. His views on the civil service 5 08 MS. bayard's honobable conduct. problem are expressed in a deposition,'*' made on April 3, 1806, '* in a caase depending in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, between James Gillespie, plaintiff, and Abram Smith, defendant." Mr. Bayard was a Federalist, but in the long contest (thirty-six bal- lots) for the presidency in the House of Representatives between the two great Republicans, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, was inclined, with the rest of his party (Federal), to support Burr, as being less opposed to them than Jefferson. But, after consultation and cor- respondence with Alexander Hamilton, Burr's personal character became better known to Mr. Bayard. There- fore, in order to keep Burr out of the presidency, and to prevent a failure to elect a President, and a conse- quent disruption of the new government, it was decided to put an end to the contest by the election of Jefferson. This was accomplished by Mr. Bayard, who held the vote of one State, casting a blank ballot.f But before * The deposition is adduced as evidence in the course of a " Vindica- tion of the late James A. Bayard," by his son, Senator James A. Bay- ard of Delaware, and may be found, with mucli other documentary evi- dence, in the Congressional Globe for January 31, 1866, page 137. Mr. Bayard's vindication of his father from the charge of falsehood made against him by Mr. Jeiferson in his " Anas *' papers (ix, 209), is com- plete and overwhelming. Mr. Jeiferson's charge was undoubtedly made under a misunderstanding of the facts of the case ; and something may also be attributed perhaps to the adroitness of Senator Smith (whose deposition appears on page 100) in drawing him out. f Mr. Bayard, in order to avoid even the suspicion of impure motives in giving, as he said, *' the * turn ' to the election," declined an appoint- ment as Minister to France, tendered to him by President Adams in Feb- ruary, 1801, and to which he had been confirmed by the Senate, because it " would be held on the tenure of Mr. JeflPerson's pleasure." He said : " My ambition shall never be gratified at the expense of a suspicion." Note.— I am indebted to Secretary of State T. F. Bayard for the minute details concerning his grandfather's course and change of senii- ment in the presidential election of 1801. WHAT MB. BAYABD^^WnTED. %a\ 99 this was done, it was thougnt^roiw w sSbpre Mr. Jefferson's engagement in ceASk ^mp^taj^ /political matters, which are explained in^^e f9llow||ig extract from the deposition of Mr. Bayan " I stated to Mr. Nicholas * that if certain points of the future administration could be understood and ar- ranged with Mr Jefferson, I was authorized to say that three States would withdraw from an opposition to his election. He asked me what those points were. I an- swered : First, sir, the support of public credit ; sec- ondly, the maintenance of the naval system ; and lastly, that subordinate public officers, employed only in the execution of details established by law, shall not be removed from office on the ground of their political character, nor without complaint against their conduct. I explained myself, that I considered it not only rea- sonable, but necessary, that offices of high discretion and confidence should be filled by men of Mr. Jeffer- son's choice. I exemplified by mentioning, on the one hand, the offices of the Secretaries of States, Treasury, foreign Ministers, &c,y and on the other the Collectors of ports, Ac. Mr. Nicholas answered me, that he con- sidered the points as very reasonable ; that he was sat- isfied that they corresponded with the views and inten- tions of Mr. Jefferson, and [that he] knew him well. That he was acquainted with most of the gentlemen who would probably be about him and enjoying his confidence, in case he became President, and that if I would be satisfied with his assurance, he could solemnly declare it as his opinion that Mr. Jefferson, in his ad- ministration, would not depart from the points I had proposed." t * Representative John Nicholas of Virginia. f Mr. Bayard's deposition is corroborated by a deposition of United 100 MB. SMITH COBBOBOBATBS MB. BATABD. Representative Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, on January 30, 1811, made a very original and unique speech on the subject of officeholding and the appoint- ment of Congressmen to office. "Early in the session," says Mr. Edmund Quincy ("Life of Josiah Quincy," p. 219), "Mr. Macon* of North Carolina moved the following amendment to the Constitution : " * JReaolvedy That no Senator or Representative shall be appointed to any civil office, place, or emolument, under the authority of the United States, until the ex- piration of the presidential term in which such person shall have served as a Senator or Representative.' States Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland, who was also a witness in the case of Gillespie vs. Smith, and who was requested by Mr. Bayard, in 1801, to inquire of Mr. Jefferson personally concerning the political topics named (p. 99), and to bring a direct reply the next day. Senator Smith says (Appendix to Cong. Globe, vol. xxxi, p. 138): *' I did so. And the next day (Saturday) told him that Mr. Jefferson had said that he did not think that such officers ought to be dismissed on political grounds only, except in cases where they had made improper use of their offices to force the officers under them to vote contrary to their judgment. That as to Mr. McLaue, he had already been spoken to in his behalf by Major Eccleston, and from the character given him by that gentleman, he considered him a meritorious officer ; of course that he would not be displaced, or ought not to be displaced. I further added that Mr. Bayard might rest assured (or words to that effect), that Mr. Jefferson would conduct, as to those points, agreeably to the opinions I had stated as his." * Nathaniel Macon, born in North Carolina, 1767 ; served as a private in the Revolutionary War, having declined a commission. He was in the House and Senate fcom 1791 to 1828, the longest term of congres- sional service, I believe, on record. He was Speaker from 1801 to 1807; and president pro tern, of the Senate from 1825 to 1828. Died 1837.— E. Quincy. It is noteworthy that Mr. Macon's proposed amendment, which was again presented and urged in 1826, is in substance the same as that of BepreBeniSkiiYe Tucker in the first Congress. (See note, page io3.) MR. QUINCY'S GREAT SPEECH. 101 " Mr. Quincy moved that the following proposition be added to it : " * And no person standing to any Senator or Rep- resentative in the relation of father, brother, or son, by blood or marriage, shall be appointed to any civil office under the United States, or shall receive any place, agency, contract, or emolument from or under any de- partment or officer thereof.' " The following are extracts from Mr. Quincy's speech, ^ as reported by his son : " Upon this subject of offices my sentiments may per- haps be too refined for the present condition of human nature. And I am aware, in what I am about to say, that I may run athwart political friends as well as political foes. Such considerations as these shall not, however, deter me from introducing just and high notions of their duties to the consideration of the members of the Legislature. I hold, sir, the accept- ance of an office of mere emolument, or which is principally emolument, by a member of Congress from the Executive, as unworthy his station, and incompati- ble with that high sense of irreproachable character which it is one of the choicest terrestrial boons of vir- tue to attain. For while the attainment of office is to members of Congress the consequence solely of co- incidence with the Executive, he who has the office carries on his forehead the mark of having fulfilled the condition. And although his self-love may denom- inate his attainment of the office to be the reward of merit, the world, which usually judges acutely on these matters, will denominate it the reward of service. * * * " Such is the opinion which, in my judgment, ought to be entertained of the mere acceptance of office by members of Congress. But as to that other class of 102 KXCOBIATIN6 PBOFESSIOKAL OFFICESEEKEBS. persons, who are open, notorious solicitors of office, they give occasion to reflections of a very different na- ture. This class of persons in all times past have appeared, and (for I say nothing of times present) in all times future will appear, on this and the other floor of Congress, creatures who, under pretense of serving the people, are in fact serving themselves ; creatures who, while their distant constituents — good, easy men, industrious, frugal, and unsuspicious — dream, in visions, that they are laboring for their country's welfare, are in truth spending their time mousing at the doors of the palace or the crannies of the depart- ments, and laying low snares to catch for themselves arnd their relations every stray office that flits by them. For such men, chosen into this high and responsible trust, to whom have been confided the precious desti- nies of this people, and who thus openly abandon their duties, and set ttieir places and their consciences to sale, in defiance of the multiplied, strong, and tender ties by which they are bound to their country, I have no language to express my contempt. I never have seen, and I never shall see, any of these notorious solicitors of office, for themselves or their relations, standing on this or the other floor, bawling and bully- ing, or coming down with dead votes in support of executive measures, but I think I see a hackney labor- ing for hire in a most degrading service ; a poor, earth - spirited animal, trudging in his traces, with much at- trition of the sides and induration of the membranes, encouraged by this special certainty, that, at the end of his journey, he shall have measured out to him his proportion of provender. " But I have heard that the bare suggestion of such corruption was a libel upon this House and upon this people. I have heard that we were in this country so AFTER man's OFFICE BEFOBE CORPSE IS COLD. 103 virtuous that we were above the influence of these allurements ; that beyond the Atlantic, in old govern- mentSy such things might be suspected, but that here we were too pure for such guilt, too innocent for such suspicions. Mr. Chairman, I shall not hesitate, in spite of such popular declamation, to believe and follow the evidence of my senses and the concurrent testimonies of contemporaneous beholders. I shall not, in my esti* mation of character, degrade this people below, noi* exalt them far above, the ordinary condition of culti- vated humanity. And of this be assured, that every system of conduct or course of policy which has for its basis an excess of virtue in this country beyond what human nature exhibits in its improved state else- where, will be found on trial fallacious. Is there on this earth any collection of men in which there exists a more intrinsic, hearty, and desperate love of office or place — particularly of fat places? Is there any country more infested than this with the vermin that breed in the corruptions of power ? Is there any in which place and official emolument more certainly follow distin- guished servility at elections, or base scurrility in the press ? And as to eagerness for the reward, what is the fact ? Let now ona of your great officeholders, a collector of the customs, a marshal, a commissioner of loans, a postmaster in one of your cities, or any officer, agent, or factor for your territories or public lands, or person holding a place of minor distinction, but of considerable profit, be called on to pay the last great debt of nature. The poor man shall hardly be dead ; he shall not be cold ; long beforiB the corpse is in the coffin, the mail shall be crowded to repletion with let- ters and certificates, and recommendations and repre- sentations, and every species of sturdy, sycophantic solicitation by which obtrusive mendicity seeks charity 104 UNSURPASSED WORD PAINTINGS. or invites compassion. Why, sir, we hear the clamor of the craving animals at the treasury-trough here in this capitol. Such running, such jostling, such wrig- gling, such clambering over one another's backs, such squealing because the tub is so narrow and the com- pany so crowded ! No, sir, let us not talk of stoical apathy toward the things of the national treasury, either in this people or in their Representatives or Senators. " But it will be asked (for it has been asked), Shall the Executive be suspected of corrupting the national Legislature? Is he not virtuous? Without making personal distinctions or references, for the sake of argument it may be admitted that all Executives for the time being are virtuous — reasonably virtuous, Mr. Chairman — flesh and blood notwithstanding. And without meaning in this place to cast any particular reflections upon this or upon any other Executive, this I will say, that if no additional guards are provided, and now after the spirit of party has brought into so full activity the spirit of patronage, there never will be a President of these United States, elected by means now in use, who, if he deals honestly , with himself, will not be able, on quitting his presidential chair, to address it as John Falstaff addressed Prince Hal : * Be- fore I knew thee, I knew nothing ; and now I am but little better than one of the wicked.' The possession of that station under the reign of party will make a man so acquainted with the corrupt principles of hu- man conduct ; be will behold our nature in so hungry and shivering and craving a state, and be compelled so constantly to observe the solid rewards daily de- manded by way of compensation for outrageous patri- otism, that if he escape out of that atmosphere with- out partaking of its corruption, he must be below or above the ordinary condition of mortal nature. Is it A GOOD OFFICE FOR A GOOD OFFICE. 105 possible, sir, that he should remain altogether unin- fected? What is the fact? The Constitution prohib- its the members of this .and of the other branch of the Legislature from being electors of the President of the United States. Yet what is done? The prac- tice of late is so prevalent as to have grown almost into a sanctioned usage of party. Prior to the presi- dential terms of four years, members of Congress, liav- ing received the privileged ticket of admission, as- semble themselves in a sort of electoral college, on the floor of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. They select a candidate for the presidency. * To their voice, to their influence, he is indebted for his eleva- tion. So long as this condition of things continues, what ordinary Executive will refuse to accommodate those who in so distinguished a manner have accom- modated him? Is there a better reason in the world why a man should give you, Mr. Chairman, an office worth two or three thousand dollars a year, for which you are qualified, and which he could give as well as not, than this — that you had been greatly instrumental in giving him one worth five and twenty thousand, for which he was equally qualified ? It is in vain to con- ceal it. So long as the present condition of things continues, it may reasonably be expected that there shall take place regularly between the President of the — - , .III * * This system continued till 1824, when William H. Crawford, who was nominated in accordance with it, ran behind both Adams and Jack- son. In 1828 Jackson and Adams ran without anv formal nomination. The first national Convention was held by the Democratic party in Bal- timore in 1832, when Jackson and Van Biiren were nominated. The Whigs held their first national Convention in Harrisburg in December, 1839, when General Harrison and John Tyler were nominated. In New York and Pennsylvania the caucus system was superseded by State Con- ventions between 1820 and 1830. Mr. Quincy helped to kill "King Caucus," as the system was sometimes called. 108 PATRONAGE 18 POWER. William Paley, D.D., writing (about 1785) of "The British Constitution," says (" Moral and Political Phil- osophy," p. 205) : " When the Constitution conferred upon the Crown the nomination to all employments in the public service, the authors of this arrangement were led to it by the obvious propriety of leaving to a master the choice of his servants, and by the manifest inconveniency of engaging the National Council, upon every vacancy, in those personal interests which attend elections to places of honor and emolument. Our an« cestors did not observe that this disposition added an influence to the regal office which, aa the number and value of public employments increasedy * would super- sede in a great measure the forms and change the char- acter of the ancient Constitution. They knew not, what the experience and reflection of modern ages have discovered, that patronage universally is power ; that he who possesses in a sufficient degree the means of gratifying the desires of mankind after wealth and dis- tinction, by whatever checks and forms his authority may be limited or disguised, will direct the manage- ment of public affairs. Whatever be the mechanism of the political engine, he will guide the motion. * * * Changes ought not to be adventured upon without a comprehensive discernment of the consequences — with- out a knowledge as well of the remote tendency as of the immediate design." In speaking of the checks and balances of the British Constitution, Doctor Paley says (p. 211) : " The King's choice of his Ministers is controlled by the obligation he is under of appointing those men to offices in the cases, and ought therefore to suffice. Many " leading statesmen's prin- ciples " appear in the succeeding chapter in preference to this because they treat of the power of removal. (See pages 210 to 216.) * The italics are mine. Compare with page 66. IXFLUENCE OF FAVOBITISM SUBDUED. 109 State who are found capable of managing the affairs of his government with the two Houses of Parliament. Which consideration imposes such a necessity upon the Crown as hath in a great measure subdued the influ- ence of favoritism ; insomuch that it is become no uncommon spectacle in this country to see men pro- moted by the King to the highest offices and richest preferments which he has in his power to bestow, who have been distinguished by their opposition to his per- sonal inclinations." In speaking of plans for " an equal or a reformed • representation," he says (pp. 215, 216): "One conse- quence, however, may be expected from these projects, namely, * less flexibility to the influence of the Crown.* And since the diminution of this influence is the de- clared and perhaps the sole design of the various schemes that have been produced, whether for regu- lating the elections, contracting the duration, or for purifying the constitution of Parliament by the ex- clusion of placemen and pensioners, it is obvious to remark that the more apt and natural as well as the more safe and quiet way of attaining the same end would be by a direct reduction of the patronage of the Crown, which might be effected to a certain extent without hazarding further consequences. Supei*fluou8 and exorbitant emoluments of office may not only be suppressed for the present, but provisions of law be devised which should for the future restrain within certain limits the number and value of the offices in the donation of the King. * * * It is the nature of power always to press upon the boundaries whicli confine it."* * It is noteworthy that so profound a thinker as Dr. Paley should favor woman suffrage. Sfieaking of the right of representation, he says (p. 214): ** We waive a controversy with those writers who insist upon 110 PATBOXAGE THB BOX OF PANDOBA. James Wilson, LL.D., one of the fraraers of the na« tional Constitution,'*' and afterward an Associate Jus- tice of the United States Supreme Court, in the course of a lecture entitled a ** Comparison of th« Constitution of the United States with that of Great Britain," thus expatiates concerning the evils of patronage (" Lectures on Law," i, 446) : " We are now arrived, in our pro- gress, at another fountain, from which, in Great Brit- ain, the waters of bitterness have plentifully flowed — I mean the fountain of office. * * * Offices of trust and profit are scattered, with a lavish hand, among those by whom a return, very dangerous to the liber- ties of the nation, may be made, and from whom such a return is but too often expected. This is the box of Pandora, which has been opened on Britain. To its poisonous emanations have been owing the contamina- ted and contaminating scenes of venality, of prostitu- tion, and corruption which have crowded and disgraced her political theater. To the same efficacy have been owing the indiscriminate profligacy and universal de- generacy which have been diffused through every chan- nel into which the treasures of the public have pro- cured admission." represeutation as a 'natural' light. We consider it so far only, as a right at all, as it conduces to public utility ; that is, as it contributes to the establishment of good laws, or as it secures to the people the just administration of these laws. These effects depend upon the disposition and abilities of the national counselors. « « « if this right be * natural,' no doubt it must be equal, and the right, we may add, of one sex as well as of the other. Whereas every plan of representation that we have heard of begins by excluding the votes of women, thus cutting off, at a single stroke, one-half the public from a right which is as- serted to be inherent in all ; a right too, as some represent it, not only universal, but inalienable, and indefeasible, and imprescriptible." * Washington called Mr. Wilson " as able, candid, and honest a mem- ber as was in the Convention." (Bancroft's His. of the Const., ii, 241.) JUSTICE WILSON'S CIVIL SERVICE BULE8. Ill In another lecture, entitled " Of Grovemment " (i, 401-2), Justice Wil- son lays down fundamental rules for guidance in appointments to office : " The appointment to offices is an important part of the executive au- thority. Much of the ease, much of the reputation, much of the energy, and much of the safety of the nation depends on judicious and impartial appointments. But are impartiality and tine discernment Hkely to pre- dominate in a numerous executive body? In proportion to their own number will be the number of their friends, favorites, and dependents. An office is to be filled. A person nearly connected by some of the fore- going ties with one of those who are to vote hi filling it, is named as a candidate. His patron is under no necessity to take any part, particu- larly responsible, in his appointment. He may appear even cold and in- different on the occasion. But he possesses an advantsige, the value of which is well understood in bodies of this kind. Every member who gives, on his account, a vote for his friend, will expect the return of a similar favor on the first convenient opportunity. In this manner a re- ciprocal intercourse of partiality, of interestedness, of favoritism, perhaps of venality, is estabUshed ; and in no particular instance is there a prac- ticability of tracing the poison to its source. Ignorant, vicious, and pros- tituted characters are introduced into office ; and some of those wlio voted, and procured others to vote for them, are the first and loudest in expressing their astonishment that the door of admission was ever opened to men of their infamous description. ♦ ♦ ♦ Those who possess talents and virtues, which would reflect honor on office, will be reluctant to appear as candidates for appointments. If they should be brought into view, what weight will virtue, merit, and talents for office have in a balance held and poised by partiality, intrigue, and chicane ? " The person who nominates or makes appointments to office should be known. His own office, his own character, his own fortune should be responsible. He should be alike unfettered and unsheltered by coim- selors. No constitutional stalking-horse should be provided for him to conceal his turnings and windings, when they are too dark and too crooked to be exposed to public view. Instead of the dishonorable in- tercourse which I have already mentioned, an intercourse of a very dif- ferent kind should be established — an intercourse of integrity and dis- cernment on the part of the magistrate who appoints, and of gratitude and confidence on the part of the people who will receive the benefit of his appointments. Appointments made and sanctioned in this highly respectable manner will, like a fragrant and beneficent atmosphere, dif- fuse sweetness and gladness around those to whom they are given. Modest merit will be beckoned to in order to encourage her to come forward. Bare-faced impudence and imprincipled intrigue will receive repulse and disappointment, deservedly their portion." CHAPTER VIII. THE POWER OF REMOVAL.* A remedy for its Mistakes and Abuses. — The Power discussed in the first (Congress (1789). — The Decision then made criticised by Ben- ton, Webster, and otliers. — The 4- Years' Term Law (note). The debate in the first Congress on the power to remove public officials was one of great interest and importance, and was besides very instructive. A bill was introduced in the House creating **The Depart- ♦On July 27, 1842, a Select Committee of the House, Garrett Davis chairman, reported as to " the cause, manner, and circumstances of the removal of Henry H. Sylvester, late a clerk in tlie Pension Office." It favored the repeal of the 4-years' law ; also the giving of written reasons for removals, that tlie removed officer might have " an opportunity to arraign his superior for an abuse of power, lx)ih before the coimtry and Congress." It denounced secret removals as " unjust, impolitic, and im- moral." '' No removal should ever take place except when the puhlic weal requires it" It further says (H. Repts. Xo. 945, 27 th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. iv, p. 4) : " Your committee know no portion of the American population which is more oppressed and enslaved in will and spirit than the subordinates in the executive departments ; none among whom there is more mental suffering, arising from a constant dread of being visited with the petty proscription of some small tyrant, ' clothed with (sic) a little brief authority,' by which they and their families are to be de- prived of tlieir support It was the duty of Mr. Spencer * * * to have protected such a subordinate as Sylvester." On page 6 of this powerful and most admirable report the committee says : " The practice of treating all the offices of this great government as ' the spoils of victory,' and, with the rise and fall of contending par- ties, the ejection of a large multitude of experienced, honest, and capable incumbents, to make room for needy mercenaries, who entered the polit- ical conflict without any principle or love of country, but impelled wholly by a hope of plunder, is the greatest and most threatening abuse that has ever invaded our system. It makes the President the great feuda- "AI^ il^VIOLABLE RIGHT." 113 ment of Foreign Affairs '^ (State Department), the Sec- retary of which was, in the words of the bill, " to be re- movable by the President of the United States/^* The discussion was on striking out the last quoted words. The majority claimed that the President alone had the power of removal, while the minority claimed that the consent of the Senate was necessary ; that is, in the case of officers confirmed by the Senate. Judged by the light of nearly a century of experi- ence, it is plain that both sides were partly right and partly wrong. The forefathers, who were legislating for less than four million of people, were constructing a political chart to guide and protect future gener- ations, and it is not strange that they should have made a few mistakes. While it is clear, as pointed out by the majority, that the President should have tory of the nation, and all oflSces fiefs^ whose tenure is suit and service to him. It is because all those fiefs are at his sovereign will, to be con- firmed or granted anew after each presidential election, that the whole country is kept perpetually convulsed by that oft-recurring and all- absorbing event" The report of the Morehead Committee on Retrenchment, made June 15, 1844, is chiefly devoted to the evils of executive patronage and the abuse of tlie power of removal Speaking of the latter subject, the com- mittee proclaims the following incontrovertible tnith (S. Docs. No. 399, 28th Cong., Ist Sess., vol vii, p. 31): ''A citizen of the United States who accepts a public trust, however obscure his birth or humble his em- ployment, has an inviolable right to be protected in the fiiithful discharge of his duties from the violence or the menaces of arbitrary power." On page 55 the committee recommends the passage of a civil service law (the first of its kind, so far as I know, ever made in Congress), as follows : " That a law ought to be passed, prescribing regulations as re- gards the qualifications, tlie appointment of persons to office, * * ♦ and • declaring the disqualifications or the reasons which will be considered in law sufficient to authorize the President, the heads of departments, and courts of law to suspend, dismiss, or remove persons from office." ♦ The motion to establish the above and other P]xecutive Departments was made originallj' by Mr. Boudinot, in a speech, on May 19, 1789. IH A PBOPOSBD BOABD OF APPEALS. the power of removal, it is equally clear, as pointed out by the minority, that there should be a check to prevent him or anybody else from abusing it. Fur- ther, the President and his chief officials are as liable to make mistakes as other men. Of all public men they should be the first to correct a mistake or to right a wrong, and thus set an example for others to follow. We should give officeholders, chief as well as sub- ordinate, all the protection we can from mistakes, dis- likes, fits of passion, jealousy, prejudices, caprices, in- trigues, &c. But what kind of protection can we give them ? It appears to me that, under the civil service law system, a Board of Appeals should be established, which could be increased in number as the number of offices and the scope of the law increase, before which all reasonable complaints could be heard, and that where the complaint is sustained, the aggrieved official should be reinstated with full pay.* It is required by Rule 16 that the Civil Service Commissioners shall perform the work of this proposed Board. But as the Commis- * There is a remedy for every distemper in government, if the people are not wanting to themselves. For a people wanting to themselves, there is no remedv. — James Wilson. Napoleon was a despot, it is said. Tet he never dismissed any one from public office without an inquiry and report of facts, and rarely ever without hearing the accused functionary ; never when the questions involved were civil or administrative. — Napoleonic Ideas. By Louis Napoleon. But Napoleon, who was a statesman as well as a soldier, sometimes dismissed officials without much ceremony. *^ *■ Tou cannot find me guilty of dishonesty,' observed the minister, Barbe-Marbois, on receiving his dismissal. * I had rather,* replied Napoleon, * that you had shown yourself dishonest than a fool. There is a limit to one ; there is none whatever to the other.' " (Crowe's " History of France," v, 147.) Napoleon was right in one respect at least, namely, that fools are not proper ptrsons to fill public offices BESTBAINT THE BODT-POLITIC SAFETY-VALVE. 115 sioners are already overworked, the proposition is not practical. The functions of this proposed Board would resemble in one respect those of the Supreme Court of the United States, for one of the most important func- tions of the Supreme Court is to correct the mistakes of the legislative and executive departments. Again, having had nothing to do with the nomination, confir- mation, or appointment of officers, it would, like the Supreme Court, be free of prejudice. Such a Board would be at least a partial check on the President and all other chief officials, and would aid in preventing some future Jackson or Lincoln from throwing the official machinery of government out of gear. This is well, for restraint, in public as well as in private life, is the safety-valve of the body-politic. The minority, as before said, were certainly right about the necessity of a check to prevent the Presi- dent from abusing the power of removal. But the senatorial check they proposed, however practical it may have been then, is certainly not practical now, for, on account of the great increase of business, the Senate has hardly time now to look after confirmations, much less removals. Further, the exact check they proposed was incorporated in the Tenure of Office Act of 1866-67,* and was found in practice to be unsatis- factory. One example of its inefficacy will suffice. J. D. Cox, in an article in the North American Beview for January, 1871 (p. 87), in speaking of the corrup- tion at Washington after the demoralizing civil war, and incidentally of the Tenure of Office Act, says that "dishonest (official) incumbents were plundering the people under the shelter of a Tenure of Office Act, which seemed to be skillfully adapted to remove every ♦Repealed in 1887. 116 GBEAT USS AND POWEB OF THE SENATE. trace of responsibility from both the appointing and confirming powers. The Republicans in Congress were complaining that the President refused to remove men who were indicted or convicted in the courts, and the friends of the President retorted that the Senate refused to consent to the removal of others who were proven to be plunderers of the treasury on the like evidence." * Again, the minority were certainly right about it being the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the Senate should be a check on the President^ and also (which was admitted by the majority) that its duties are sometimes executive and sometimes ju- dicial, and that it is to this extent blended with both the executive and judicial departments The Senate, so far as the removal of an officer confirmed by it is concerned, is at all times a more or less perfect check on the President, bec^ause he has to depend on it for the confirmation of a successor. The Senate, in fact, as it is almost self -evident was the intention of the f ramei*s of the Constitution, exercises great power. It should therefore be composed of experienced and trained states- men only. No mere politician should enter its cham- ber. And it would be better, far better, that its mem- bers should all be as poor as Socrates, than that one of them should be chosen on account of his wealth, or be even charged with buying his election. Bad men may get into the Senate ; but the people who, on account of this fact, howl for its abolition, would destroy the equilibrium of the government. They might as well, for the same reason, ask for the abolition of either the House of Representatives or the United States Supreme Court. The proper remedy is purification. * See the remarkable prediction of Representative Ames, page 125. Mr. Madison (page 117) also indulges in some lamentable forebodings, and under the patronage system their realization is not impossible. THE NEED AND USE OF BSSPONSIBILITT. 11 H SPEECHES IN FAYOB OF BEMOYAL BY THE PBBSIDBNT ALONE. * James Madison of Virginia said (pp. 462, 463, 496, 498, 581) : " It is evidently the intention of the Con- stitution that the first Magistrate should be responsi* ble for the executive department. So far therefore as we do not make the officers who are to aid him in the duties of that department responsible to him, he is not responsible to his country. Again, is there no danger that an officer, when he is appointed by the concurrence of the Senate, and has friends in that body, may choose rather to risk his establishment on the favor of that branch than rest it upon the discharge of his duties to the satisfaction of the executive branch, which is constitutionally authorized to inspect and control his conduct? And if it should happen that the officers connect themselves with the Senate, they may mutu- ally support each other, and for want of efficacy re- duce the power of the President to a mere vapor ; in which case his responsibility would be annihilated, and the expectation of it unjust. The high executive of- ficers, joined in cabal with the Senate, would lay the foundation of discord, and end in an assumption of the executive power, only to be removed by a revolution in the government. I believe no principle is more clearly laid down in the Constitution than that of responsi- bility. * * * * The salient points only of this debate are given. They are taken from vol. i of " The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, compiled from authentic materials, by Joseph Gales, Sr." The speeches, divided pro and con, are given in the order of their de- livery ; but those who spoke twice or three times, have their remarks combined in one speech. Repetitions of arguments, either by the same or different speakers, have, as far as practicable, been omitted. 118 BEMOYAL AN EXBCUTIVB POWER. "Is the power of displacing an executive power? I conceive that if any power whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws. If the Con- stitution had not qualified the power of the President in appointing to office, by associating the Senate with him in that business, would it not be clear that he would have the right, by virtue of his executive power, to make such appointment? Should we be authorized, in defiance of that clause in the Constitution, * The exec- utive power shall be vested in a President,' to unite the Senate with the President in the appointment to office ? * * * If it is admitted that we should not, I think it may be disputed whether we have a right to associate them in removing persons from office, the one power being as much of an executive nature as the other ; and the first only is authorized by being excepted out of the general rule established by the Constitution, in these words ; * The executive power shall be vested in a President.' * * * " The doctrine, however, which seems to stand most in opposition to the principles I contend for is that the power to annul an appointment is, in the nature of things, incidental to the power which makes the ap- pointment. I agree that if nothing more was said in the Constitution than that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, should appoint to office, there would be great force in saying that the power of removal resulted, by a natural implication, from the power of appointing. But there is another part of the Constitution no less explicit than the one on which the gentleman's doctrine is founded. It is that part which declares that the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States. The association of the Senate with the President in exer- GOOD OFFICERS SHOLLB NOT BK BKMOVKD. 119 cising that particular function is an exception to this general rule; and exceptions to general rules, I con- ceive, are ever to be taken strictly.* But there is an- other part of the Constitution which inclines, in my judgment, to favor the construction I put upon it — the President is required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If the duty to see the laws faith- fully executed be required at the hands of the Execu- tive Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally in- tended he should have that species of power which is necessary to accomplish that end. * * * Now if the officer, when once appointed, is not to depend upon the President for his official existence, but upon a dis- tinct body (for where there are two negatives required, either can prevent the removal), I confess I do not see how the President can take care that the laws be faith- fully executed. * * * " The danger then consists merely in this : the Presi- dent can displace from office a man whose merits re- quire that he should be continued in it. What will * * * operate to prevent it (this abuse of power) ? * Daniel Webster says (iv, 193): '* The error of this argument lies in this. It supposes the power of removal to be held by the President under the general grant of executive power. Now it is certain that the power of appointment is not held under that general grant, because it is particularly provided for, and is conferred, in express terms, on the President and Senate. If therefore the power of removal be a natural appendage to the power of appointment, then it is not conferred by the GENERAL WORDS granting executive power to the President, but is con- ferred by the special clause which gives the appointing power to the President and Senate. ♦ ♦ ♦ If exceptions to a general rule are to be taken strictly, when expressed, it is still more clear, when they are not expressed at all, that they are not to be implied except on evident and clear grounds ; and as the general power of appeinUnent is conf ss- edly given to the President and Senate, no exception is to be implied in favor of one part of that general power, namely, the removing part, un- less for some obvious and irresistible reason." 120 WHEN IMPEACHMENT IS JUSTIFIABLK. In the first place, he will be impeachable by this House, before the Senate, for such an act of maladministration, for I contend that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject him to impeachment and removal from his own high trust. * * * Can he accomplish this end? No. He can place no man in the vacancy whom the Senate shall not approve. ** If there is any point in which the separation of the legislative and executive powers ought to be main- tained with greater caution, it is that which relates to officers and offices. The powers relative to offices are partly legislative and partly executive. The Legisla- ture creates the office, defines the powers, limits its duration, and annexes a compensation. This done, the legislative power ceases. They ought to have nothing to do with designating the man to fill the office. That I conceive to be of an executive nature." John Vining of Delaware said (pp. 465, 511): "If this power is not in the President, it is not vested in any body whatever. It cannot be within the legisla- tive power of the Senate, because it is of an adverse nature. It cannot be within the executive power of the Senate, because they possess none but what is ex- pressly granted by the Constitution, * * * " I take it that the best principle is that he who is responsible for the conduct of the officer, ought to have the power of removing him. * * * Perhaps it might > be equally right that the responsible person should have the appointment of those who are to aid him. But this case is qualified by an express stipulation in the Constitution, and therefore must be submitted to. " The argument of convenience is strong in favor of the President, for this man (Secretary F. A.) is an arm or an eye to him. He sees and writes his secret dis- patches. He is an instrument over which the President SENATE LESS INTERESTED THAN PBESIDENT. 121 ought to have a complete command. * * * If the Pres- ident removes a valuable officer, which seems to be the great danger the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Smith) apprehends, it would be an act of tyranny which the good sense of the nation would never forget. But if the Senate turns out a good man, they might be re- elected by the Legislatures. The Senate may remove a good officer without feeling any injury. They are. not feelingly sensible of the advantages arising from his labors, because they do not act in concert with him ; while the President, by such a removal, deprives him- self of a valuable and necessary aid. When a good officer is obtained, the President has every motive of justice, self-interest, and public good to retain him in his situation. None of these motives operate, or but faintly operate, upon the Senate." On page 670 Mr. Vining, in reply to Mr. Jackson, speaks of the danger " of denying the Executive a due proportion of. power." This, he said, was the case in both Sweden and Poland. " In Sweden," he said, " the limited power of the King was nearly annihilated by an aristocracy." The King, " for the security of his nation," and with the assent of the nation, had been compelled " to assume all the powers of despotism." Of Poland he said : " The object of the Poles has been to guard against what was called the encroachments of the throne. * It is not,' said they but a century ago, * a master that we want, it is only a chief.' Some went further, and asserted that a free people wanted no chief at all." Of our own government he said : " If by legis- lative encroachment we weaken the executive arm, we render it incapable of performing the functions assigned it by the Constitution, and subject it to become an easy prey to the other branches of the government." Elias Boudinot of New Jersey said (pp. 468, 409, 62'i, 6 122 THE SENATE MAT THWART THE PBESIDENT. 528) : '* Let us examine whether it (the power of re- moval) belongs to the Senate and President. Certain- ly, sir, there is nothing that gives the Senate this right in express terms. But they are authorized, in express words, to be concerned in the appointment. And does this necessarily include the power of removal ? If the President complains to the Senate of the misconduct of an officer, and desires their advice and consent to the removal, what are the Senate to do? Most certainly they will inquire if the complaint is well founded. To do this they must call the officer before them to answer. Who then are the parties ? The supreme executive of- ficer against his assistant ; and the Senate are to sit as judges, to determine whether sufficient cause of removal exists. Does not this set the Senate over the head of the President ? But suppose they shall decide in favor of the officer. What a situation is the President then in, surrounded by officers with whom, by his situation, he is compelled to act, but in whom he can have no confidence ; reversing the privilege given him by the Constitution, to prevent his having officers imposed upon him who do not meet his approbation ! " But I have another more solid objection, which places the question in a more important point of view. The Constitution has placed the Senate as the only security and barrier between the House of Representa- tives and the President. Suppose the President has desired the Senate to concur in removing an officer, and they have declined. Or suppose the House has applied to the President and Senate to remove an of- ficer obnoxious to them, and they determine against the measure. The House can have recourse to nothing but an impeachment, if they suppose the criminality of the officer will warrant such procedure. Will the Senate then be that upright court which they ought to ap- WHY THE SENATE SHOULD BE UNPREJUDICED. 123 peal to on this occasion, when they have prejudged your cause? I conceive the Senate will be too much under the control of their former decision to be a proper body for this House to apply to for impartial justice. As the Senate are the dernier resort, and the only court of judicature which can determine on cases of impeach- ment, I am for preserving them free and independent, both on account of the officer and this House. I there- fore conceive that it was never the intention of the Constitution to vest the power of removal in the Presi- dent and Senate ; but as it must exist somewhere, it rests on the President alone. * * * " The President nominates and appoints. He is fur- ther expressly authorized to commission all officers. Now does it appear from this distribution of power that the Senate appoints? Does an officer exercise powers by authority of the Senate ? No. I believe the Presi- dent is the person from whom he derives his authority. He appoints, but under a check. It is necessary to obtain the consent of the Senate. But after that is obtained, I ask who appoints? Who vests the officer with authority? Who commissions him? The Presi- dent does these acts by his sole power, but they are ex- ercised in consequence of the advice of another branch of the government. If therefore the officer receives his authority and commission from the President, surely the removal follows as coincident. * * * The Con- stitution vested* all executive power in the President. The power of designating and appointing officers to execute the laws was in its nature executive. Conse- quently the President would appoint ex officio, if he had not been limited by the express words of the Con- stitution. Hence he (Mr. Boudinot) inferred, ex officio, he would remove without limitation. * The four closing sentences are reported in the second person. •-^r- •• ! . '•' all 'W- •r I. ■ • aii.-'vsr . : : * -_ ••: : T- lit* SeL' : .• r "»- . iipwtr: ■ • • -rr.- iiLi: •:::•. :.i: - . •• . .. .--.;-:■.■.- dei^ri- i i . I •• V . . . 1 1 : * • ! ' » — T -• *. . 4 . t». . :.. ...!•.:!.._ I.: J.^rr- Tut :iL.T -'.••■ .: r:l' -•»•.- S- Tilt I'.'l.*- .1. ■ .4jii f' ii;v.t ii. viT !■: ..... .. :ti»-^- r-[i-5- vi":l stffTv. • ■It :ii.i lit !* im; 'ri'rtSf'iv .'■.: .•rii.-: ; :.iii C ;»i:si"iu:::'i2 • ... .•■■•.ti i...t te. >. .( »*^.'» trs •'•..* .1". }V-:>.;^tr.: bv and '• • • ..-■... *. ; V. iTr. Tht' power '*^ *^" . .. J . :■.".:'.: U::: not being didiuJ/.i- J I.. .... I •.t..-.\.'. .\..\ .\ ^. [ r.tnu' l»efore the l*«^«-l.*i II • .,«..i i.b< HO) oi.lu-i oiiiiiU'il casi*, must be iV HOW S£XAT£ MAY CAUSE BEBIOUS TBOUBLK. 125 " The attempt to blend the executive and legislative departments in exercising the power of removal is such a mixing as ought not to be carried into practice on arguments grounded on implication. And the gentle- man from Virginia (Mr. Whitens) reasoning is wholly drawn from implication. He supposes, as the C\)nsti- tution qualifies the President's power of appointing to office by subjecting his nominations to the conmirrenoe of the Senate, that the qualification follows of course in the removal. " Another reason occurs to me against blending these powers. An officer who superintends the publi(i reve- nue will naturally acquire a great iufiuenc(\ If he ob- tains support in the Senate, upon an atteni))t of the President to remove him, it will be out of the power of the House, when applied to by the first Magistrate, to impeach him with success, for the very nieans of proving charges of malconduct against him will be under the power of the officer. All the pajiers neees- sary to convict him may be withheld while the person continues in his office. Protection may be rendered for protection ; and as this officer has sueh exten- sive influence, it may be exerted to prot^ure the n*- election of his friends. These circumstances, in addi- tion to those stated by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Boudinot), must clearly evince to every gentlnnwin the impropriety of connecting the Senate with the Pres- ident in removing from office. * * On page 642 Mr. Ames SHys : *' If the SenuUt iiit* U) immhumh tlio power of removal, they will be enabled to hold tho imm'hou in oHlct*. lul the circumstances be what they may that |)o!nt out tht) niH*t)ririity (»r pni- priety of his removal. It creates a permanent oouniHitiun. It will nurse faction. It will promote intrigue to obtain protMtOi* and tu shelter tools. Sir, it is infusing poison into tbi OmmMMII^^A^J* * There is ruin in it. It is tempting the Senate 124 SUSPENSION A NUGATORY FOWEB. " Gentlemen say they have a sufficient remedy for every evil likely to result from connecting the Senate with the President. This they propose to do by allow- ing the power of suspension. This does not answer the end, because there iB a possibility that the officer may not be displaced after a hearing before the Sen- ate. * ♦ * ^^Q had better at once give a power that would answer two valuable purposes, than one alto- gether nugatory. In the first place, it (removal) would entirely separate the legislative and executive depart- ments, conformably to the great principles of the Con- stitution ; and, in the second place, it would answer the end of government better, and secure real benefits to the Union." Fisher Ames of Massachusetts said (pp. 474, 475, 476, 477, 640) : " The executive powers are delegated to the President with a view to have a responsible officer to superintend, control, inspect, and check the officers nec- essarily employed in administering the laws. The only bond between him and those he employs is the confi- dence he has in their integrity and talents. When that confidence ceases, the principal ought to have power to remove those whom he can no longer trust with sefety. * * * The powers of the President are defined in the Constitution. But it is said that he is not expressly authorized to remove from office. If the Constitution is silent also with respect to the Senate, the argument may be retorted. If this silence proves that the power cannot be exercised by the President, it certainly proves that it cannot be exercised by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The power of removal is incident to government. But not being distributed by the Constitution, it will come before the Legislature, and, like every other omitted case, must be supplied by law. HOW SENATE MAT CAUSE SERIOUS TBOUBLE. 125 " The attempt to blend the executive and legislative departments in exercising the power of removal is such a mixing as ought not to be carried into practice on arguments grounded on implication. And the gentle- man from Virginia (Mr. White's) reasoning is wholly drawn from implication. He supposes, as the Consti- tution qualifies the President's power of appointing to office by subjecting his nominations to the concurrence of the Senate, that the qualification follows of course in the removal. " Another reason occurs to me against blending these powers. An officer who superintends the public reve- nue will naturally acquire a great influence. If he ob- tains support in the Senate, upon an attempt of the President to remove him, it will be out of the power of the House, when applied to by the first Magistrate, to impeach him with success, for the very means of proving charges of malconduct against him will be under the power of the officer. All the papers neces- sary to convict liim may be withheld while the person continues in his office. Protection may be rendered for protection ; and as this officer has such exten* sive influence, it may be exerted to procure the re- election of his friends. These circumstances, in addi- tion to those stated by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Boudinot), must clearly evince to every gentleman the impropriety of connecting the Senate with the Pres- ident in removing from office. * * On page 542 Mr. Ames says : " If the Senate are to possess the power of removal, they will be enabled to hold the person in office, let the circumstances be what they may that point out the necessity or pro- priety of his removal. It creates a permanent connection. It will nurse faction. It will promote intrigue to obtain protectors and to shelter tools. Sir, it is infusing poison into the Constitution. * * * There is ruin in it. It is tempting the Senate with forbidden fruit." 126 PBESIDENT'S EXSCUTIVE PoWSB ILLUSTBATBD. *' But why should we connect the Senate in the re« moval ? Their attention is taken up with other impor- tant business, and they have no constitutional authority to watch the conduct of the executive officers, and there- fore cannot use such authority with advantage. If the President is inclined to shelter himself behind the Sen- ate with respect to having continued an improper per- son in office, we lose the responsibility, which is our greatest security. The blame among so many will be lost. * * * " It must be admitted that the Constitution is not explicit on the point in contest. Yet the Constitution strongly infers that the power is in the President alone. It is declared that the executive power shall be vested in the President. Under these terms all the powers properly belonging to the executive department of the government are given, and such only taken away as are expressly excepted. If the Constitution had stopped here, and the duties had not been defined, either the President had had no powers at all, or he would acquire from that general expression all the powers properly belonging to the executive department. * * * "The President * * ♦ is the agent. The Senate may prevent his acting, but cannot act themselves. It may be difficult to illustrate this point by examples which will exactly correspond. But suppose the case of an executor, to whom is devised land, to be sold with the advice of a certain person, on certain condi- tions. The executor sells, with the consent and on the conditions required in the will. The conditions are broken. May the executor re-enter for the breach of them? Or has the person with whom he was obliged to consult in the sale any power to restrain him ? The executor may remove the wrongful possessor from the land, though perhaps by the will he may hold it in trust SENATE NOT INSPECTORS OP OFPICBRS. 127 for another person's benefit. In this manner the Presi- dent may remove from office ; though, when vacant, he cannot fill it without the advice of the Senate." Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania said (pp. 479, 480, 481) : " This is an office of considerable importance. * * * In all commercial countries it will require men of high talents to fill such an office, and great respon- sibility. It is necessary to connect the business in such a manner as to give the President a complete command over it ; so in whatever hands it is placed, or however modulated, it must be subjected to his inspection and control. * * * " Another reason why the power of removal should be lodged with the President rather than the Senate arises from their connection with the people. The Pres- ident is the representative of the people in a near and equal manner. He is the guardian of his country. The Senate are the representatives of the State Legislatures ; but they are very unequal in that representation. Each State sends two members to that House, although their proportions are as ten to one. Hence arises a degree of insecurity to an impartial administration. But if they possessed every advantage of equality, they can- not be the proper body to inspect into the proper be- havior of officers, because they have no constitutional powers for this purpose." John Lawrence of New York said (pp. 483, 484) : " It has been stated as an objection that we should extend the powers of the President, if we give him the power of removal ; and we are not to construe the Constitution in such way as to enlarge the executive power to the injury of any other ; that as he is limited in the power of appointment by the control of the Sen- ate, he ought to be equally limited in the removal. If there be any weight in this argument, it applies as forci- 128 CONSISTENCY AND PRESIDENTIAL SEMOYALS. bly against vesting the power conjointly in the President and Senate ; because if we are not to extend the powers of the Executive beyond the express detail of duties found in the Constitution, neither are we at liberty to extend the duties of the Senate beyond thosQ precise points fixed in the same instrument. Of course if we cannot say the President alone shall remove, w^ cannot say the President and Senate may exercise such power. ^^ It is admitted that the Constitution is silent on this subject. But it is also silent with respect to the ap- pointments it has vested in the Legislature. T}ie Con- stitution declares that Congress may by law vest the ap- pointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, of heads of departments, yet says nothing with respect to the removal. ♦ * * In those cases in which the Consti- tution has given the appointment to the President, be must have the power of removal for the sake of con- sistency ; for no person will say that if the President should appoint an inferior officer, he should npt have the power to remove him when he thought prpper, if no particular limitation was determined by the lnw." Representative George Clymer of Pennsylvapia said (pp. 489, 490) : " I am clear that the Execu|tive has the power of removal as incident to his department ; and if the Constitution had been silent with respect to the appointment, he would have had that power also. The reason perhaps why it was mentioned in the Constitution was to give some further security against the introduction of improper men into office. But in cases of removal there is not such necessity for this check. What great danger would arise from the removal of a worthy man, when the Senate must be consulted in the appointment of his successor? Is it likely they will consent to advance an improper char- MS. BBNSON'S ADMIBABLE ILLUSTRATION. 129 acter? The presumption therefore is that he would not abuse this power ; or, if he did, only one good man would be changed for another. If the President is divested of this power, his responsibility is destroyed. You prevent his efficiency, and disable him from af- fording that security to the people which the Consti- tution contemplates. * * * '^^lie Executive must act by others. But you reduce him to a mere shadow when you control both the power of appointment and removal. If you take away the latter power, he ought to resign the power of superintending and directing the executive parts of government into the hands of the Senate at once, and then we become a dangerous aristocracy, or shall be more destitute of energy than any government on earth." Egbert Benson of New York said (pp. 505, 506, 607) : "I will not repeat what has been said to prove that the true construction is that the President alone has the power of removal, but will state a case to show the embarrassment which must arise by a combination of the senatorial and legislative authority in this particu- lar. I will instance the officer to which the bill re- lates. To him will necessarily be committed negotia- tions with the ministers of foreign courts. This is a very delicate trust. The supreme executive officer, in superintending this department, may be entangled with suspicions of a very delicate nature relative to the trans- actions of the officer, and such as from circumstances would be injurious to name. Indeed he may be so situated that he will not, cannot, give the evidence of his suspicion. Now, thus circumstanced, suppose he should propose to the Senate to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Are we to expect the Senate will, without any reason being assigned, implicitly submit to his proposition? They will not. Suppose 130 SENATE ONLY ▲ CONSTITUTIONAL CHECK. he shoald say he suspected the man's fidelity. They would say we must proceed further, and know the rea- son for this suspicion. They would insist on a full communication. Is it to be supposed that this man will not have a single friend in the Senate who will contend for a fair trial and a full hearing? The Presi- dent then becomes the plaintiff and the Secretary the defendant. The Senate are sitting in judgment be- tween the Chief Magistrate of the United States and a subordinate ofiicer. Now I submit to the candor of the gentlemen whether this looks like good government. Yet in every instance when the President thinks proper to have an officer removed, this absurd scene must be displayed. How much better, even on principles of expediency, will it be that the President alone have the power of removal. " It has been warmly contended that the power of removal is incidental to the power of appointment. It may be true in general, but upon examination we shall find there is a distinction in this case from what the general principle supposes. If the President and Senate are to be considered as one body, deliberating together on the business of appointments, every individual of which participates equal powers, the reasoning that has been urged will hold good. But I take it for granted that they are two distinct bodies, and can only give a simple affirmative or negative. No member of the Sen- ate has power to offer an original proposition. In short, the moment we depart from this simple idea that the provision in the Constitution is intended for any other purpose but to prevent the President from introducing improper persons into office, we shall find it difficult to form any certain principle upon which they ought to act, and our opinions and deliberations will be discord- ant and distracted." MB. SEDGWICK'S PBBTINBXT INQUIBIB8. 131 Mr. Benson farther said that ^^ if we declare in the bill that the officer shall be removable by the President, it has the appearance of conferring the power upon him." Therefore, in order to avoid even an apparent conference of power, and to do nothing more than de- clare the House's " sentiments upon the meaning of a constitutional grant of power to the President," he moved as a substitute for the words " to be removable by the President," the following : " whenever the said officer shall be removed by the President." Mr. Madi- son, who appreciated Mr. Benson's delicate legislative distinction, seconded the latter's motion. The amend- ment was adopted by a vote of 30 to 18. Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts said (pp. 522, 623) : " What is to be the consequence if the Senate are to be applied to (for permission to remove an of- ficer)? If they are to do anything in this business, I presume they are to deliberate, because they are to ad- vise and consent. If they are to deliberate, you put them between the officer and the President. They are then to inquire into the causes of removal. The Presi^ dent must produce his testimony. How is the question to be investigated ? Because, I presume, there must be some rational rule for conducting this business. Is the President to be sworn to declare the whole truth, and to bring forward facts? Or are they to admit suspi- cion as testimony ? Or is the word of the President to be taken at all events ? If so, this check is not of the least efficacy in nature. But if proof be necessary, what is then the consequence ? Why, in nine cases out of ten, where the case is very clear to the President that the man ought to be removed, the effect cannot be produced, because it is absolutely impossible to pro- duce the necessary evidence. Are the Senate to pro- cead without evidence? Some gentlemen contend not. 132 SEPAKATK POWERS THE ONLY SAFETY. Then the object will be lost. Shall a man, under these circumstances, be saddled upon the President who has been appointed for no other purpose but to aid the President in performing certain duties? * * * if he is, where is the responsibility? * * * Without you make him responsible, you weaken and destroy the strength and beauty of your system. What is to be done in cases which can only be known from a long acquaintance with the conduct of an officer?" On page 582 Mr. Sedgwick says there are a thousand circumstances, exclusive of impeachments, which may demand removal from office, of which the President alone is the proper judge. Richard Bland Lee of Virginia said (pp. 525, 526) : ^^It is laid down as a maxim in government by all judicious writers that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be kept as separate and distinct as possible, in order to secure the liberties of the people. And this maxim is founded on the experience of ages ; for we find that however governments have been estab- lished, however modified in their names or forms, if these powers are blended in or exercised by one body, the effects are ever the same — the public liberty is de- stroyed. * * * The framers of the Constitution * * * divided our gpvernment into three principal branches, with express declarations that all legislative power shall vest in one, all executive in another, and the whole judicial in a third. * * * " It is our duty to vest all executive power belonging to the government where the Convention intended it should be placed. It adds to the responsibility of the most responsible branch of the government ; and with- out responsibility we should have little security against the depredations and gigantic strides of arbitrary power. It 18 necessskry to hold up a single and specific object to THE PCBLIC MUST HAVB SOMEBODY TO WATCH. 133 the public jealousy to watch. Therefore it is necessary to connect the power of removal with the President. The Executive is the source of all appointments. Is his responsibility complete unless he has the power of re- moval? * * * If the power of removal is vested in the Senate, it is evident, at a single view, that the responsibility is dissipated, because the fault cannot be fixed on any individual. Besides the Senate are not accountable to the people. * * * gut even if they were, they have no powers to enable them to decide with propriety in the case of removals, and therefore are improper persons to exercise such authority." Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts said (pp. 533, 534) : << It has long been an opinion entertained of the people of America that they would not trust the gov- ernment with the power of doing good lest it should be abused. * * * The question on the present occasion seems to stand on nearly the same ground — whether we shall trust the power of doing good to the Executive Magistrate, or deprive him of it for fear he may abuse it. * * * The only security which the Constitution means to give us is to call the officers of government to account if they abuse their powers, and not to cramp their exercise so as to make them inef- ficient. * * * " It has been said that the power would be more safe in the hands of the Senate than m that of the President. But I do not view it in that light. * * * It would be a very inconvenient and useless power for them to be possessed of. It is in nothing similar to the power they have in appointments. There they are really use- ful by their advice, because it is more probable that the Senate may be better acquainted with the charac- ters of the officers that are nominated than the Presi- dent himself. But after their appointments such knowl- 134 BSMOVING SOMETIMES A SEPARATE POWER. edge is little required. The officer is placed under the control of the President, and it is only through him that the improper conduct of a person in a subordinate situ- ation can be known." Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania indulged in a semi- facetious speech, but he made one good point when he said (p. 533) : ^* Is anything more plain than that the President, above all the officers of government, both from the manner of his appointment and the nature of his duties, is truly and justly denominated the man of the people? Is there any other person who represents so many of them as the President ? He is elected by the voice of the people of the whole Union. The Sen- ate are the representatives of the State sovereignties. * * * Yet this body is held up as more nearly related to the people than the President himself." Abraham Baldwin of Georgia said (pp. 657, 558, 659) : " Gentlemen who undertake to construe, say they see clearly that the power which appoints must also remove. Now I have reviewed this subject with all the application and discernment my mind is capable of^ and have not been able to see any such thing. There is an agency given to the President in making appoint- ments, to which the Senate are connected. But how it follows that the connection extends to the removal, positively I cannot see. They say that it follows as a natural, inseparable consequence. This sounds like logic. But if we consult the premises, perhaps the conclusion may not follow. The Constitution opposes this maxim more than it supports it. The President is appointed by electors chosen by the people them- selves, or by the State Legislatures. Can the State Legislatures, either combined or separate, effect his re- moval ? No. But the Senate may, on impeachment hy this House. The judges are appointed by the Presi* THB RBSTBAINING PC WEB OF tliPEACBMEXT. 135 dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. But they are only removable by impeachment. The President has no agency in the removal. Hence, I say, it is not a natural consequence that the power which appoints should have the power of removal also. We may find it necessary that subordinate officers should be appointed in the first instance by the Presi- dent and Senate. I hope it will not be contended that the President and Senate shall be applied to in all cases when their removal may be necessary. * * * I (Jig. pute the maxim altogether ; for though it is sometimes true, it is often fallacious. Bu^ by no means is it that kind of conclusive argument which they contend for. " But what is the evil of the President being at lib- erty to exercise this power of removal? Why we fear that he will displace not one good officer only, but, in a fit of passion, all the good officers of the govern- ment ; by which, to be sure, the public would suffer. * * * I believe he could not turn out so many but that the Senate would still have some choice out of which to supply a good one. But even if he was to do this, what would be the consequence? He would be obliged to do the duties himself, or, if he did not, we would impeach him and turn him out of office as he had done others. I must admit though that there is a possibility of such an evil ; but it is a reniote possibility indeed. * * * Checked and surrounded as his powers are, I see little cause for apprehension." Peter Sylvester of New York said (p. 561) : "I lay it down as a positive case that the President is invested with all executive power necessary to carry the Consti- tution and the laws passed in pursuance thereof into full effect, so far as these powers are unchecked and uncontrolled by express stipulations in the Constitution. If the exceptions with respect to appointments had not 136 THE ADVOCATES OP SUSPENSION. been made, the President would have had that power as well as the power of removal. In the first his power is eclipsed by the interference of the Senate, but in the last the manifestation is clear. Both these powers be- ing inherent in the executive branch of the government, must remain there." SPEECHES IS FAVOR OP BEMOVAL BY THE PBESIDENT AND SENATE. Alexander White of Virginia, who made the motion to strike out the words " to be removable by the Presi- dent," said (pp. 467, 6<7) : "It was objected that the President could not remove an officer unless the Senate was in session, but yet the emergency of the case might ' demand an instant dismission. I should imagine that no inconvenience would result on this account, because, on my principle, the same power which can make a temporary appointment can make an equal suspension.* The powers are apposite to each other. " The gentleman (Mr. Madison) says we ought not to blend the executive and legislative powers further than they are blended in the Constitution. I contend we do not. There is no expression in the Constitution which says that the President shall have the power of removal from office. But the contrary is strongly im- plied, for it is said that Congress may establish offices by law, and vest the appointment, and consequently the removal, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or heads of departments. Now this shows that Con- gress are not at liberty to make any alteration by law in the mode of appointing superior officers, and conse- * The practicability of suspension In lieu of removal was also advoca- ted by Messrs. Jackson, Sherman, Page, Stone, and Tucker. Mr. Bou- dinot, as has already been shown, thought it would be too indecisive. THE DANGBK IN AN AUBITIODS PBEBIDXNT. 137 qaently that they are not at liberty to alter the manner of removal. " It has been said if the concurrence of the Senate be neceeaary, they may refuse to concur when a removal is proper, « • • Wg are to presume the Senate will do their duty. * * * But shall we, because the Senate may do wrong, give the President the power to act without them ? Is it contended that the Presi- dent has any snperior agency in this business because he nominates ? We may as well contend, on the same principle, that because this House lias the exclusive power of originating money bills, we may repeal a law of that nature without the consent of the Senate," William Smith of South Carolina said (pp. 457, 458, SOS) : " I imagine, sir, we are declaring a power in the President which may hereafter be greatly abused. * * * We ougbt to • • * contemplate this power in the bands of an ambitious man, who might apply it to dangerous purposes. If we give this power to the President, he may, from caprice, remove the most worthy men from office. * * • *' Another danger may result. If you desire an of- ficer to be a man of capacity and integrity, you may be disappointed. A gentleman possessed of these qual- ities, knowing he may be removed at the pleasure of the President, will be loath to risk his reputation on snch insecure ground. As the matter stands in the Constitution, he knows if he is suspected of doing any- thing wrong he shall have a fair trial, and the whole of his transaotions be developed by a He will have confidence i can only be removed for i^ is subjected to the whimti from entering iiilo the seri if he is not subeervient I 138 ALSXANDBB HAMILTON ON BEMOYALS. may be turned out, and the public may be led to sup- pose for improper behavior. This impression cannot be removed, as a public inquiry cannot be obtained. Be- sides this, it ought to be considered that the person who is appointed will probably quit some other office or business in which he is occupied. Ought he, after mak- ing this sacrifice in order to serve the public, to be turned out of place without even a reason being as- signed for such behavior ? Perhaps the President does not do this with an ill intention. He may have been misinformed ; for it is presumable that a President may have around him men envious of the honors and emol- uments of persons in office, who will insinuate suspi- cions into his honest breast that may produce a re- moval. Be this as it may, the event is still the same to the removed officei*. The public suppose him guilty of malpractices. Hence his reputation is blasted, his property sacrificed. I say his property is sacrificed, because I consider his office as his property. He is stripped of this and left exposed to the malevolence of the world, contrary to the principles of the Constitution, and contrary to the principles of all free governments, which are that no man shall be despoiled of his prop- erty but by a fair and impartial trial. '^ Gentlemen say we ought not to suppose such an abuse of power in the President. But the Constitution wisely guards against his caprice in the appointment, and why should we abate the security in cases of re- moval?"* * Representative Smith made the following quotation from General Alexander Hamilton (" The Federalist," Hallowell Ed., p. 868): " It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co- operation of the Senate in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change TBNUBE DURING GOOD BSHAVIOB. 139 On page 471 Mr. Smith says : " It will not be con- tended that the State governments did not furnish the late Convention with the skeleton of this Constitution. I have turned over the Constitutions of most of the States. In some instances I find the Executive Magis- trate suspends, but none of them have the right to re- move officers." On page 459 he says that in order to test and decide the constitutionality of the question of removal, a removed officer could apply to a court of justice for a mandamus to be restored to his office, and that the court would settle it. As to the tenure of sub- ordinate officers, he said they could " be regulated by law." But as to the removal of chief officials, he said that inasmuch as the Constitution prescribed impeach- ment only, it " contemplated only this mode." Messrs. Page and Huntington also believed in removal by im- peachment. Impeachment for removal, except where required by the Constitution, is of course impracticable nowadays, even for the Secretary of State, which cor- responds to the then (1789) proposed Secretary of For- eign Affairs. Messrs. Smith, Page, and Stone favored the holding of offices during good behavior. Other Representatives were opposed to this principle, and yet of the Chief Magistrate therefore would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government as might be expected if he were the Bole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station has given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new Presi- dent would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him by the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of dis- credit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which con- nects the official existence of public men with the approbation or disap- probation of that body, which, from the greater permanency of its own composition, will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy than any other member of the government." 140 BEMOVAL A QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. they feared that wortliy men would be removed from office. In this respect their arguments were both in- consistent and contradictory. Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut said (p. 459) : " I think the clause ought not to stand. It was well observed that the Constitution was silent respecting the removal otherwise than by impeachment. I would like- wise add that it mentions no other cause of removal than treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misde- meanors. It does not, I apprehend, extend to cases of infirmity or incapacity. Indeed it appears hard to me that after an officer has become old in an honorable ser- vice, he should be impeached for this infirmity. * * * It was said if the President had this authority, it would make him more responsible for the conduct of the of- ficer. But if we have a vicious President, who inclines to abuse this power, which God forbid, his responsi- bility will stand us in little stead. Therefore that idea does not satisfy me that it is proper the President should have this power." Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts said (pp. 472, 473, 502, 574) : '^ Some gentlemen consider this as a ques- tion of policy. But to me it appears a question of constitutionality, and I presume it will be determined on that point alone. "The best arguments I have heard urged on this occasion came from the honorable gentleman from Vir- ginia (Mr. Madison). He says the Constitution has vested the executive power in the President, and that he has a right to exercise it under the qualifications therein made. He lays it down as a maxim that the Constitution vesting in the President the executive power, naturally vests him with the power of appoint- ment and removal. Now I would be glad to know from that gentleman by what means we are to decide this THE SENATE'S SALUTAKT STABILITY. 141 question. Is bis maxim supported by precedent drawn from tbe practice of tbe individual States? Tbe direct contrary is establisbed. In many cases tbe Executives are not in particular vested witb tbe power of appoint- ment. And do tbey exercise that power by virtue of their office ? It will be found that other branches of the government make appointments. How then can gentlemen assert that the powers of appointment and removal are incident to the executive department of government? To me it appears at best but problem- atical. Neither is it clear to me that the power that appoints naturally possesses the power of removal. " It has been argued that if the power of removal vests in the President alone, it annuls or renders nuga- tory the clause in the Constitution which directs the concurrence of the Senate in the case of appointments. It behooves us not to adopt principles subversive of those established by the Constitution. ** It has been frequently asserted, on former occa- sions, that the Senate is a permanent body, and was so constructed in order to give durability to public mea- sures. If they are not absolutely permanent, they are formed on a renovating principle, which gives them a salutary stability. This is not the case either with the President or House of Representatives. * * * j^ appears to me that a permanency was expected in the magistracy,* and therefore the Senate were combined in the appointment to office. But if the President alone has the power of removal, it is in his power at any time to destroy all that has been done. It appears to me that such a principle would be destructive of the intention of the Constitution, expressed by giving the power of appointment to the Senate. It also subverts the clause which gives the Senate the sole power of * This could not be unless a President were elected term after term. 142 MB. GEBBT FSABS THE PBESIDBXT. trying impeachments, becaase the President may re- move the officer in order to screen him from the effects of their judgment on an impeachment. Why should we construe any part of the Constitution in such a manner as to destroy its essential principles, when a more consonant construction can be obtained? * * * *^ It has been said by my colleague that these officers are the creatures of the law. But it seems as if we were not content with that. We are making them the mere creatures of the President. They dare not exer- cise the privilege of their creation, if the President shall order them to forbear, because he holds their thread of life. His power will be sovereign over them, and will soon swallow up the small security we have in the Senate's concurrence to the appointment ; and we shall shortly need no other than the authority of the supreme executive officer to nominate, appoint, con- tinue, or remove. * * * " It is said that the President will be subject to im- peachment for dismissing a good man. This in my mind involves an absurdity. How can the House im- peach the President for doing an act which the Leg- islature has submitted to his discretion? "The Senate and this House may think it necessary to inquire why a good officer is dismissed. The Presi- dent will say : * It is my pleasure. I am authorized by law to exercise this prerogative. I have my reasons for it, but you have no right to inquire them of me.' This language may be proper in a monarchy ; but in a republic every action ought to be accounted for." Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire said (pp. 478, 479) : " Surely a law passed by the whole Legislature cannot be repealed by one branch of it. So I conceive in the case of appointments it requires the same force to superseda an officer as to put him in office. I ac- BXSCUTIVE POWBB NOT ALL PRESIDENT'S. 143 knowledge that the clause relative to impeachment is for the benefit of the people. It is intended to enable their representatives to bring a bad officer to justice who is screened by the President. But I do not con- ceive, with the honorable gentleman from South Caro- lina (Mr. Smith), that it by any means excludes the usual ways of superseding officers. '^ When an important and confidential trust is placed in a man, it is worse than death to him to be displaced without cause. His reputation depends on the single will of the President, who may ruin him on bare sus- picion. Nay, a new President may turn him out on mere caprice, or in order to make room for a favorite. This contradicts all my notions of propriety. Every- thing of this sort should be done with due deliberation. Every person ought to have a hearing before he is pun- ished." James Jackson of Georgia said (pp. 487, 488, 489, 630, 631, 556) : "If this power is incident to the ex- ecutive branch of government, it does not follow that it vests in the President alone, because he alone does not possess all executive powers. The Constitution has lodged the power of forming treaties, and all executive business, I presume, connected therewith, in the Presi- dent ; but it is qualified by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Sen- ate agree therein. The same has taken place with re- spect to appointing ofiicers. * * * It may be wrong that the great powers of government should be blended in this manner. But we cannot separate them. The error is adopted in the Constitution. * * * " Behold the baleful influence of the royal preroga- tive when officers hold their commissions during the pleasure of the Crown! At this moment, see the King of Sweden aiming at arbitrary power, shutting up the 144 PRESIDENT AND SENATE CHECK EACH OTHEIS. doors of his Senate, and compelling, by force of arms, his shuddering councilors to acquiesce in his despotic mandates.* I agree that this is the hour in which we ought to establish our government. But it is an hour in which we should be wary and cautious, especially in what respects the Executive Magistrate. With the present, I grant, every power may be safely lodged. * * * May not a man with a Pandora's box in his breast come into power and give us sensible cause to lament our present confidence and want of foresight? * * * I think this power too great to be safely trusted in the hands of a single man, especially in the hands of a man who has so much constitutional power. * * * I cannot agree to extend this power, because I conceive it may at some future period be exercised in such a way as to subvert the liberties of my country. * * * If the President has the power of removing all officers who may be virtuous enough to oppose his base measures, what would become of the liberties of our fellow-citizens? * * * " I differ with gentlemen who say that the Senate have no part of the executive power, or that the Presi- dent has no part of the legislative authority. I con- sider them as checks upon each other, to prevent the abuse of either. And it is in this way the liberties of the people are secured. I appeal for the truth of this sentiment to the writings of Puhlius, f " I call upon gentlemen once more to * * * prove to me that it was not the intention of this Constitu- tion to blend the executive and legislative powers. If these are the principles of the Constitution, why will * Compare with Mr. Vining's remarks, page 121. Also see the ad- mirable Swedish civil service regulations of the present day, page 186. The contrast between Sweden in 1789 and 1888 is remarkable. f Alexander Hamilton. MB. PAGE'S HIGH OPINION OF THE SENATE. 145 gentlemen contend for the independency of each branch of the government?" John Page of Virginia said (pp. 490-1, 519-20, 551, 552) : ^' I venture to assert that this clautje of the bill contains in it the seeds of royal prerogative. If gen- tlemen lay such stress on the energy of the government, I beg them to consider how far this doctrine may go. Everything which has been said in favor of energy in the Executive, may go to the destruction of freedom, and establish despotism. This very energy, so much talked of, has led many patriots to the Bastile, to the block, and to the halter. If the Chief Magistrate can take a man away from the head of a department with- out assigning any reason, he may as well be invested with power, on certain occasions, to take away his ex- istence. But will you contend that this idea is con- sonant with the principles of a free government, where no man ought to be condemned unheard, nor till after a solemn conviction of guilt, on a fair and impartial trial ? * * * If gentlemen had been content to say that the President might suspend, I should second the motion, and afterward the officer might be removed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. "The framers of the government had confidence in the Senate, or they would not have combined them with the Executive in the performance of his duties. * * * Some gentlemen contend that the Senate are a dangerous and aristocratic body. But I contend that they are a safe and salutary branch of the government, representing the republican Legislatures of the individ- ual States, and intended to preserve the sovereignty and independence of the State governments, which they are more likely to do than the President, who is elected by the people at large. A populsfr President, influenced by the sentiments of his electors, may be induced to 146 FOUBFOLD CHECKS ON THE PBESIDENT. believe that it would be best for the general interest that those governments were destroyed. But as long as we have that body independent of him, and secured in their authority, we may defy such impotent attempts. They will watch his conduct and prevent the exercise of despotic power. But if they are weakened and strip- ped of their essential authority, they will become weak barriers against the strides of an uncontrolled power. If you take from them their right to check the Presi- dent in the removal of officers, they cannot prevent the dismission of a faithful servant who has opposed the arbitrary mandates of an ambitious President. The principles laid down in the Constitution clearly evince that the Senate ought not only to have a voice in the framing of laws, but ought also to see to their execu- tion. * * * I myself shall never be satisfied unless I see fourfold checks upon the President. It (the clause in the bill) will inevitably lead to the establishment of those odious prerogatives which we, by an arduous con- flict, have been endeavoring to get rid of. "Indecision, delay, blunders — nay, villainous actions in the administration of government — ^are trifles com- pared to legalizing the full exertion of a tyrannical despotism. Good God ! What ! authorize in a free republic, by law too, by your first act, the exertion of a dangerous royal prerogative in your Chief Magis- trate ! What I where honor and virtue ought to be the support of your government, will you infuse and cherish meanness and servility in your citizens, and in- solence and arbitrary power in your Chief Magistrate, when you know that thousands of virtuous citizens are dissatisfied with your government because they think they see the seeds of monarchy in it ? And two whole States have refused to unite with you because they think your government dangerous to their liberties ! «*A MONSTROUS DOCTBINB. " 147 Will you openly, before their faces, in a solemn act of Congress, insert words which fully justify their opin- ions and fears ? * * * ''It is said the officers ought to be commissioned durante bene placitOy et ne dure se bene gesserint^* a monstrous doctrine. As to inferior officers, who, we are told, must also be impeached, Congress have a con- stitutional right to empower the President to appoint, and, I suppose, to remove also ; not that the power nec- essarily follows appointments." Roger Sherman of Connecticut said (pp. 491, 492, 538, 576) : '' It is a general principle in law as well as reason that there shall be the same authority to remove as to establish * * * unless there are express ex- ceptions made. * * * It is so in legislation, where the several branches whose concurrence is necessary to pass a law, must concur in repealing it. Just so I take it to be in cases of appointment ; and the President alone may remove when he alone appoints, as in the case of inferior officers to be established by law. * * * I have not heard any gentleman produce an authority from law or history which proves that where two branches are interested in the appointment, one of them has the power of removal. I remember that the gen- tleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Sedgwick) told us that the two Houses, notwithstanding the partial negative of the President, possessed the whole legislative power. But will the gentleman infer from that that because the concurrence of both branches is necessary to pass a law, a less authority can repeal it? This is all we contend for. " If gentlemen would consent to make a general law declaring the proper mode of removal, I think we should acquire a greater degree of unanimity, which, on this * During good pleasure, and not during good behavior. 148 "A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS OP MEN." occasion, must be better than carrying the question against a large minority." Michael Jenifer Stone of Maryland said (pp. 493, 495, 564, 566, 567, 568, 569) : " If the Constitution had given no rule by which ofEcers were to be appointed, I should search for one in my own mind. But as the Constitution has laid down the rule, I consider the mode of removal as clearly defined as by implication it can be. It ought to be the same as that of the appointment. What quality of the human mind is necessary for the one that is not necessary for the other ? Information, impartiality, and judgment in the business to be con- ducted are necessary to make a good appointment. Are not the same properties necessary for a dismission ? " I cannot subscribe to the opinion that the executive, in its nature, implies the power to appoint the officers of government. Why does it imply it ? The appoint- ment of officers depends upon the qualities that are nec- essary for forming a judgment on the merits of men ;* and the displacing of them, instead of including the idea of what is necessary for an executive officer, in- cludes the idea necessary for a judicial one. Therefore it cannot exist, in the nature of things, that an execu- tive power is either to appoint or displace the officers of government. Is it a political dogma ? Is it founded in experience ? If it is, 1 confess it has been very lon^ wrapped up in mysterious darkness. * * * It is very forcible to my mind that the Constitution has con- fined his (the President's) sole appointment to the case of inferior officers. * * * "Now I would ask, in all cases where the integrity * Mr. Stone cut very close to the civil service law, for the examiners, by the aid of competitive examinations, form ** a judgment on the merits of men.'* The law is the fulfillment of his prophecy, namely, " I believe the people can apply a remedy,'' &c. (p. 149). BALANCE BETWEEN PBESIDENT AND SENATE. 149 and confidmice is the same, whether it is more likely that one man should do right and exercise his power with propriety than a number of men with the aid of each other's deliberations? Is it more likely that a number of men should do wrong than one man ? * * * It would be more difficult for a majority to be obtained in a body composed of members of thirteen independ- ent States in favor of despotic measures than might justly be expected from the caprice or want of judg- ment in a single individual. Is it likely the danger would be so great? I apprehend it is not. * * * " If the evils we apprehend should absolutely arise from our determination, I do not conceive, with some other gentlemen, that we are inevitably ruined. I be- lieve the people can apply a remedy ; and 1 have no doubt but they have sense and resolution enough for that purpose. * * * '^ I suppose it is necessary to keep up the balance be- tween the Executive Magistrate and the Senate. What is this balance? It is laid down in the Constitution that the President shall nominate and the Senate ap- prove. We are bound then to carry this balance throughout all the subjects to which it relates. If the President has the sole power of removal, you destroy the power of the Senate. And though you do not ex- pressly put the power of appointment in the President alone, yet you put it there effectively, because he may defeat, by removal, the joint appointment. Will this be giving the proper balance which the Constitution directs? No. It will be directly the reverse. " If all executive power is vested in the President, what right has this House to prescribe him rules to in- terfere in forming executive officers ? The Executive can better form them for itself. * * * " If I look to the constitution or nature of things, I 150 AN APPOINTMEXT AN IMPLIED CONTRACT. should be led to conclude that the body choosing ag(>nts has the power of dismissing them, because the power naturally lodges in those who have the interest and management of the concern. The executive business of this officer is under the superintendence and man- agement of the Senate as well as the President. Trea- ties with foreign nations must be conducted by the advice of the Senate, and concluded with their consent. Hence results a necessity in that body having a concern in the choice and dismissal of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. I do not see any other sure or safe bottom on which the question can be determined. '^ In the nature of things, in all appointments, there is an implied contract ; on the part of the officer that he will perform the service, and on the part of those who appoint him that he shall have an adequate re- ward. In the engagement of the officer, qualities com- mensurate with the duties are required. In the reward, the dignity of the station and the qualities of the of- ficer ought to be' estimated. And although in this en- gagement an officer may dispense of certain forms of trial, yet he can never surrender a natural right — he cannot engage to be punished without being guilty, or dismissed without being useless. It has been well ob- served that the appointment ought to cease when the causes of it no longer exist. But it is equally clear that it ought to continue as long as the reasons re- main. And although in public and private life it may be proper to discharge an agent without divulging the reason, yet clearly a good reason ought to precede the dismission, because otherwise you do an act of injus- tice by a breach of contract. * * * " It has been judged by some gentlemen a dreadful affair that the President should become a party before the Senate. It would degrade his dignity. It was said LIBEBTT EXALTS THE HUMAN SPECIES. 151 the judiciary would be pleased if this weighty question could be taken off their hands. To what a hight do gentlemen exalt that character in their own minds ! How far above the level of the people, when they con- sider it derogatory to his dignity to institute an exam- ination into the conduct of an officer next to himself in rank I when they consider it almost above human na- ture to determine a question of right between the Presi- dent and a great officer of the United States. If gen- tlemen have an idea that this character is to have such a degree of elevation above the community, it is time to think of restraining his power.* On what does power depend ? Not on the strength of arm, but opinion. If gentlemen will exalt a character above themselves, call him what you will, he will be possessed of monarchy. " We have expended our treasure, our blood, and our time to very little purpose if we do not think that lib- erty and safety exalt the human species. From the meanest to the highest rank in life, the propriety of conduct arises from the security and independence of situation. * * * " If a man is a candidate for an office held by the tenure of will and pleasure, he must examine his soul and see if there are qualities in him to enable him to cringe and submit to the arbitrary mandate of the Pres- ident. If he finds these qualities in his disposition, he is suited for the business. But if the Constitution is to be justly administered, and he finds himself disposed * Mr. Stone, so far as I know, is the first American to make this sug- gestion. It is fitting that the author of such a clear, profound, and pro- phetic argument should have this honor. A worthy President is entitled to the support, good-will, and even love of the people, but he is no better as a man than any other worthy citizen. Further, respectful criticism of the President's official acts is always in order, even by ofiiceholders. Intelligent criticism is often useful. 152 PBOPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. to sacriiice to the pleasure of the Chief Magistrate, although he possesses qualities which suited him for his employment, yet he is unfit for the office." Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina said (pp. 584, 585) : *^ I am embarrassed on this question, as the yeas and nays are called, because the vote is taken in such a manner as not to express the principles upon which I vote. In the Committee of the Whole I voted for striking out the words that are now proposed to be struck out, and my reason was I was doubtful whether it was proper to vest, on this occasion, the power in the President alone. It appears to me that the power is not necessarily vested in the President by the Constitution ; neither in the President and Senate. I find no words that fix this power precisely in any branch of the government. It must, however, by im- plication be in the Legislature, or it is nowhere until the Constitution is amended. * * * X apprehend a law is necessary in every instance to determine the ex- ercise of the power. In some cases it may be proper that the President alone should have it. I am not clear in my own mind what general rule, if any, can be established on this subject. Perhaps in other cases it may be lodged with the President and Senate ; or it may be given to the heads of departments. But who- soever is invested with it, it must be in consequence of a law ; and the Legislature have a right to vest it where they please." Mr. Tucker closed his speech by saying, among other things, that perhaps it would be out of order to change the word remove to suspend, * * Mr. Tucker, some weeks after the close of the debate, mored the consideration of numerous amendments to the Constitution, among them the following (p. 762) : " Art. ii, Sec. 4, clause 8. At the end add these words : He shall also have power to suspend from his office, for a time JOHN ADAMS'S MISTAKE (NOTE). 153 Thomas Sumter of South Carolina said (p. 591) : ^^ This bill appears to my mind so subversive of the Constitution, and in its consequences so destructive to the liberties of the people, that I caunot consent to let it pass without expressing my detestation of the principle it contains. I do it in this public manner in order to fulfill what 1 think to be my duty to my country, and to discharge myself of any concern in a matter that I do not approve."* The bill passed the House by a vote of 29 to 22, and went to the Senate on the 14th of July. As before said, the words " to be removable by the President," had been amended to read : " whenever the said prin- cipal officer shall be removed from office by the Presi- dent of the United States^ the chief clerk shall, during the vacancy, have charge and custody," Ac. It was moved to strike out the italicized words. The debate lasted nearly four days, only one day less than that in the House. The vote was a tie (9 to 9), but as Vice- President Adams f voted in the negative, the words stood. The Senate's action was disinterested if not not exceeding twelve months, any officer whom he shall have reason to think unfit to be intrusted with the duties thereof ; and Congress may by law provide for the absolute removal of officers found to be unfit for the trust reposed in them." Also the following : " Art. i, Sec. 6, clause 2. Amend to read thus : No person having been elected, and having taken his seat as a Senator or Repre.4entntive, shall, during the time for which he was elected, he appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States." * The world owes Mr. Sumter more than is apparent in the above remarks. Twice during the five days' debate he appealed to the House to postpone calling the yeas and nays in order to give the subject a full and free discussion. f Mr. Adams thought the Senate ought not to confirm appointments, as it would lessen the responsibility of the President, turn public atten- tion to and excite ambition in the Senate, &c. (Works, vi, 433.) 154 SIJ/IPLB AND COMPOUND POWEBS. patriotic, for it delegated a power to the President which by implication at least belonged to itself and the President. The Senate sat with closed doors from 1789 till 1796, "with a single exception, through all leg- islative as well as executive transactions." But Vice- President Adams kept notes for at least one day (July 15), and it is to him that the world is indebted for the following glimpse of what must have been a very in- structive debate (" Works of John Adams," vol. iii, pp. 408 to 412). NOTES OF ONE DAY'S DEBATE IN THE SENATE. Charles Carroll of Maryland : " The executive power is commensurate with the legislative and judicial pow- ers. "The rule of construction of treaties, statutes, and deeds. "The same power which creates must annihilate. This is true where the power is simple, but when com- pound, not. "If a Minister ia suspected to betray secrets to an enemy, the Senate not sitting, cannot the President dis- place nor suspend ? " The States*General of France demanded that offices should be during good behavior. "It is improbable that a bad President should be chosen ; but may not bad Senators be chosen ? "Is there a due balance of power between the exec- utive and legislative, either in the general government or State governments? ^'Montesquieu, English liberty will be lost when the legislative shall be more corrupt than the executive. Have we not been witnesises of corrupt adts of Legis- latures, making depredations? Rhode Island yet per- severes." SQUILIBBIUM OP CONSTITUTIONAL POWEB. 165 Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut : " We are sworn to support the Constitution. " There is an explicit grant of power to the President which contains the power of removal. The executive power is granted ; not the executive powers hereinafter enumerated and explained. " The President, not the Senate, appoints ; they only consent and advise. '* The Senate is not an executive council ; has no executive power. "The grant to the President express, not by impli- cation." Pierce Butler of South Carolina : " This power of re- moval would be unhinging the equilibrium of power in the Constitution. " The Stadtholder withheld the fleet from going out, to the annoyance of the enemies of the nation. "In treaties, all powers not expressly given, are re- served. Treaties to be gone over, clause by clause, by the President and Senate together, and modeled. " The other branches are imbecile ; disgust and alarm ; the President not sovereign ; the United States sovereign, o/ people or Congress sovereign. "The House of Representatives would not be in- duced to depart, so well satisfied of the grounds." Senator Ellsworth again : " The powers of this Con- stitution are all vested ; parted from the people, from the States, and vested, not in Congress, but in the President. " The word sovereignty is introduced without deter- minate ideas. Power in the last resort. In this sense the sovereign executive is in the President. "The United States will be parties to a thousand suits. Shall process issue in their name versus or for themselves ? 156 THE PBESIDENT NOT ABOVE THE LAW. "The President, it is said, may be put to jail for debt." Richard Henry Lee of Virginia : " United States merely figurative, meaning the people." William Grayson of Virginia : " The President is not above the law ; an absurdity to admit this idea into our government. Not improbable that the Presi- dent may be sued. Christina II of Sweden committed murder. France excused her. The jurors of our lord, the President, present that the President committed murder. A monarchy by a side wind. You make him vindex injuriarian,* The people will not like * the ju- rors of our lord, the President,' nor * the peace of our lord, the President,' nor his dignity ; his crown will be left out. Do not wish to make the Constitution a more unnatural, monstrous production than it is. The British Court is a three-legged stool ; if one leg is longer than another, the stool will not stand. " Unpalatable ; the removal of officers not palatable. We should not risk anything for nothing. Come for- ward like men, and reason openly, and the people will bear more quietly than if you attempt side winds. This measure will do no good, and will disgust." Senator R. H. Lee again : " The danger to liberty greater from the disunited opinions and jarring plans of many than from the energetic operations of one. Mariiis, Sylla, Caesar, Cromwell trampled on liberty with armies. " The power of pardon ; of adjourning the Legisla- ture. " Power of revision sufficient to defend himself. He would be supported by the people. ** Patronage gives great influence. The interference more nominal than real. * Au uveiiger of injury. ENGLISH LIBEBTY OWING TO JURIES. 157 " The greater part of power of making treaties in the President. " The greatest power is in the President ; the less in the Senate. " Cannot see responsibility in the President or the great officers of state. "A masked battery of constructive powers would complete the destruction of liberty. '^ Can the Executive lay embargoes, establish fairs (8ic)y tolls, Ac.r' " The Federal government is limited ; the legislative power of it is limited ; and therefore the executive and judicial must be limited. " The Executive not punishable but by universal con- vulsion, as Charles I. * Mr. Martin says : ** Provinces contend for the shining prize, and the town that gives the victor birth becomes noted forever. Swift heralda bear the tidings of his triumph, and the hearts of the people leap at their approach. We have seen them enter a humble cottage, and amid the flaunting of banners and the blare of trumpets, announce to its startled inmates that one of their relations had been crowned by the Emperor as the laureate of the year. And so high was the estimation in which the people held the success of their fellow-townsman, that his wife was requested to visit the six gates of the city, and to scatter be- fore each a handful of rice, that the whole population might share in the good fortune of her household. " Mr. Martin may well ask what could be more democratic than choos- ing one of the chief officers of a nation of about 400,000,000 people from *' a humble cottage," or words to thai effect. CONPDCIUS'S WISDOM AND STATESMANSHIP. 193 it One great defect," says the Encyclopedia Britan- nica (v, 669), "in the competiiive system in China is that there is no limit to the number of candidates, nor to the age when they may go up for examination, and the result is that, what with the surplus victors and the unsuccessful aspirants,* who go on trying year after year until they have become gray-haired old men, there exists a large non*producing class in the community which acts as a dead weight on the national prosperity.'* Confucius (551 B.C.), the philosopher and statesman, whose wise words are an important supplement to the foregoing extracts, speaking of officeseekers and office- holders, says ("Chinese Classics," i, 189) : "While they have not got their aims, their anxiety is how to get them. When they have got them, their anxiety is lest they should lose them. When they are anxious lest such things should be lost, there is nothing to which they will not proceed." Confucius's estimate of the value of education as a qualification for officeholding may be inferred from the *Dr. Martin, who is now (Nov., 1890), lecturing in this country, says: "There are no surplus victors in the competition for the \hird degree, the only one that professes to open to them the doors of office." William Alexander Parsons Martin, D.D., LL.D., was bom in Livo- nia, Indiana, April 10, 1827; went to Ning-po, China, in 1850, where he was engaged for ten years in missionary labor. From 1863 till 1868 he was a missionary at Peking, and in 1869 became President of the Tong Weng College in that city and Professor of international law. He acted as an adviser of Chinese officials on questions of international law when disputes have arisen with European powers, nbtably during the conflict with France in 1884-85. In 1885 he was made a Mandarin of the third class. (Appleton's Cyc of Am. Biography, iv, 234.) Dr. Martin is the author of a work entitled " The Chinese : their Ed- ucation, Philosophy, and Letters" (Harpers, 1881), and he will "soon bring out another volume of similar import" 9 194 OBEAT UNITY OF THE CHINESE. following (p. 208) : " The student, having completed his learning, should apply himself to be an officer. The officer, having discharged all his duties, should devote his leisure to learning/' A government founded on these principles is sure to stand. It is like a house built on a rock. When it perishes, if a government founded on such imperishable principles can perish, it will be from natural causes. But alas for the Chinese, the same wall that for so xnany centuries inclosed their learning and wisdom, also excluded the learning and wisdom of other nations ! John W. Draper says ("Intellectual Development of Europe, '^ ii, 397, 398) : "A trustworthy account of the present condition of China would be a valuable gift to philosophy, and also to statesmanship. On a former page I have remarked that it demands the highest pol- icy to govern populations living in great differences of latitude. Yet China has not only controlled her cli- matic strands of people— she has even made them, if not homogeneous, yet so fitted to each other that they all think and labor alike. Europe is inevitably hasten- ing to become what China is. In her we may see what we shall be like when we are old.'* In two respects, at least, the United States and China are much alike, namely, in great extent of territory and "great diflferences of latitude." If we can make our " climatic strands of people think and labor alike," the success of republican government is probably assured. Montesquieu says ("Spirit of Laws," Am. Ed., i, 266, 263, 270): " If it be true that the temper of the mind and the passions of the heart are extremely different in different climates, the laws ought to be relative both to ihe variety of those passions and to the variety of those tempers. — ^The law which forbade the Carthaginians to drink wine, was a law of the climate. Such a law would be improper for cold countries, where the climate seems to force them to a kind of national intemperance very different from personal ebriety. — Happy climate which gives birth to innocence and produces a lenity in the law." APPENDIX. Note. — The following articles were written for the Albany Evening Journal by the author of this work, but only two of tlie five were published by it The matter has been retouched, and a few notes have been added. FIRST ARTICLE. To the Albany Evening Journal: A writer in your paper of the 12th instant (Nov., 1889), objects to the civil service law because it is an experiment. The objection is not valid, because all laws are experiments. Sir George Cornwell Lewis truly says. (See note, page 25.) The writer also says, and repeats the assertion (in substance) five times in the course of his article> that the certification of three names to an appointing officer is "practically to dictate appointments/' Again he is mistaken, for an appointing officer may, if he deems it for the good of the service, object in writing to ap- pointing any or all of the three. (See Fifth An. Rept. TJ. S. C. S. Com., p. 60.) The law, in fact, is flexible. It does not say that the President shall or must do thus and so, but that he "is authorized^' to do thus and so. In fact, in case of an emergency — of war, for example — if he deemed it for the public good, he could temporarily suspend the operation of the entire civil, service law system, just as, under similar circum- 196 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM UTTERAlSrCES. stances, the writ of habeas corpus (the guardian of our liberties), may be constitutionally suspended. The writer is again mistaken when he says : "No party in convention ever proclaimed what the character of the desired reform should be/* (See note, p. 94.) The question of official removals, about which the writer speaks, is of great importance. The power of removal is just as necessary in public business as it is in private business, for it is essential to discipline. But it is often abused. A remedy for its abuse is one of the errors of omission of the civil service law. (See p. 114.) 4c 4c 4c 4c 4c 4c 4t ' Note. — One of the headings to the above article was as follows : "A Plank from such Eminent Authority as a Democratic Platform." The following planks are taken from such eminent authority as Republican platforms : 18Y2. "Any system of the civil service under which the subordi- nate positions of the government are considered rewards for mere party zeal is &tally demoralizing, and we therefore favor a reform of the sys- tem by laws which shall abolish the evils of patronage, and make hon- esty, efficiency, and fidelity the essential qualifications for public posi- tion, without practically creating a life tenure of office." 18*76. The gist of it was that "Senators and Representatives * * * should not dictate appointments to office," and that minor offices should " be filled by persons selected with sole reference to efficiency of the public service." 1880. ♦ ♦ ♦ "Fitness, ascertained by proper practical testa, shall admit to the public service; ♦ ♦ * that the tenure shall be during good behavior, with power of removal for causa" 1884. " The reform of the civil service, auspiciously begun under Republican administration, should be completed by the further exten- sion of the reformed system, already established by law, to all the grades of the service to which it is applicable. The spirit and purpose of the reform should be observed in all executive appointments, and all laws at variance with the object of existing reformed legislation should b^ repealed, to the end that the dangers to free institutions which lurk in the power of official patronage may be wisely and effectively avoided." 1888. After speaking of "the men who abandoned the Republican CIVIL SEEVICE REFORM IN ENOLAISTD. 197 party in 1884," it says : " We will not fiiil to keep our pledges because they have broken theirs, or because their candidate has broken ids. "We therefore repeat our declaration of 1884" (as above). The only notable civil service reform utterance in a national Demo- cratic platform, except that of 1876 (printed on page 94), is that of 1872, as follows : " The civil service of the government has become a mere instrument of partisan tyranny and personal ambition, and an object of selfish greed. It is a scandal and reproach upon free insti- tutions, and breeds a demoralization dangerous to the perpetuity of re- publican government," &>c SECOND AETICLE. To the Albany Evening Journal: Mr. Ham begins his second article by saying that competitive examina- tions have " been on trial in England since 1871, with indifferent and unsatisfactory results/' They have been on trial since May 21, 1855, and have so purified the civil service of that country that the old act of 1782, which disfranchised 40,000 excise, customs, and postof- fice officials for corruption at elections, was repealed in 1858. Mr. Ham also says that public opinion in Eng- land " has veered around and is now opposing it '* (the competitive system). The aristocracy of England have always been more or less opposed to the system. (See p. 69.) As to the '* commission '' which Mr. Ham says "has been sitting there for over two years,'' seeking remedies for defects, I have addressed a letter of inquiry to the British Civil Service Commission, the answer to which I will, if permitted, publish in the Journal, * * In a letter of Dec. 19, 1889, the Secretary of the British Civil Ser» vice Commission says : " I inclose for your perusal a copy of the Treas- ury Minute of August last, on the recommendations of the Royal Com- mission of Civil Establishments (called from its Chairman the Ridley Commission). This Commission was appointed to inquire how &r the scheme of Civil Service Organization recommended by the Playiair 198 ENGLAND'S ADMIRABLE POSTAL SEBVICE. In the same paragraph Mr. Ham says^ in effect^ that civil service reformers oppose the discussion of civil Commission some thirteen years ago had been tried, and whether any modifications of this scheme were needed. The main principle of the Playfair Scheme was the division of tlie service into two grades of clerkships, recruited by two different open competitive examinations, the regulations regarding which I inclose; and this arrangement is fully accepted and approved for the future. The compititive exami- nations held under these regulations have, however, for a time been discontinued, pending the substitution of Lower Division for Higher Division clerks, and the extension of the hours of work in the Lower (or Second) Division. These examinations will, however, be resumed as soon as the reorganization of the service is complete. "The regulations, which I also inclose for your perusal, regarding examinations for female clerks, boy clerks, and telegraph learners, as well as those for higher appointments abroad (in Lidia, Ceylon), and for some technical appointments, will show you that the general prin- ciple of selection by open competition is fully maintained." The Royal Commission, in the course of the Treasury Minute, says : " The reform of the civil service * * * will in no great number of years attain, or nearly attain, the object at which the Playfiur and Ridley Commissions have aimed. * * * Changes should be car- ried out gradually, and with the minimum of disturbance. It cannot be doubted that constant reorganization is prejudicial to discipline and to that confidence in easy and steady administration which is essential to the efficiency of the civil service." A. J. Mundella, M. P., says : " The postal service was the first to be rescued from the influence of politics. * * * The postal de- partment is as well served as any private firm in Great Britain — I believe I should be justified in saying better served. It is the one department of which all Englishmen are proud. It is unequaled for punctuality, civility, and dispatch. It has been able to go on steadily with reductions and reforms. * * * "The competitive system was adopted as the test of fitness for of- ficial employment ; and I stand before you the representative of one of the largest constituencies in England, without the power to influ- ence in the smallest degree the appointment of a custom house of- ficer or an exciseman. I rejoice in this for several reasons, personal and public Personally, I say no representative can be strictly inde- pendent who touts after the Executive for appointments. No man TWO CONTRADICTIOJ^S. 199 service reform principles. He is mistaksn. They are discussing them in the press (religious and secular), in the pulpit, in circulars, pamphlets, &c. In fact, they invite discussion. This is well, for a system that will not bear discussion is not worthy of trial even. Mr. Ham, speaking in his first article of appoint- ments, says: ^^The commission has fixed a very nar- row limit within which the appointing power must confine its choice.*^ By a "very narrow limit** he either means the eligible list or the still narrower limit, the three highest competitors. In his second article he says : " The appointing power is not bound by the eligible list.** Again, in his first article he can efficiently serve his constituents and his country whose time is occupied and mind harassed by hunting after and dispensing patron- age. He knows that for every office he bestows he is pretty sure to make ninety-nine enemies and one ingrate. The public reasons are still more potent The prizes of the State are open to all classes, without distinction of rank or social position. The child of the poor man with brains has the same chance as the son of a peer. The effect of the system upon the education of the people must be ben- eficial in the highest degree. When it is once seen that the son of the artisan may snatch the prize from his noble competitors, parents will be more willing to make sacrifices for the education of their chil- dren. Not only will the winners be rewarded, but even the unsuc- cessful will be gainers in intelligence and intellectual force. The nation will gain every way. It will secure honest and competent servants, whose tenure of office and promotion will be solely depend- ent upon meritorious service; and when representatives are diosen, not for what they can get or can give, but for their knowledge of political science and their power and disposition to service the fether- land, a higher tone may be expected to pervade the circle of politics." James Bryce, M. P., who takes the same view of civil service re- form as Mr. Mundella, and who is an equally good representative of English pubUc opinion, speaking of civil service reform in this coun- try, says ("American Commonwealth," ii, 476): "They (the Ameri- cans) are laboriously striving to bring tlieir civil service up to the German or English level" 200 WERE THE PEOPLE DECEIVED? says : ^^ President Harrison goes on making removals without fear, * * * and he listens, as men have of yore, to the voice of the politician before he acts/' In his second article he says President Harrison is doing his ^^best to sustain it (the law), as Gen. Grant did the law of 1871/' Comment is unnecessary. Mr. Ham says : *' In the rank and file where the competitive scheme would have a chalice to operate, there was efficiency and little or no corruption ; and the people were deceived by the venders of this elixir which was offered as a panacea/' It is true that the government has been blessed with many efficient and faithful subordinate employes. But it has also been cursed by many corrupt employes, both chief and subordinate. The following narratives almost surpass belief. The United States Civil Ser- vice Commissioners say (Fourth Report, p. 123) : ^'Senator Hoar, in his speech on the Belknap impeachment trial, forcefully stated the condition of tlie public mind at that time when he said: ^I have heard in highest places the shameless doctrine, avowed by men grown old in office, that the tnie way by which power should be gained in this republic is to bribe the people with the offices created for their service, and the true end for which it should be used when gained is the promotion of selfish ambition and the gratification of personal revenge.' " Again the Commissioners say (same Kept., p. 121) : " Before the enactment of the civil service act the condition of the executive civil service in the departments at Washington and in the customs and postal services was deplorable. In tlie Department of the Treasury 3,400 persons were at one time employed, less than 1,600 of them under authority of law. Of these 3,400 employes, 1,700 were put on and off the rolls at the pleasure of the Secretary, who paid them out of funds that had not by law been appropriated for the payment of such employes. At that time, of a force of 958 per- sons employed in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 639, with annual salaries amounting to $390,000, were, upon an investigation of that bureau, found to be superfluous. For years the force in some TWENTY TO PERFOBM THE WOUK OF ONE. 201 branches of that bureau had been twice and even three times as great as the work required. In one division there was a sort of platform, built underneath the iron roo^ about seven feet above the floor, to accommodate superfluous employ^. In another division 20 messen- gers were employed to do the work of one. The Committee that made this investigation reported that 'patronage,* what is known as the 'spoils system,' was responsible for this condition, and declared that this- system had cost the people millions of dollars in that branch of the service alone. So great was the importunity for place under the old system of appointments, that when $1,600 and $1,800 places became vacant, the salaries thereof would be allowed to lapse — ^to accumulate — so that these accumulations might be divided among the applicants for place on whose behalf patronage-mongers were inces- sant in importunity. In place of one $1,800 derk, three would be employed at $600 each — ^would be employed, according to the pecu- liarly expressive language of the patronage-purveyors, 'on the lapse.' ' In one case,' said a person of reliability and of accurate information, testifying before the Senate Committee on Civil Service Reform and Retrenchment, '35 persons were put on the "lapse fund" of the Treasurer's oflBce for eight days at the end of a fiscal year to sop up aome money which was in danger of being saved and returned to the treasury.' Unnecessary employes abounded in every department, in every customs office, and in almost every postoffice. Dismissals were made for no other purpose than to supply with places the prot^es of importunate solicitors for spoils." In the face of such testimony, and much more to the same effect, how can Mr. Ham say that " the peo- ple were deceived ?^* Mr. Ham says "that one of the main incentives which induced public men to give the ^competitive^ theory support was a desire to rid themselves of the ^importunity^ of small officeseekers. * * * But it is a serious question whether a public servant, under our institutions, has a right to pass a law simply to elude the demands of his constituents, who have as perfect a right to seek place or preferment at his hands as they have to cast the ballot that aids to ele- vate the Senator or Eepresentative to public station/^ 202 ONE OF CONGRESS'S RIGHTS. In view of the above facts (facts printed on pages 58, 59, 60 of this work), is it strange that Congress- men should ** desire to rid themselves of the impor- tunity of small officeseekers ?" A man's "right to seek place or preferment " cannot be denied ; but he has no right to obstruct the business of Congress or to annoy Congressmen. That is carrying the demo- cratic principle a little too far. As to a man's ab- stract right to office Daniel Webster says. (See p. 36.) The abstract right of Congress to prevent its business from being obstructed certainly cannot be denied. Under the heading, "The First Agitation,'' Mr. Ham claims that Mr. Jenckes began the civil service agitation in 1866, when, as he says, "the nation had just successfully emerged from a struggle for exist- ence," and when, owing to th^ demoralisation caused by that struggle, "the people were in ripe condition to reform abuses." As a matter of fact Senator Sum- ner framed the first competitive examination bill in 1864, when the nation was in the very throes of war. THIRD ARTICLE. To the Albany Evening Journal: In his third arti- cle Mr. Ham charges that Mr. Jenckes "was certainly guilty of plagiarism from Benton and Calhoun's re- ports on civil service reform, made in 1826 and 1835. '^ As the object of Messrs. Benton and Calhoun and their colleagues was to diminish the President's power, while Mr. Jenckes's object was to increase his power, the charge of plagiarism is not well taken. Even if the respective objects were the same, theire would be nothing wrong or unusual about the matter, for it is a common thing for statesmen of one generation to A RECKLESS CHARGE. 203 copy those of another — to drink of the wisdom of the past, as it were. (See note, p. 100.) Mr. Benton once said : ^^ The very men who advocate the spoils system for public business, would call a man a fool if he proposed the same system for private business.^' Would any one think of charging Mr. Benton with plagiarism because he gave force and form to a self- evident truth, a truth that is probably as old as gov- ernment itself ? There are some things in political ^science as well as literature that are held in common, New ideas, like discoveries, are rare. We should not forget that history repeats itself. Mr. Ham is either very careless or very reckless, for he charges Messrs. Benton and Calhoun and all their equally earnest colleagues, and all subsequent civil service ref orn^ers, with insincerity ! He s^y^ : "The truth is that neither in 1826, nor in 1835, nor yet in 1866, much less in 1871 and 1882, when civil service reform found its way on the statute book, was there any real or sincerely apprehended danger from 'patronage.'" Shades of the Revolution, of 1812, of '61, of every struggle for honesty in and improvement of government, did ye ever dream that an American could charge ye with insincerity ! To mention one individual, Mr. Ham charges that unsurpassed hero of the Revolution, Nathaniel Macon, who declined a commission and served as a private soldier, and who subsequently served in Congress from 1791 till 1828, with insincerity ! Would Mr. Ham charge Phillips, the Lovejoys, Garrison, Giddings, Smith, Johnson, Brown, Birney, and the noble band of equally earnest Abolitionists who aided them, with insincerity ? What does Mr, Ham think of the civil service reform dec- larations of the national Republican platforms for the past sixteen years— 1872 to 1888 ? (See p. 196.) 206 A RARE DISH OF HODGEPODGE. obtaining a just participation^ on deaths^ resignations^ and delinquencies." Speaking of Jefferson, Mr. Ham further says: "It would not do for the average civil service reformer to hold him up as a ^ partisan.^" In the face of his preaching above and his practice while President, how could they "hold him up as a partisan," in the ordi- nary acceptation of the term ? But Mr. Ham does so. Hands off the first six Presidents, Mr. Ham, if you please. The man who says they removed subor- dinate officeholders for partisan reasons, slanders them. All of them denounced this doctrine. (See p. 91.) In the words of President Hayes, let us return to the prin- ciples and practices of the founders of the government. Born of passion, if not revenge, the infamous system of removal for partisan reasons was not engrafted on our national government till 1829. (See p. 74.) Speaking of Senator Marc/s celebrated spoils doc- trine speech, Mr. Ham perpetrates the following ex- traordinary if not unparalleled jumble of words : " Mr. iiarcy's familiar remark — which the advocates of civil service reform so delight to recall from its slumbers — viz., that ' to the victors belong the spoils,' contained a very essential appendage, which is al- ways suppressed. Mr. Wright {sic) added, 'but I do not mean to say that the victors shovM plunder their own camp.^ A very important qualification indeed ; one that carries a complete refutation of the con- struction placed in his {sic) original remark by the civil service people ! " Does Mr. Ham imagine he can befog the reader with such hodgepodge as the foregoing ! How can Mr. Wright's words be an ^^ essential appendage'' to or ^^a very important qualification'' of Mr. Marcifs words ? Mr. Wright could not have " added " any- thing at the time,* for he was not a member of the * Mr. Wright succeeded Mr. Marcy, taking his seat January 14, 1833. Charles E. Dudley was Mr. Marcy's New York colleague. DEFINITIONS OF THE WORD SPOILS. 207 Senate at the time. But even if Senator Marcy had used the words himself, which he did not, would they qualify the spoils principle laid down by him in the least ? In quoting from a speaker, how can unuttered words be "suppressed ?^^ Mr. Marcy^s "familiar re- mark" is quoted on page 81 of my "Civil Service Law." If Mr. Ham can find anything "essential" to the main question "suppressed," he can do more than I can, and I have read all three of Senator Marcy^s speeches on this occasion (the debate on the confir- mation of Martin Van Buren as Minister to England.) Mr. Ham^s serious charge against "the civil service people" is so mixed, absurd, and contradictory as to be actually comical. Mr. Ham speaks of "the construction placed in his original remark," &c. Of course a had construction can be placed on a remark of Mr. Marcy or anybody else ; but how can a good construction be placed on the word spoils ? Webster defines the word (the noun) thus : " That which is taken from others by violence ; especially the plunder taken from an enemy ; pillage ; booty ; that which is gained by strength or effort ; act or practice of plundering ; robbery ; corruption ; cause of corruption." The man who hath not music in himself Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds, Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils. — Shakespeare. As I have said in my " Civil Service Law," if Amer- icans, when talking about public offices, would stop to think of the exact meaning of this word, it would no longer mar our political vocabulary. In the polit- ical vocabulary, if not the dictionary, of the Twenty- fifth Century the word will probably be defined thus : A relic of barbarism. Obs. 208 TWO MORE CONTRADICTIONS. FOURTH ARTICLE. To the Albany Evening Journal: Mr. Ham begins his fourth article most inauspiciously. He says : "Following the passage of the civil service law of 1871 came the zealous efforts of the reformers to prepare rules and regulations to make the scheme work out their theories. They &iled, and the 'competitive' idea finally collapsed in 1876-6." A few lines further on and he says : "There was some difference of opinion, but Congress must have conceived that the law was not worth the powder, or it would not have allowed it to die for want of money to keep it in motion, aa that was the method taken to put it to death." The last statement, which is substantially true, con- tradicts the first statement. The first statement is not only not true, but it contradicts President Grant's sixth annual message, which says. (See p. 204.) Again, in his second article, in speaking of ^Hhe competitive feature of the civil service law,'* he says : " And yet in this country the slightest manifestation of a disposi- tion to reexamine the matter is denounced, but upon what assump- tion, no one save so-called civil service reformers can discover." In his fourth article he says : " This only seemed to wet (sic) the appetite of the reformers, who commenced a systematic siege, and for several years in public print, in conventions, meetings, and on the stump, it was sought to create a sentiment which would justify a second appeal to Congress of suf- ficient proportions to terrify and bulldoze the legislative branch into passing an elaborate act." ' The truth of Mr. Ham's first statement was dispu- J ted in my second article, and now he disputes it him- iself, and therefore contradicts himself. An honest [and intelligent discussion of public issues for the pur- pose of creating ^^sentiment,'* means health to the body politic. This is indisputable. How could the PRESIDENT GRANT REFUTES MR. HAM. 209 reformers ^^ terrify *' or ^* bulldoze" Congress? The charge is ridiculous. Speaking of Mr. Eaton and others, Mr. Ham says : "These aristocratic persons, who go abroad for ideas, and who decline to perform the duties of good citizens, conceive themselves aggrieved because the people neglect to honor them with office." President Grant, who is almost as high an author- ity as Mr. Ham, says that Mr. Eaton and the other two Commissioners did 7Wt ^'decline to perform the duties of good citizens." In his 1874 message he says : "The gentlemen who have given their services, without compen- sation, as members of the Board to devise rules and regulations for the government of the civil service of the country, have shown much, zeal and earnestness in tlieir work, and to them, as well as to my- self, it will be a source of mortification if it is to be thrown away.'* In the sublime " Sermon on the Mount '' it is said : ** Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteous- ness* sake : for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.'* Not- withstanding President Grant's earnest pleadings in five consecutive annual messages, and the fact that he was speaking of business that pertained to the executive (his own) department, and the further fact that he was in almost daily communication with the heads of the departments, and knew their wants, which Congressmen as a rule did not. Congress allowed the law, as Mr. Ham says, "to die for want of money to keep it in motion.*' Under the circumstances how could such treatment be anything but "a source of mortification " to him ? Speaking of Mr. Eaton's Report on the English civil service, Mr. Ham, among other things, says : "The suggestion which it conveyed, to wit: that the abuses in England had been eradicated by civil service * competitive ' examina- tions, rather than by revolutions, was the weakest feature of his his- torical effort" 210 "A BUSINESS MEASURE." As there has not been a political revolution in Eng- land since 1G88, Mr. Ham is evidently mistaken. Mr. Ham says ** Senators did not concede that there was any corruption or inefficiency in the grades which the law would reach." Let us decide whether this statement is true or not by giving the words not only of * Senators^ but of Representatives also before, dur- ing, and after 1871. * Eepresentative John H. Hubbard of Connecticut, speaking of Mr. Jenckes's civil service bill, says (Cong. Globe, Feb. 6, 1867, pp. 1033-34) : " I regard it as one of the most important bills ever oflEered here since I first had the honor to take a seat in this Hall * * * It is a business measure, not a party one. * * * It will funiish a strong incentive to the young to lead honorable and useful lives. A * A late (1864) Commissioner of Customs says (House Repts., No. 8, 39th Congress, Second Session, January 31, 1867, vol i, p. 9): '•It is known that men have been appointed as custom house in- spectors, at compensations varjing from $1.50 to $2.50 and $3 a day, who were never required to perform a single day's service, and whose only attendance at the custom house was for the purpose of receiving and receipting for their pay. Such appointments were made as rewards for past or expected political labors or influence, and were so understood by the appointees, who felt under no obligations, not even a moral one, to render any service to the government whose money their consciences did not forbid them to take." In this same (the Jenckes Joint Select Committee) Report (p. 1) it is said : " The result of this system, or rather want of system, has been that persons have been received into the service as officers of the government who have had to be educated in the duties which they are to perform after receiving their commissions, and without any probationary course during which their qualifications for the oflBce might be tested. And in cases where tliere has been manifest inef- ^ ficiency on the part of the appointee, and where a disposition has been shown to do as little for the public service as was necessary to satisfy the minimum requirements in his office, the political influ- ences which secured the original appointment have been able to pre- vent a removal." SENATOR SHERMAN'S TESTIMONY. 211 certificate of good character and efficiency from such a government board, a board appointed by the President of the United States, will help destitute young men to obtain employment In private life, if they fail to get a public office. Thousands upon thousands of poor boys will struggle hard and practice much self-denial to obtain such a prize." Mr. Hubbard's prophecy has been partly fulfilled. Eepresentative Eobert C. Schenck of Ohio, who also favored Mr. Jenckes's bill, suggested to Eepresentative Woodbridge of Vermont, who somewhat facetiously opposed the bill, that he (Woodbridge) offer an amend- ment to the bill like this (Cong. Globe, Feb. 6, 1867, p. 1036): ''That the appointments shall be made from such persons as are recommended by a member of Congress from Vermont, or some other State, for services performed in securing by ti*eat8 of liquor or other- wise the votes of Bill Johnson and Sam Smith for said member at the last preceding election. [Laughter.]" Mr. Schenck not only completely turned the tables on Mr. Woodbridge, but he described precisely how some votes are secured. He also spoke seriously of the need of civil service reform. He was as pro- phetic as Mr. Hubbard, for he said the report of the (Jenckes) Committee on the Civil Service, whereof he himself was a member, would be a guide for the ac- tion of future Congresses. It was followed by the acts of 1871 and 1883. Senator Sherman says (Cong. Globe, 1870, p. 3846) : '^ Everj' man of sense knows that he can go to any of these depart- ments and cut off one-half of tlie clerical force, and yet have a sufiBcient force to perform all the duties. If others do not know it, I at least have a very strong conviction on this point There is scarcely a de- partment of this government in which, if conducted by a private in- dividual as he would conduct his private business, or the affairs of a private corporation, he would not only reduce the compensation of these employes, but reduce largely the number of the employes. Who does not know that this is so in every one of the executive departments ? " 212 JAMES Q. BLAINE'S VIEWS. Senator Trumbull, referring to the above, said : "I think the country should know this, and it comes to us au- tlioritatively. I did not know it I had no conception that there were twice as many employes in these departments as tlie public service required. Certainly I should not have voted for any increase of the number of clerks had I known such to be the fact" Had the noble Senator Morton known these facts, he never would have opposed civil service reform. He made an effort to ascertain the facts by address- ing letters of inquiry to several heads of departments, but he failed to get them. The evils, as Mr. Trum- bull's confessions prove, were insidious. A FEW FURTHER FACTS. In his third article Mr. Ham says that Messrs. Blaine, Wilson, Windom, Allison, and Kasson were '^men who took no stock in the idea'* (civil service reform), and in his fourth article he says .practically the same thing about Senator Dawes. Let these gen- tlemen speak for themselves. James 6. Blaine says ("Twenty Years of Congress, '^ ii, 648, 651) : "The settled judgment of discreet men in both political parties is adverse to the custom of changing non-political ofiBcers on merely political grounds. They believe that it impairs the eflBdency of tlie pubhc service, lowers the standard of pohtical contests, and brings reproach upon the government and the people. * * * No reform in tlie civil service will be valuable tliat does not release members of Congress from the care and the embarrassment of appointments ; and no boon so great could be conferred upon Senators and Representa- tives as to relieve them from the worry, the annoyance, and the re- sponsibility which time and habit have fixed upon them in connec- tion with the dispensing of patronage, all of which belongs, under the ConstitutitM, to the Executive. On the other hand, the evil of which President [W. H.] Harrison spoke — the employment of the patronage by the Executive to infiuence legislation — is for the great- est abuse to which the civil service has ever been perverted." WHAT LINCOLN SAID TO WILSON. 213 Senator Wilson says (Cong. Globe, 1871, p. 670) : " Mr. Lincoln said to me one day, in speaking of this terrible (of- ficeseeking) pressure, that it seemed to liim tliat wliile one end of the house was on fire, instead of putting it out, he was called upon to give men little ofiBces, and that if we put down the rebellion, he did not know that the country could live ten or twenty years longer unless the present system was broken up. Sir, everybody in oflBce and out of office admits these abuses."* Senator Windom says (Cong. Record, 1882, p. 365) : " I am in &vor of the bQl substantially as reported from the com- mittee, and I much prefer to have a vote upon it to making a speech. ♦ * * There ought to be an improvement in the mode of making ap- pointments, and I am for this bill because I tliink it will improve it" Mr. Windom's belief in the utility of the civil ser- vice law has been confirmed by experience. He says (Eeport of Secretary of Treasury, 1889, p. cvi) : "The beneficial influences of the civil service law, in its practical workings, are clearly apparent Having been at the head of the de- partment both before and after its adoption, I am able to judge by comparison of the two systems, and have no hesitation in pronounc- ing the present condition of affairs as preferable in all respects. Un- der the old plan appointments were usually made to please some one under political or other obligations to the appointee, and the question of fitness was not always the controlling one. The temptation to make removals, only to provide places for others, was always pres- ent, and constantly being urged by strong influences; and this rest- less and feverish condition of departmental life did much to distract and disturb the even current of routine work. Under instrumentali- * Speaking of CoL S. S. Fisher (whose services are mentioned on page 36 of this work), Mr. Wilson said: "I believe he has never been surpassed by any officer that has been in that office (the Pat- ent Office) during my time." Senator Morrill of Vermont said : " That is my opinion." It is related of Col. Fisher that in giving verbal orders for an ex- amination for promotion in the Patent Office he said: "Peg it to them. It is not as if they were a set of poor devils who would lose their places if they didn't pass." 214 CAPABLE, WORTHY, ADAPTABLE CLERKS.. ties which are now used to secure selections for clerical places, the department has some assurance of mental capacity, and also of moral worth, as the character of the candidates is ascertained before exam- ination. * ♦ ♦ The clerks received from the Civil Service CJom- mission usually adapt themselves readily to the duties they are called upon to perform, and rank among the most efficient in the department" Senator William B. Allison not only favored civil service reform, but he wanted to make the enforce- ment of the civil service law binding on the President instead of optional. (See Congressional Eecord, JDec. 23, 1882, p. 603.) Representative John A. Kasson, who introduced the Pendleton-Eaton bill in the House (January 4, 1883), where it was passed by a vote of 155 to 47 (87 not voting), says (Cong. Record, 1883, p. 866) : "It is not here and now, as with some men, that I for the first time lift my voice in favor of this reform. I did so before the last election and upon the stump in the State of Iowa." Senator Henry L. Dawes, in the course of a mas- terly speech, says (Cong. Record, 1882, p. 1082) : "Mr. President, the general public anxiety for an improvement in the methods of appointments to ofiQce is a healthy sign. That there is diversity of opinion as to the best mode of securing it, is no cause for discouragement The more urgent and constant this anxiety for a better way shall become, the more surely will that diversity of plans which now troubles us disappear." (See note, p. 60.) In 1870 Mr. Dawes, though in favor of the reform, thought the movement somewhat in advance of pub- lic sentiment. (See Cong. Record for Jan. 24, 1882.) SIX OTHER CONCESSIONS OF CORRUPTION. Here are six other Congressmen who were brave enough to call a spade a spade. Senator Trumbull says (Cong. Globe, 1871, p. 666) : "The great objection to the mode in which persons are appointed to office is that it reaches out among the people; that it demoralizes BARGAINS, CORRUPTION, AVARICE, ETC. 215 the people; that it is corrupting in its influence, and is calculated to bring improper influences to bear in the congressional districts and in the States. Representatives get postmasters and revenue officers and others appointed, who become mere instruments to electioneer for them. It is just as corrupting as if money was offered. So in regard to more general offices, where Senators use their influence to have men appointed to this office or that office." Senator George B. Vest of Missouri says (Cong. Ee- cord, Dec. 20, 1882, p. 461) : '• That very great evils exist there can be no sort of question, evils so monstrous, so deadly in their effects that men of all political par- ties have come to the conclusion tliat some remedy must be applied." Representative Edw. Y. Rice of Illinois says (Cong. Globe, 1872, pp. 3071-72) : "The history of our civil service is the history of incompetency, unfaithfulness, and corruption, notwithstanding there are many hon- orable exceptions. * * * It is estimated that one-fourth of the revenues are lost to the government in consequence of the vicious and unsatisfactory condition of the civil service of the country, in- volving an annual loss to the treasury of a sum greater than was required to support the government prior to 1860. * ♦ ♦ The same influence that secures position in the public service is employed to retain in place those who are known to be un&ithful, and to con- ceal their frauds, and to protect from removal and merited punish- ment men who bring -the service into disrepute." Representative James R. McCormick of Missouri says (Cong. Globe, 1872, p. 1748) : "The present condition of the civil service of the United States, Mr. Speaker, calls so Ipudly for reform that its consideration rises above party. The evils which afflict it result mainly from a disregard of principles found in the Constitution, and from a widespread avarice now pervading almost every condition of society in this country." Comparing the policy of the six first Presidents with that in vogue in 1872, Mr. McCormick said : "Faithful and efficient men were appointed to office without re- gard to their political views. ♦ ♦ ♦ Now the first great prere- quisite for office is fidelity to party." 216 SIXTEEN STATESMEN VERSUS MR. HAM. Representative William S. Holman of Indiana says (Appendix to Cong. Globe, 1872, p. 334) : "We cannot ignore the imperative necessity for reform; we can- not shut our eyes to the painful feet tliat venality riots in every de- partment of the government * ♦ * A republic cannot long exist unless there is purity and honesty in the conduct of its afi^rs. ♦ * * We have reached a period in our history when ♦ * ♦ men (should) be appointed to office because they are competent and honest, and not for mere partisan services." Eepresentative Albert S. Willis of Kentucky says (Cong. Record, 1882, pp. 5809, 5816): ^^Both (bills) are aimed at our false, inefficient, and unrepublican system of civil service, that fountain head from which flows nearly every stream of political corruption in our land. The complete over- throw of that system is, sir, in my judgment, the great demand of the hour. * * * In every forum of opinion our civil service has been denounced as a national disgrace and a national danger. Let us make merit the sole test of official appointment and promotion." Mr. Ham is certainly mistaken when he says that ** Senators did not concede that there was any cor- ruption or inefficiency in the grades which the law would reach." Sixteen statesmen are against him. FIFTH ARTICLE. To the Albany Evening Journal: Mr. Ham begins his fifth article thus : "The resort to Mr. Pendleton was about as astute a political con- ception by men supposed to be above the ' dirty pool of politics * as the average patronage politician would have thought of." In a letter of September 20, 1887, Mr. Eaton says : "I placed the act in Senator Pendleton's hands, who had never before seen it, and he presented it precisely as handed to him in the Senate, waiving and abandoning a previous and utterly unlike bill which he had before presented, I being glad to have my relation ignored if only a Senator would have the patriotic courage to pre- sent the bill" MR. PENDLETON'S HONORABLE RECORD. 217 In other words, Mr. Eaton merely gave his bill to Mr. Pendleton for exaimination, and Mr. Pendleton compared it with and preferred it to his own bill. Mr. Eaton trusted his bill to Mr. Pendleton because he knew he had "the patriotic courage^' to present it, but he did not know till he tried him that he also had the magnanimity to present it instead of his own. Did any Senator, except Mr. Pendleton, forfeit his seat in the Senate because of his advocacy of civil ser- vice reform principles ? There may have been abler men in the Senate than Mr. Pendleton, but none was braver or purer. He did that which some statesmen fail to do — ^he rose above party. It is noteworthy that Mr. Pendleton, in order to lighten the burdens of offieeseeking, proposed a constitutional amendment making postmasterships elective instead of appointive offices. This was also prior to introducing the Eaton bill. "Dirty pool of politics. '^ Bah! Mr. Ham quotes the words of "a leading (newspa- per) correspondent,^^ who, writing nearly six months after the inauguration of President Harrison, says : " Cabinet officers have been compelled to dose their doors and see callers only by card, because the crowds of place-hunters left them no time to attend to public business." This is bad, but it is nothing new. (See p. 82.) President Harrison has no one to blame for this de- plorable state of affairs but himself. He and he only could have prevented it by simply obeying the man- date of his party platforms. The civil service planks of the Republican platforms of 1884 and 1888 say: '*The spirit and purpose of the reform should be observed in all executive appointments.'' President Harrison has not only disobeyed this mandate himself, but he has permitted others to disobey it. Common honesty as well as consistency required that no re- 10 218 PREACHING VERSUS PRACTICE. movals should be made except for cause.* ''That the tenure shall be during good behavior, with power of removal for cause/* says the Republican platform of 1880. That Washington should be inundated, as it were, with officeseekers is not the fault of the civil service law, for the law can neither enforce itself nor increase its own scope. But the President can. The correspondent quoted above further says : "Republican Congressmen, who ordinarily would have gone awaj for the summer long ago, are still kept here by the importunities of their officeseeking constituents," Ac. The correspondent's words, in full, have been prin- ted in many civil service reform periodicals. Mr. Ham gets on the wrong side of the question when he prints them, of course. But it is not his first "offense'' in this line. Therefore he has -some excuse for the fol- lowing words in his seventh article : " From the line of defense * » * we enter upon a line of attack.*' • * In his letter of ac litical action of any person or body. 7. There shall be non-competitive examinations in all proper cases before tlie commission, when competent persons do not compote, after notice has been given of the existence of the vacancy, under such rules as may be prescribed by the commission- ers as to the manner of giving notice. 8. That notice shall be given in writing by the appointing power to said commission of the pei-sons se- lected for appointment or employment from among those who have been examined, of the place of residence of such persons, of the rejection of any such persons after probation, of transfers, resignations, and removals, and of the date thereof, and a record of tiie same shall be kept by said commission. And any necessary exceptions from said 8 fundamental provisions of the ndes shall be set forth in connection with such rules, and the reasons therefor shall be stated in the annual reports of the commission. 3. Said commission shall, subject to the rules that may be made by the President, make regulations for, and have control of, such examina- tions, and, through its members or the examiners, it shall supervise and preserve the records of the same ; and said commission shall keep min- utes of its own proceedings. 4. Said commission may make investigations concerning the facts, and may report upon all matters touching the enforcement and effects of said rules and regulations, and concerning tiie action of any examiner or board of examiners hereinaft^er provided for, and its own subordinates, and those in the public service, in respect to the execution of this act 5. Said commission shall make an annual report to the President for transmission to Congress, showing its own action, the niles and regula- tions, and the exceptions thereto, in force, the practical effects thereof^ and any suggestions it may approve for the more effectual accomplish- ment of the purposes of this act Sec. 3. That said commission is authorized to employ a chief examiner, a part of whose duty it shall be, under its direction, to act with the ex- amining boards, so far as practicable, whether at Washington or else- where, and to secure accuracy, uniformity, and justice in all their pro- ceedings, which shall be at all times open to him. The chief examiner shall be entiUed to receive a salary at the rate of $3,000 a year, and he shall be paid his necessary traveling expenses incurred in the discharge of his duty. The commission shall have a secretary, to be appointed by the President, who shall receive a salary of $1,600 per annum. It may, when necessary, employ a stenographer and a messenger, who shall be 230 THE CIVIL SERVICE STATUTE. paid, when employed, tlie former at the rate of $1,600 a year, and the latter at the rate of $600 a year. The commission sliall, at Washington, and ill one or more places in each State and Territory where examina- tions are to take place, designate and select a suitable number of persons, not less than 3, in the official service of the United States, residing in said State or Territory, after consulting the head of the department or office in which such persons serve, to be members of boards of examin- ers, and may at any time substitute any otlier person in said service liv- ing in such State or Territory in the place of any one so selected. Such boards of examiners shall be so located as to make it reasonably con- venient and inexpensive for applicants to attend before them; and where there are persons to be examined in any State or Territory, ex- aminations shall be held tlierein at least twice in each year. It shall be the duty of the collector, postmaster, and other officers of the United States, at any place outside of the District of Columbia where examina- tions are directed by the President or by said board to be held, to allow the reasonable use of the public buildings for holding sudi examinations, and in all proper ways to facUitate the same. Sec. 4. That it shall be tlie duty of the Secietary of the Interior to cause suitable and convenient rooms and accommodations to be assigned or provided, and to be furnished, heated, and lighted, at the City of Washington, for carrying on the work of said commission and said ex- aminations, and to cause the necessary stationery and other articles to be supplied, and the necessary printing to be done for said commission. Sec. 5. That any said commissioner, examiner, copyist, or messenger, or any person in the public service, who shall willfully and corruptly, by himself or in co-operation with 1 or more other persons, defeat, deceive, or obstnict any person in respect of his or her right of examination accord- ing to any such rules or regulations, or who shall willfiilly, corruptly, and falsely mark, grade, estimate, or report upon the examination or proper standing of any person examined hereunder, or aid in so doing, or who shall willfully And corruptly make any fiilse representations concerning the same, or concerning the person examined, or who shall willfully and cormptly furnish to any person any special or secret information for the purpose of either improving or injuring the prospects or chances of any person so examined, or to be examined, being appointed, employed, or promoted, shall for each such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemean- or, and upon conviction thereof! shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100, nor more than $1,000, or by imprisonment not less than ten days, nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Sec. 6. That within 60 days after the passage of this act it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, in as near conformity as may THE CIVIL SERVICE STATUTE. 231 be uo the classification of certain clerks now existing under the 1 63d section of the Revised Statutes, to arrange in classes the sevenil clerks and persons employed by the collector, naval officer, surveyor, and ap- praisers, or either of them, or being in the public service, at their respec- tive oflBces in each customs dieftrict where the whole number of said clerks and persons shall be all together as many as 50. And thereafter, from time to time, on the direction of the President, said Secretary shall make the like classification or arrangement of clerks and persons so employed, in connection with any said office or offices, in any other customs district And, upon like request, and for the purposes of this act, said Secretary shall arrange in one or more of said classes, or of existing classes, any other derks, agents, or persons employed under his department in any said district not now classified ; and every such arrangement and clas- sification, upon being made, shall be reported to tlie President 2. Within said 60 days it shall be the duty of the Postmaster-General, in general conformity to said 163d section, to separately arrange in classes tlie several clerks and persons employed, or in the public service, at each postoffice, or under any postmaster of tlie United States, where the whole "number of said clerks and persons shall together amount to as many as 50. And thereafter, from time to time, on the direction of the President, it shall be the duty of the Postmaster-General to arrange in like classes the clerks and persons so employed in the postal service in connection with any other postoffice ; and every such arrangement and classification, upon being made, shall be reported to the President 3. That from time to time said Secretary, the Postmaster-General, and each of the heads of departments mentioned in the 158th section of the Revised Statutes, and each head of an office, shall, on the direction of the President, and for fiicilitating the execution of this act, respectively revise any then existing classification or arrangement of those in their respective departments and offices, and shall, for the purposes of the examination herein provided for, include in 1 or more of such classes, so far as practica- ble, subordinate places, clerks, and officers in the public service pertain- ing to their respective departments not before classified for examination. Sec. 7. That after the expiration of 6 months from the passage of this act no officer or clerk shall be appointed and no person shall be em- ployed to enter or be promoted in either of the said classes now existing, or tliat may be arranged hereunder pursuant to said rules, until he has passed an examination, or is shown to be specially exempted from such examination in conformity herewith. But nothing herein contained shall be construed to take from those honorably discharged from the military or naval service any preference conferred by the 1764th section of the Revised Statutes, nor to take from the President any authority, not in- 232 THE CIVIL SERVICE STATUTE. consistent with this act, conferred by the 1753d section of said statutes ; nor shall any oflScer not in the executive branch of the government, or any person merely employed as a laborer or workman, be required to be classified hereunder ; nor, unless by direction of the Senate, shall any person who has been nominated for confirmation by the Senate be re- quired to be classified or to pass an examination. Seo. 8. That no person habitually using intoxicating beverages to ex- cess shall be appointed to, or retained in, any office, appointment, or employment to which the provisions of this act are applicable. Seo. 9. That whenever there are already 2 or more members of a fem- ily in the pubhc service, in tlie grades covered by this act, no other mem- ber of such &mily shall be eligible to appointment to any of said grades. Seo. 10. That no recommendation of any person who shall apply for office or place imder the provisions of this act which may be given by any Senator or member of the House of Representatives, except as to the character or residence of the applicant, shall be received or consid- ered by any person concerned in making any examination or appoint- ment under this act Seo. 11. That no Senator, or Representative, or territorial Delegate of the Congress, or Senator, Representative, or Delegate elect, or any officer or employe of either of said houses, and no executive, judicial, military, or naval officer of the United States, and no clerk or employ^ of any de- partment, branch, or bureau of the executive, judicial, or military or naval service of the United States shall, directly or indirectly, solicit or receive, or be in any manner concerned in soliciting or receiving, any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political purpose whatever, from any officer, clerk, or employe of the United States, or any department, branch, or bureau thereof, or from any person receiving any salary or compensa- tion from moneys derived from the Treasury of the United States. Seo. 12. That no person shall, in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by any officer or employe of the United States mentioned in this act, or m any navy-yard, fort, or arsenal, solicit in any manner whatever, or receive any contribution of money or any other thing of value for any political purpose whatever. Seo. 13. No officer or employe of the United States mentioned in this act shall discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in [any] manner change the official rank or compensation of any other officer or employ^, or prom- ise or threaten so to do, for giving or withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of money or other valuable thing for any political pur- pose. Sec. 14. That no officer, clerk, or other person in the service of the United States shall, directly or indirectly, give or hand over to any other officer, clerk, or person in the service of the United States, or to any Senator or member of the House of Representatives, or territorial Dele- gate, any money or other valuable thing on account of or to be applied to the promotion of any political object whatever. Seo. 15. That any person who shall be guilty of violating any pro- vision of the four foregoing sections, shall be deemed guilty of a misde- meanor, and shall, on conviction thereof^ be punished by a fine not ex- ceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years, or by such fine and imprisonment both, in the discretion of the court. Approved, January 16th, 1883. INDEX. Adams J. on removals, 91 ; notes, Bell J. on freedom of elections and 153, 165 : notes of debate in Sen- patronage evils. 42 ; quotes Eng- ate on power removal, 154-159. lish history and a celebrated res- Adams Joliu Quincy, on removals, olution of Parliament, 43, 44. 92 ; notes, 160, 1*74. Benson K. power removal, 129. Allan Chilton, power removal, 166. Benton T. H. note, 19; on patron- Allison W. B. radical views of, 214. age and the freedom of elections, Ames F. power removal, 124—127 ; 41 ; on congressional decision as predictions of, 125, 126, 162. to power removal, 159; report Andrews 0. C. notes, 183, 188. on executive patronage, 173. Appeals, a proposed board o£, 114. Bibb G. M. power removal, 168; on Application papers, how marked division of governmental powers (note) 26. * (note) 169. Applicants' certificates (note) 27. BUI, the first civil service, 7, 202. Appointments cannot bo dictated, Blaine J. G. civil service views o^ 195. 212. Aristocracies, cause of and remedy Board of Appeals, a proposed, 114. for, 63-66. Boudinot E. note, 113; power re- Aristocracy, no use for in this coun- movaL, 121-124. try, 62 ; little danger of nfflcehold- Branch J. on Senate's tlmctions and ers\ 61, 66; Roman and Klnglish, danger ambitious leaders, 174. 63, 64; views of latter, in 1855, Breuton Samuel, resolution ot 8. of English civil service law, 69. Bribery at elections, danger o^ 39 : Aristocrats, real and apparent, 62. Buchanan, Harrison, Benton, Jef- Arthur C. A. on fitness for and sta- ferson, and Bell on, 40-43 ; pat- bility in office, 37, 95. ronage a great cause of, 40. Auditor Treasury, testimony 0^224. British Civil Service Commission, the, 197; letter ih>m secretary Baldwin A. power removal, 134. of, 197, 198. Bancroft G-eorge, note, 24. British India, civil service o^ 182. Barton D. on purity and freedom Brokerage, office, 39. of elections, 42 ; on 4-ycars' law. Brooks E. competitive tests, &c. 65. 162 ; good behavior tenure, 167. Browning E. B. on competition, 222. Bayard James A. why he changed Bryce James. M. P. on civil service his vote from Burr to Jefferson reform in America, 199, 220. in 1801, civil service views ofj Buchanan James, on danger of bri- vindication ofj Ac. 97-100. bery at elections, 40; Mr. Marcy Bayard T. F. obligation to, 98: de- to, 82; sutiordinate officers, 93. nounces so-called ' practical poll- Burr A. adroitness ofj 71 ; unrepub- ticians ' and spoils system, 107. lican ideas of about elections, 72. 234 INDEX. Burt Silas W. difference between the conduct of public and private business (note) 19; on competi- tive examinations, 35, 37. Butler P. power removal, 165. OiESAB JuLins, anecdote of; 64. Calhoun John 0. denounces spoils system, criticises debate on re- moval, and gives his own views, 106, 107, 163, 164; on compro- mise and competition, 222. Canada, civil service of, 178-182. Carroll C. power removal, 154. Caucus system, the (note) 105. Chamber of Commerce, New York, ikvors examinations for custom house officials, 35, 36. Chambers^s Encyclopedia, on com- petition. 222. Chandler J. departmental balances, 175. China, civil service o^ 189-193. Civil service bills, various, 7, 8. Civil service law of 1871, why it " collapsed," 208. Gvil service law (tlie statute) 228. Civil service law, the, summary of provisions o^ 9-12; why its scope should be increased, 12- 13 ; fruits and features of, 1 7-21 ; its chief object, 19 ; its constitu- tionality, 20-24; an elaboration and improvement of two preced- ing laws— §§ 164 and if 53 of U. S. Revised Statutes, 23 ; causes a radical cliange, 24; will in- crease efficiency, elevate politics, aid in purifying elections, &c 38-40; will promote self-respect, honesty, impartiality, Ac. 54-56 ; has caused a salutary change and promises complete reform, 89, 90; its flexibility, 195; no objec- tion because it is experimental, 195; cannot enforce itself^ 218. Civil service laws, two other, 23. Clay H. denounces prescriptive pol- icy, relates incident of a dem- ocratic convention, tells Marcy that Gov. Metcalfe practiced the merit system, criticises decision on power removal, 76, 81, 163,* resolution of, 168. Cleveland Gr. on Castle Grarden cor- ruption, 56; notes, 89, 90; de- fends the merit system, 96, 97. Clinton D. W. on patronage, 73. Clymer Gr. power removal, 128. Commission, the civil service, no right to depart from the law and evidence (note) 26, 27; on cor- ruption in Washington, 200, 201. Commission, the New York State civil service, on results realized and competitive tests, 18, 33; on same in Ireland, 34 ; on read- justment of salaries, 66. Commission, the Jay, 57. Commission, the Royal, 198. Commissioner of Customs, report of; 210. Commissk>ns, the Ridley atronage, 73, 205 ; ficeseekers, 223. on removal, 91; mistake of, 98; Livermore S. on removal, 142. conditional assurances of (note) Locke John, on competition, 222. 100; on 4-years' law (note) 160; Low Seth, on competitive tests, 34. ' opinion ' of (note) 165 : refutes Lowell J. R. on Prince of Wales's Mr. Ham, 205. * celebrated ' speeches, 64. Jenckes T. A. bill of and humor of, 8, 62; New York Independent Macaulay Thos. Babinoton, on on (note) 8 ; not a plagiarist, 202. corrupt English elections, 47. Jenckes joint select committee, re- Macon N. resolution of and note on, port of (note) 210. 100; a typical reformer, 203. Johnson Andrew, his removals, 86 ; Madison J. on appointments and his comparatively conservative removals, 21; mistake 0^81; on course, 87 ; power removal liable the spoils of victory, 92 ; power to abuse, 93. removal, 117-120; on 4-year8' Johnson Cave, on postal reforms law (note) 160. (note) 1 2. Marcy W. ll speech, humorous let- Johnson W. S. power removal, 159. ter, use of word spoils, 81, 82 ; Jones P. H. competitive tests, 37. letter from Jas. Parton about, 82 ; his speech correctlj- quoted, 207. Kasson J. A. bill of, 8 ; introduces Martin Wm. A. P. on Chinese civil Eaton's bill in the House, 214. service, 189-192; note on, 193; Kent James, power removal, 164. refutes the Encyclopedia Britan- " King Caucus," death of (note) 105. nica (note) 193. Kingsley Mr. on competition, 222. Massacliusetts, civil service ezami- Kinney W. alleged remark of and nations in, 16; veteran soldiers note on, 83. triumph in (note) 53. Kleiner J. J. experience of, 60. May T. E. on English officeholders in American colonies, 176. Lallt T. a. note on, 158. McCormick J. R. warning o^ 215. Law, the civil senMce. See " Civil McDuffie G. on removal, 169. service law." McKee S. resolution of (note) 66. Lawrence John, probably antedated Metcalfe Thomas, non-piartisan ap- Biirr in advocating spoils system pointments of (note) 81. (note) 72; on removal, 127. Mill J. S. on competitive tests, 30. Lee R. B. on removal, 132. Miller Senator, on Van Buren, 78. Lee R. H. on removal, 156, 157. Monarchical power, inherent fear in Lewis Sir G. C. on adapting laws to Americans o^ 166. the people (note) 25. Monroe James, views of, 92. Lewis W. B. on Mrs. Jackson (note) Montesquieu Charles de, on dimat- 74; on danger spoils system, 76. ic influences, 194. Life tenures, no danger in if based Morehead James T. report o( 113. on merit, 66; will bo rare, 66. Morrill Justin S. opinion of, 213. Lincoln A. preaches one thing and Morton Oliver P. inquiries o^ 212; practices another, 83 ; remarks on competition for office, 2i22. of to Lamon, Sumner, Schurz, Mundella A. J. on English civil ser- Wilson, 83, 84, 213; Lamon^s vice before the reform (note) 64 ; dark picture of (note) 84 ; Swett after the reform (note) 198, 199. and Trumbull corroborate La- Murtha W. H. good example ot, 66. *.^38 INDEX. Napoleon I, official rules and an- Poindexter G^. on Yan Buren, *t1, ecdote of (note) 114. Poles, political yiews <^ 121. Nicholas John, assurances of, 99. Potter H. C. on Washing^Um, 227. Nicolay and Hay, descriptiou of of- Potts Wm. report ofj 16. flceseeking scenes by, 223. President, the, status of (note) 151. Norway, civil service and govern- PrinciiJle, votinjr for, .39 ; carrying ment of; 188, 189. the democratic too far, 202. ' Probation, trial by, uses ot, 27, 28. O'Bbien H. on laborers and Bos- Promotion examinations, oompulso- ton's labor bureau (note) 16. ry, 10; should be carefully con- Office brokerage, 39. ducted, 28 ; note on, 28. Office, insolence ofj remedy for, 70. Prussia, civil service o^ 183. Officeholders, ignorance of some, Public business, fundamental rules 55 ; favoritism shown by, 55. o^ the same as private, 19. Officeholders' salaries, too much dif- ference in, 64-66; readiustment QuiNCT E. on Macon (note) 100. of; 66 ; N. Y. C. S. C. on (note) 66. Quincy Josiah, characteristic prop- Officeholders, able-bodied should be osition and speech of; 101~6 ; rule soldiers (note) 28 ; politically am- of law laid down by (note) 106. bitious, how checked, 29 ; should Quincy Josiah, jr. maxim o^ 106. be protected fh)m mistakes, 114. Officeholding, why sometimes uu- Randolph J. on patronage, 174. desirable, 55; ordinary, some- Read Q-. on removal, 158. thing better than, 90. Reform, civil service, " surest guar- Officeseeking, pictures of by Cox, antee of the safety and sucoess Dawes, Quincy, Nicolay, Hay, of American institutions,*' 97. 58, 59, 60, 87, 88, 101-106, 223 ; Reformers, civil service, invite dis- interferes with Cabinet officers, cussion, 199 ; not insincere, 203. 82, 2 17 ; affect of on Lincoln, 223. Removal, importance of power, 1 12. Removals, danger of sweeping, 56 ; Page J. power removal, 145-147. number by 7 first Presidents, 93. Paley W. on patronage, 108, 109; Republics, cannot, stand multiform woman suffrage (note) 110. and long -continued corruption, Parton J. on Mrs. Jackson's death, 40; Holman on, 216; besetting affect of on Jackson, Van Buren's sin of, 225 ; rocks on which they tact and secrecy, 74, 75, 79; let- have &llen, 225, 226; natural ters from, 80, 82 ; a reformer, 80. tendency to party spirit in,' 226. Party spirit, danger in, 225, 226. Reynolds J. views o^ 83. Paterson W. on removal, 157. Rice E. Y. plain words of, 215. Patronage evils insidious, 89, 212. Robertson Wm. H. on competitive Patronage system, the, fairness of examinations, 35. only apparent, 72, 73; undemo- Roman aristocracy, depravity of; 63. cratic and un-American, 86. Pearson H. G. competitive tests, 35. Satterlee Henry Y. plain, direct Peiching (a Chinese examiner) put courafreous. truthful words o^ 52. to death for fraud, 192. Scheiick R. C. views and prophecy Pendleton G. H. unique civil ser- of, 211. vice record o^ 216, 217. Schurz C. bill o^ 8; conversation Phillips Lee, letter of; 15. with Lincoln, 84; not eligible to Planks, civil service, of all national the presidency, 221. Democratic and Republican plat- Scott Thomas, on removal, 134. forms (notes) 94, 196, 197. Sedgwick T. on removal, 131. IHTDEX. 239 Senate, great power and use o^ 116. harsli words (uttered in the heat Sherman John, testimony ot, 211. of debate) concerning, 7 6-7 9; a Sherwin H. letter of, 14; civil ser- good word from James Parton vice examinations form a part of about, 80. a general educational system, 18. Vest G. B. on patronage evils, 215. Smith S. deposition of (note) 100 ; Veteran soldiers triumph (note) 53. removal for opinion's sake, 172. Veteran soldiers and sailors, pref- Smith W. on removal, &c. 137-39. erence for, 10, 53. Southard S. L. fiivors repeal of 4- Vining J. on removal, Swedea, Po- yearsMaw, 161 ; on removal, 170. land, 120, 121; on aggregating SpoUs, a military and bad word, 82, political knowledge (note) 177. 85, 86 ; definitions of; 207. Spoils, a pandemonium o^ 86, 87, Washington Geo. on officeseeking 88, 200, 201, 223. burdens, 29; maxim of, 32; on Sprague P. on effects of Jackson's national university, 32 ; lays the prescriptive policy, 170. foundation for civil service law. Statute, the civil service, 228-232. 91 ; solemn warning of, 225, 226. Stone M. J. removal, prophecy, civil Waters E. F. note, 176; civil ser- service rules, 148-152 ; cringing vices of British India and France, disposition requisite for an office 182, 184; letter from, 185. held at will and pleasure, 151. Webster D. on legislative powers Storey J. opinion o^ 24; on remo- (note) 20; maxim o^ 36; public val, 1 64 ; solemn warning ofj 225. virtue the principle of republican Sumner C. bill oC 7, 202. governments (note) 40 ; depreca- Sumter T. removal and note on, 153. ted Irgh salaries (note) 64; pre- Sweden, civil service o^ 186-188; diction of (note) 79; criticises tyranny in (in 1789) 121, 143. Madison (note) 119; criticises de- Sylvester P. on removal, 135. cision on removal, 160; 4-years' Systems, civil service, none perfect, law, Jackson's nominations, evils 30. of patronage (notes) 162, 163. Webster W. H. letter from, 13. Tazewell L. W. on executive pow- Wheeler E. P. views of, 18. er, 175. White Alexander, on removal, 136. Tenure, advantage of security o^ 56. White H. L. on office-hunting, 172. Tenure of office law, &ilure o^ 115. Whitridge Fred. W. on the end of Thomas J. L. examinations by, 37. old Council of Appointment, 71. Thorbum John, letters from, 180-2. William III, election laws o^ 47-8. Tilden S. J. gift o( views of. 33, 94. William and Mary, election law of. Tree of Liberty, what wiU kill it, 41. 47. Trevelyan Su- C. (note) 18. Williams G. H. on decision of first Trumbull L. author § 1753 U. S. R. Congress on removal, 165. S. 7; bill o^ 58- on Lincoln, 85; WDlis A. S. ringing words o^ 216. on Johnson's removals (note) 86 ; Wilson Henry, conversation with on Sherman's revelations, 212; Lincoln, 213; on Fisher, 213. on evils of patronage, 214, 215. Wilson Justice, on patronage and TuckerT.T. on removal, 152; con- appointments, 110, 111; Wash- stitutional amendments, 152-53. ington on and maxim o^ 110, 114. Tyler J. on regulating and restrain- Windom Wm. on " beneficial influ- ing removal, 93 ; on * spoils,' 170. ences of civil service law," 213. Wise Henry A. on Van Buren, 79. Van Buren M. adroitness ot, 11; Woman suffrage (note) 110. on drawbacks of patronage, 79 ; Worcester J. E. on competition, 222. 240 PUBLIC OPINION. It is a work of lasting value. — New Haven PaUadiurru Tho iKKjk is one of the needs of the times. — Christian at Work. It appears to be a broad, thorough, able treatise. — CongregoHonalisL ' It leaves little to \>g wiid on the subject, eitlier for or against^ Boston Comnwnwealih. ^ It is a masterly defense of the principles of civil service reform. — Ihre Haute (//id) Gazette, -j This volume might well be called tlie civil service reformers' vade ' mecum. — Providence {R. J.) Journal. ^ The book is written with a full appreciation of the merits of the J subject. — New York Commercial Advertiser, The book is an armory of argument in favor of a proper system ; of government ser^'ice. — American Bookseller. It covers its subject with much conciseness and comprehensive- ness, and is a valuable presentation of the reform. — Boston Post < It is so thorough * * * that we commend it to all who are inter- ested in the subject as an authoritative treatise. — Indianapolis News, The work is of marked historical value, and is a powerful argu- ^ ment in favor of a national reform which is as yet largely a creature of the imagination. — Philadelphia Episcopal Recorder. This book gives an excellent presentation of the entire civil service reform discussion, being by no means, as its title would seem to in- dicate, confined to the law itself. — American Hebrew. It is an instructive volume, which will be a real armory for the supporters of civil service reform, and which will open the eyw of the opponents of the system. — CharUstmi (S. C.) Sunday Nenos, This book is full of information about the workings and the benefit of a practical civil service reform, and will prove a valuable hand- book to the student of political economy. — Manchester (N H.) Union. If any one doubts the benefits to be derived from a properly en- forced civil service law, or the necessity for such a law, he needs only to read this book to have his doubts removed. — Savannah {Go.) News. This book covers the field in a thorough and able manner. It gives evidence of great research, and its luminous pages will be highly appreciated by those who desire information upon this impor- tant subject. — St. Louis Republic. The "Power of Removal" is discussed with much ability. The extensive compilation of opinion, gleaned from the great men of the present and past, and representing botli sides of the question, is col- lected with untiring pains and research, and quoted with admirable feimess and generosity. — Public Opinion ( Washington and New York). It is a compact, well-filled, interesting, and timely volume, which I hope may have a large circulation. The information it contains and the principles it enforces should be a part of the possessions of every citizen who assumes to be fairly well informed concerning the poli- tics and government of tliis country. I congratulate you on havini; rendered a patriotic and useful public service. — Borman B. Eaton. * •—■-><■ . •^4-t.-^ ■••ji-<-'.«it«iiuifc«k^m«M««aMiMw«MaM^V LINCOLN AS AN 0FF1CE8EEKER. 239 "THE VORACIOUS DESIRE OP OFFICE." On page 84 of this work it is stated that '^ with Lincoln oflficeseeking was a disease/' The following eelf-explanatory matter, based on unimpeachable testi- mony, seems to prove that the statement is true. The facts developed are the result of what is known as the McClure-Nicolay controversy. On July 7, 1891, Col. A. K. McClure, editor of the Philadelphia Times, said that Lincoln was responsible for the nomination of Andrew Johnson for Vice-President in 1864. Mr. John G. Nicolay, in a dispatch to Mrs. Hamlin, sym- pathizing with her in her bereavement (Mr. Hamlin having died on July 4, 1891), denied the truth of Mc- Clure's statement. McClure, in self-defense, printed, in a series of articles, the following damnable facts. S. N. Pettis, ex-Congressman, ex- Judge, &c., says : Meadville, Pa., July 20, 1891. The Eon. A. K, McClure — Dear Sir: * * * On the morning of the meeting of the Baltimore Convention in 1864 * * * i called upon Mr. Lincoln in his study and stated that I called especially to ask him whom he desired put on the ticket with Uhn as Vice-President He leaned fwward^ and in a low hut distinct tone of voiccy said: *• Gov. Johnson of Tennessee^ In March 1889, I spent an hour witli Mr. Hamlin in Washington, Among other matters I casually mentioned the expression of Mr. Lmcoln the morning of the meeting of the Baltimore Convention, not. supposing for .a moment that it was anything that would surprise him. You can imagine my annoyance" at the remark it called out, which was : *' Judge- Pettis, I am sorry you told me that" Judge Pettis further says that, fearing Mr. Hamlin might question the accuracy of his memory, he sent him *'a published interview '^ with Col. McClure him- self, corroborating all that he (Pettis) had said, which elicited the following reply from Mr. Hamlin : . Bakoor, Mains, September 13, .1889. * * * Wten I met;. aad conferred with you in Washington, / 242 PATItlOTISM VERSUS OFFICESEBKING. the nomination for tlie office was actually offered to him by Lincoln, through Simon Cameron, at Fortress Monroe, about May 1, 18G4 Butler, in a letter to McOlure of July 14, 1891, not only sustains the latter in his controversy with Nicolay, but refers to an article that he wrote for the North American Review (Oct., ^85, p. 333), in which, addressing Cameron, he says :* Please say to Mr. Lincoln that while T appreciate with the liiUost sensibility this act of friendship and the compliment he i>aya me, yet 1 mnst decline. Tell him that, with the j)rospcct8 of the [njilitary] campaij^n, I would not qnit the field to be Vice-President, even witli liimself as President, unless (he said laupfhingly) he will give me bond with sureties in the full sum of his four years' salar}' that he will die or resign within three months afler his inauguration. Gen. Cameron corroborated the above in an inter- view with Mr. James Eankin Youngf in 1873, telling him, among other things, " how near Butler came to being President instead of Johnson.^' This interview as well as another with a Col. Burr was revised by Gen. Cameron. To Col. Burr he said : Oen. Butler positively declined to consider the subject (the vice- ]>resldency), saying that he preferred to remain in the military ser- vice, and he thought a man could not justify himself in leaving the army in time of war to run for a politic4il office (the same patriotic reply that he made to Chase's "prominent Treasury official.") Nicolay's dispjitch to Mrs. Hamlin was based on the following autograph letter of Abraham Lincoln. Nic- olay attended the Baltimore Convention as a spectator. Being in the dark, he could not comprehend Swett's nomination of Holt, Therefore he asked for and re- ♦This article, entitled "Vice-Presidential Politics in '64," was not written of Gen. Butler's own volition, but at the rei^uest of Mr. Allen 'niomdiko Rice, the then editor of the Review. Three weeks previous to Cameron's visit Butler was asked by ''a prominent Treasury offi- cial," who was "fully empowered by Mr. Chase," if. he would accept n nomination for the vice-presidency on a ticket wiik Chasa Wendell PhilHps favored Butler's nomination for President by the Cleveland Convention in '64, provided Gen. John C. Fremont was not nominated. f Brother of Jolm Russell Young; late Minister to China. LINCOLN DECEIVES NICOLAY. 243 coived the following information and imsinformation (Abraham Lincoln : a Jlistory, ix, 7S) : * Swctt is unquestionably all ri^'lit. Holt is a jr«XKl man, but I had not heard or thowjht of him for V. P. Wish mtt to inttrftre alKnit V. J*. Cannot interfere about platform. Conveniiou nnist judjjro ihv itself. The words about Swett are cnnning, to say the least, but the two statements iii italics are absolutely false. Lincoln not only lied to Nicolay in writing, but ho lied to him verbally also, for Nicolay, in his dispatcli to Mrs. Hamlin, says : *^ J/r. Lincoln'.'^ personal feel- ings ♦ ♦ ♦ were for Havilin's renominalion, as he coyifidentidlly expressed to me" On page Tl (above volume) Nicolay and Ilay say : For several davs before the Convention the President had been besieged by inquiries as to his personal wishes in repird to his as- sociate on the ticket. He Jiad per^istentty refwitd to yiue thn slightvist intimation of suck wish. If President Lincoln could have foreseen tliat his two honest and efficient private secretaries would in the future record in history the above shameful and humiliating blunder, he would have treated them with GommoQ fairness and courtesy, if nothing else. MORE TESTIMONY AND MORE DECEPTION. Lamon (pp. 498-500) says that " Col. Matheny al- leges that from 1854 to 18(30 Lincoln * played a sharp game * on the Christians of Springfield, ' treading their toes^ and saying: 'Come and convert me.'^' Lincoln feared that ''his popularity would suffer by an open * McCluro (in his paper) says that Swett made ITolt, who wjls an impossible candidate, a mere foil to divide and conquer the 8up)M)rtcrs of Hamlin. In his Lincoln and Men of War-Tinies (p. 110) ho sjiys tliat Swett wisely declared Holt to be his candidate as a foil to protect Lincoln. Ho also says that of all living men Swett was the one most tnisted by Lincoln. Nicolay and Hay call him one of X'incoln's most intimate "friends (ix, 72). Gen. Sickles (late New York State Civil Sel Statortl He has already exercised this dictutorial nsurpatiou in Louisiaiiii, and lie defeated the bill to pre- vent its liniitiition. [Lincoln's order to Gov. Hahn is here cited.] Tlie President's puriMjso to instruct his Military Governors " to proceed aceonlinjr to the bill " — a makeshift to calm tho disappoint- ment its defeat has occasioned — is not merely a grave usurpation, but a transjMirent delusion, lie cannot *^ proceed according to the bill" after proventiuj^ it from becoming a law. Whatever is done will be done at his will and pleasure, by persons responsible to no law, and more intcrcsiod to secure the interests and execute tho will of the President tliun of the people ; and the will of Congress is to be " Jield for naughty " unless tlie loyal people of t)ie rebel States choose to adopt it!" The President is warned that the authority of Coi> gress is paramoTiiit and must be respected ; that he must obey and execute, not make the laws ; that he must leave political reorganization to Congress, &c.* Senator Zachariah Chandler (Nicolay-Hay, ix, 120) asked Lincoln if he intended to sign tho bill, saying the important point in it was the ^'one prohibiting slavery in the reconstructed States." Lincoln said : " That is the point on which I doubt the authority of Congress to act.'^ Cliandler : " It is no more than you have done yourself." Lincoln : " I conceive that I may, in an emergency, do things on military grounds which cannot bo done constitutionally by Congress.'* Thus was arrogance and a deliberate insult to Con- gress added to usurpation and lying, all of which was caused, to use Lincoln's own words, hy the voracious desire of office. *The Cleveland Convention tliat nominated Fremont for President and Gen. John Cochrane for Yice- President (May 31, 1864), passed this resolution : " That the question of the reconstruction of the re- bellious States belongs to the people, through their representatives in Congress, and not to the Executive." Both of the soldiers had the nobility to withdraw in favor of Lincoln on September 21. Fr^ mont, unfortunately for himself (for he afterward became a bankrupt), ])ad the nobility to resign his army commission after his nomination. Lincoln insulted Fremont in the army by superseding liim by Pope. LINCOLN'S INGRATITUDE AND I3fM0DESTY. 247 In a letter to Kichard S. Thomas of Virginia, 111. (Feb. 14, 1843), Lincoln says of his own "voracious desire of office " {fferndo7i*s Lincoln, ii. 267) : Now if you should hear any one say that Lincoln don't (sic) want to go to Congress, I wish you, as a personal friend of mine, would tell him you have reason to believe ho is mistaken. How Lincoln treated "a friend in need'' is thus told by both Lamon and Herndon : *'Bill Butler" was his friend, and he took him in with little ref- erence to board bills and the settlement of accoimts. According to Dr. Jayne lie "fed and clothed him for years;" and this signal ser- vice, rendered at a very critical time, Lincoln forgot wholly when he was in Congress and Butler wanted to be Register of the Land Office, as well as when ho was President of the United States. (Lu- men's Life of Lincolit, pp. 224, 225.) Lincoln boarded at Butler's house for several years. He became warmly attached to the family, and it is probable the matter of pay never entered Butler's mind. He was not only able but wUling to befriend the young lawyer in this and many other ways, (fferndon's Lincoln^ i. 185.) According to Herndon Lincoln himself applied for the position of Commissioner of the Land Office soon after the expiration of his term in Congress. Lincoln's immodesty is testified to by John Hay, who says {Herndon's Lincoln, iii, 616, 517) : He read very little. He scarcely ever looked into a newspaper unless I called his attention to an article on some special subject. He frequently said : " I know more about it than any of them." It is absurd to oill him a modest man. '*''*''*' It was his intellectual arrogance and unconscious assumption of superiority that men liko Chase and Sumner never could forgive. A part of Lincoln's Gettysburg funeral oration much resembles a part of Pericles^s celebrated funeral oration (the statesman Pericles aided by the historian Thucyd- ides). It is noteworthy, as showing the honesty of Ed- ward Everett, that he made and credited in his Gettys- burg oration a quotation from Pericles^a oration, viz. : *' The whole earth is the sepulcher of illustrious men.^* 248 WAS LINCOLN A PLAGIARIST? Linroln. Fourscore and seven yciira apo our tatiu'i's brought fortli on tins conthuMit ji new nation, conceived in Lil)erty, an«l doUicaled to the proposition tliat all men arc crea- ttMl equal. Now we are enpjijred in a proat civil war, testing whether that na- tion, or any nation so conceived and HO dedicated, can enthiro. "SVo arc met on a gr(?al battle-Ueld of that war. AVo are met to dedicate a IMjrtion of it Jis tlio (uial rcsting- pbico of tlioso who here gjive their lives that that nation miglit live. It is altogether fitting and pro{)er that we shouhl do this. lint in a larger Reuse wo CJinnot dedicate, we cannot consecrate^, wc c^mnot liallow, this ground. Tho bnive men, living and dead, who struggled here, hav(? consecmted it far above our power to add or de- tnict Tho world will little noto nor long rememl.H?r what wo wiy here, but il can never forget what ihev did here. It is for us, the liv- ing, nither to Ixj dedicated to tho untinished work tluit tliev have thus far so nobly carried on. It is nithcr for u3 to bo dedicated to tho great Uusk remaining iK'fore us, — that from these honored d«id w© tJike increased devotion to the cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion. — that wo here highly resolve that the dead shall not have died in vain, that the nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the l>eople. and for tho ))copIe, sliall not perish from the earth.* I Perides. . . . It wiia for such a coun- try then that these men, nobly re- solving not to havo it taken from them, fell fighting ; and every one of their survivors may well be will- ing to suffer in its behalC . . . With regard to the tilings for whicli I have commended tho city . [Athens], it was tho virtues of ' these men, and sudi us tliese, that adorned her with them ; and few ' of tho Greeks are there whose dime, like these men's, would ap- l>eiir but tho just counte^poiso of their deeds. . . . ^uch did these men prove tliem- . selves, as IxH-'amo tho character of their coinitrv. For vou that re- main, you must pray that you may have a moro succossful resolution, but must determine not to have ono less lK)ld against your ene- mies. . . . While coUectivelr m they gave her Uieir lives, individ- ually they received that reuown which never grows old, and tlio most distinguished tomb they could have; not so much tliut in whicli they aro laid, as that in which their glory is led behind thoiu, to bo everlastingly recorded on every oc- casion for doing so, either bj' word or deem time to time present itselC . . . Vying then with theso mon in your turn, and deeming happiness to consist in freedom, and freedom in valor, do not tliink lightly of the hazards of war — History of (he Peloponesian War, Dale's transla- tion, pp. 116, 116, 117. t * Lincoln, who seems to havo merely improved on Pericles, evi- dently tried to improve on Web.ster also. Webster expresses tlie aiK)ve idea thus (iii, 321) : " It is. Sir, the people's Constitution, tho ]>eople's Goveniment ; made for the people, made by tlio people, and answerable to the ]>eople.'' f Pericles was born about 495 B, C, Thucydide4 about 471 B. C. 84: LAMOK'S DARK PICTLRE OF LINCOLN. than was the rebellion.'^ Senator Sumner vouched for these words to Senator Schurz. Again, shortly before the fall of Richmond, Lincoln left Washington for City Point, Va., partly, he said, to be near the important military operations then in progress and partly to get away from the officeseekers. To the then Gen. Schurz, speaking of officeseeking, he said : ^^ I am afraid that thing is going to ruin republican government/^ And again. Ward H. Lamon says Lincoln said that if ever the government was overthrown, it would be caused by ** the voracious desire of office — this wriggle to live with- out toil, from which I am not free myself/^* * WitJi Lincoln oflRceseeking was a disease. Lamon says (" Life of Lincoln," pp. 237, 481, 483): "There is no instance where an important office seeniod to be within his reach and he did not try to get it. * * * Notwithstanding liis overweening ambition, he had not a particle of sym- pathy with the great mass of his Ibllow-cltizens who were engaged in similar scrambles for place. "When a candidate himself, he thought th(i whole canvass ought to be conducted with reference to his success. Ho would say to a man, ' Your continuance in the field injures me,' and be quite sure ho had given a iMjrfect reason for his withdrawal. He did nothing out of mere gratitude, and forgot tlie devotion of his warmest partisans as soon as the occasion for their services was past. What they did for him was quietly appropriated as the reward of superior mer- it, calling for no return in kind. * * * It was seldom that he praised anybody ; and when he did, it was not a rival or an equal in the stnig gle for popularity and power. No one knew better how to ' damn with feint praise,' or to divide the glory of another by being the first and frankest to acknowledge it His encomiums were sometimes mere stmt- agems to catch tlie applause he pretended to bestow. * * * Fully alive to tlie fact that no qualities of a public man are so Charming to the people as simplicity and candor, he made simplicity and cjindor the mask of deep feelings carefully concealed and subtle plans studiously vailed from all eyes but one." (See page 239.) Leonard Swctt says ("Hemdon's Lincoln," iii, 533, 534, 537): "In dealing with men ho was a trimmer, and such a trimmer the world has never seen. Halifax, who was great in his day as a trimmer, would blush by the side of Lincoln : yet Lincoln never trimmed in principlies ; SWETT AND TBUMBULL CORROBORATE LAMON. 85 A few moro words as to the patronage system. The doctrine that to the victors belong the spoils, which, as before said, was first practiced nationally in this country by President Jackson, has probably had its day. If it has, it is well. Like the doctrine itself, spoils is a bad word. It is synonymous with robbery, pillage, destruction ! It is suggestive of the days of it was only in his conduct witli men. lie used the patronage of his of- fice to feed the liungop of various factions. * * * lie used every force to the best possible advantage. Ife never wasted anything, and would always give more to his enemies than he would to his friends : and the reason was because he never had anything to spare, and in the close calculation of attaching tlie factions to him, he counted upon the ab- stract affection of his friends as an element to be offset against some gifl with which he must appease his enemies. Hence there was always some tnith in the charge of his friends that he failed to reciprocate their devotion with his favors. * * * Adhesion was what lie wanted ; if he got it gratuitously, he never wasted his substance paying for it ^^ One great public mistake of his cliaracter, as generally received and acquiesced m, is that he is considered by the people of tliis country as a frank, guileless, and unsophisticated man. There never was a greater mistake. Beneath a smooth surface of candor and apparent declanition of all his thoughts and feelings, he exercised the most exalted tact and the wisest discrimination. He liandled and moved men remotely as we do pieces upon a clicss-board. He retained through life all the friends he ever had, and he made tlie wrath of his enemies to praise him. This was not by cunning and intrigue, in the low acceptjition of tlio term, but by far-seeing reason and discernment He always told enough only of his plans and purposes to induce tlic belief that he had communicated all ; yet he reserved enough to have communicated nothing. He told all that Wixs unimportant with a gu»hiug frankness ; yet no man ever kept his real purposes closer, or penetrated tlie future furtlier witli his deep designs.'* Lyman Trumbull, in a letter of Oct 1, 1890, says : "I entirely agree in tlieir (Lamon and Swett's) statements as to the ambition, shrewdness, cunning, and reticence of Mr. Lincoln ; but I am not prepared to say that he was the trimmer Mr. Swett descriljes him to have been." * * * David Davis Siiys Uiat Lincoln was the most reticent, secretive man J 10 ever knew. Herndon describes his ambition as overflowing, restless. He says Swett's letter makes the Lincoln historical picture more hfe-like. All of the five men were Lincoln's personal as well as political friends. SKOOND KDITION, RKVISKD. CIVIL SERVICE LAW : A DEFENSE OF ITS PRINCIPLES, WITH CORROBORATIVE EVIDEN'CE FROM THE WORKS OF MANY EMINENT AMERICAN STATESMEN. BY WILLIAM HARRISON CLARKK. PREFACE. Tlie improvements in the revised edition of this work consist iu an Appendix, a new Index, tlie addition of fresh matter to al)Out 30 pap:es of the text, and the correction of a few errors. The Appendix possesses much historical vahie, for it contains perthient quotations from tlie works of many contemporary and recent aUUesnien not quoted in the ix)dy of the book. Tlie warning of Story and Washinji^ton concerning the dan- gers of party spirit, should be read and hooded by every Amer- ican. Parties, when they strive solely for principle, are the life of a nation ; but when they strive solely for pelf, patron- age, and power they are its death. Even corrupt party leaders may destroy a republic; sometimes even ambitious Iciiders may do so. Did a nation ever make a narrower escape than did our own during the slaveliolders' rebellion ? Who but ambitious i^irty leaders caused tliat rebellion ? Some truthful words concerning the crime of buying and selling votes have been added to page 52. This evil cannot be too soon remedied. Voters should be educated up to a higlier standard. The American who acknowledges any man as his politiciil " boss," at the polls or elsewhere, disgraces the name American. Independent voting and an educational test for voters are what is wanted The man who cannot both read and write the English language, should not Ije allowed to vote. This would supersede the necessity for the so-ctiUed Force Bill, for the rule would apply to blacks as well as whites. A few words concerning the crime of business men neglecting to vote would be an important addition to p^ige 52. The subject of civil service reform is still one of the greatest issues of the day. The Christian Register (Boston) truly says : *' We are yet on the threshold of this the most important rtfor- mation in American political history." * * * Rut the out- look is hopeful. If civil service reformers are as vigilant in the future as they have been in the past, ultimate victory is assured. A people who have the intelligence to discover their mistakes and tlie courage to correct them, are capable of self- government; otherwise they are not JUDGE STORY'S WARNING. " The fa to of other repubhcs, their rise, tlieir progress, their docHne, and their fall, are written but too legibly on tlie pages of liistory, if indeed they were not continually before us in the stjirtling fragments of their ruins. Those republics have per- ished, and liave perished by their own hands. Prosperity has enervated them ; corniption has debased them, and a venal populace Jias consummated their destruction. The people, al- ternately the prey of military chieftains at home, and of ambi- tious invaders fVom abroad, have been sometimes cheated out of their liberties by servile demagogues ; sometimes betrayed into a surrender of them by fiilse patriots, and sometimes they have willingly sold them for a price to the despot who has bid- den highest for his victims. They have disregarded tlie warn- ing voice of their best statesnien, and have persecuted and driven from office their truest friends. They have listened to the counsels of fawning sycophants, or base calumniators of the wise and the good. They have reverenced power more in its high abuses and summary movements tlian in its calm and constitutional energy, when it dispensed blessings with an un- seen but a liberal hand. They have surrendered to faction what belonged to the common interests and common rights of the country. Patronage and party^ Uie triumph of an artful popular leader, and the discontents of a day, have outweighed^ in their view, all solid principles and institutions of govern- ment. Such are the melancholy lessons of the past history of republics down to our own. [Switzerland is an ejccepUon.J " The besetting sin of repubhcs is a restlessness of tempera- ment, and a spirit of discontent at slight evils." (" Exposition of the Constitution," pages 247, 267.) WASHINGTON'S WARNING. '^ I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more com- prehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the banefiil effects of the spirit of party generally. '•This spirit unfortunately is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of tlie hunum mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed ; but in those of tlie popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is tnily their worst enemy. "" The alternate domination of one &ction over anoUier, sharp- ened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disor- ders and miseries which result, gradually incline the minds of ►l-- •■■•. -. men to seek security and repose in the absolute power ol" an individual ; and sooner or liiter the chief of some prevailinjr faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the pur^nxses of his own elevation — on the ruins of Public Liberty j * * * " It serves always to distnict the Public Councils and onlbe- ble the Public Administration. It agitates tlic Community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms ; kindles the animosity of one part against another; foments occasional riot and insur- rection. It opens tlie door to foreign influence and corniption, which find a faciliUvted access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another. " There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administmtion of the government and serve to keep alive the spirit of Liberty. Tliis, within certain limits, is probably true ; and in governments of a Monarchical cast. Patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character — in governments purely elective — ^it is a spirit not to -be encour- aged. From their natural tendency^ it is certain there will cUways be enough of that spirit fw every salutary purpose. And, there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a fiame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume." (" Writings," xii, 224.) PUBLIC OPINION. It is concise and comprehensive. — Boston Post It is a work of lasting value. — Neto Haven PaMadium. Doubters will find solace in its lessons. — Newark News. It is one of the needs of the times. — Christian at Work. It appears to be broad, thorough, able. — GongregaMonalist. It is forciWy and clearly written. — Sacramento Record- Union. It leaves httlo to be said on the subject, either for or against — Boston Commonwealth. It is a masterly defense of the principles of civil 8er\'ice re- form. — Terre Haute {Ind.) Gazette. Tins volume might well be called the civil service reformer's- vade mecum. — Providence {R, I.) JoumaL The book is written with a full appreciation of the merits of the subject — New York Commercial Advertiser. The book is an armory of argument in favor of a proper sys- tem of government service. — American Bookseller. It is so thorough, covering the ground so completely, that we oomitoend it to all who are interested in the subject as an authoritative treatise. — IndAanapoHs News. The contents are so Krou|)ed that any phase of the question may be conveniently referred to, making it of value to writers and siMJakers. — New Albany (Ind.) Ledyer. The law is shown to Ije in harmony with the utterances of loading statesincn of this country from the foundation of Uie government. — Los Atvjelas {Col.) Express. It is full of information about the workings and benefit of a practicjil civil service reform, and will prove a valuable aid to the student of ix)litical economy. — Manchester {N. II.) Union. The work is of marked historical value, and is a |)ow«rful argument in favor of a national reform which is as yet largely a creature of the imagination. — PJtiladdphia Episcojyal Recorder. This book gives an excellent prosenUition of the entire dvil service reform discussion, being by no means, as its title would seem to indicate, confined to the law itselfl — American Hebrew. It is an instructive vohnne, whicli will be a real armory for the supporters of civil service reform, and which will open the eyes of the opponents of the system. — Charleston (S. C.) News. If any one doubts the benefits to be derived from a properl3' enforced civil service law, or the necessity for such a law, lie needs only to read this book to have his doubts removed. — Sor- vannah {Ga.) News. Tliis book covers the field in a thorough and able manner. It gives evidence of grciit research, and its luminous pages will be highly appreciated by those who desire information on this important subject — aS^. Louis Republic. The author recites the points of the English election laws from 1275 to 1883, and sketches the civil service svstems of England, Canada, British India, Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, and China. — Utica (N. Y.) Herald. Every phase of the subject is treated with convincing logic. The " power of removal " is discussed with much ability. The extensive compilation c^ opinion gleaned from the great men of the present and past, and representing both sides of the question, is collected with imtiring pjiins and research, and quoted with admirable fairness and generosity. — Public Op?7i- ion ( Washington and New York). It is a compact, well-filled, interesting, and timely volume, which I hoi)e may have a large circulation. The information it contains and the principles it enforces should be a part of the possessions of every citizen who assumes to be fairly well in- formed concerning the politics and government of this coun- try. I congratulate you on having rendered a patriotic and useful public service. — Dorman B. Eaton. Cloth. $1. CHARLES T. DILLINGHAM, . Publisher, 718 and 720 Broadway, New Yorit Gi^ J ^UN 1 S 1954 FLEX Bm \